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H – 1157

International Court of Justice

H1157 - 0002

# CONSOLIDATED LIST OF DOCUMENTS FOR DOCUMENT BOOK 7.

## KEITEL AND JODL.

| Doc.No. | Exhibit No. | Doc Book | S/N Ref. | Date. | Description | Included in briefs on Keitel | Jodl |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PS-137 | | V | 1673 | 5.7.40 | Keitel Directive on search of State Libraries. | + | - |
| PS-138 | | | | 17.9.40 | Keitel's authority for Rosenberg to remove cultural goods | + | - |
| PS-375 | US.84 | O | 752 | 25.8.38 | Plan for Low Countries. | + | - |
| PS-388 | US.26 | L | 755-807 | 1938 | Fall Grün File. (Items 1,2,5,8,11, 14,17,19,21,22,24,20, 31,32,34,36,37,38, 39) | + | + |
| PS-440 | GB 107 | 4 | 1115,6 | 20.11.39 | Directive No.8 signed Keitel. | + | - |
| PS-444 | GB 116 | I | 1166 | 12.11.40 | Directive 18. Preps for occupation of Greece. Initialled Jodl | - | + |
| PS-446 | US 31 | L | 382, 1170 | 18.12.40 | Directive No.21 for Barbarossa Initialled Keitel, Jodl. | + | + |
| PS-447 | US 135 | P | 1175, 1189 | 13.3.41 | Keitel Directive for Special Areas (Barbarossa) | + | - |
| PS-448 | GB 118 | 5 | 1135 | 11.1.41 | Hitler Order No. 22 on Albania Initialled Keitel, Jodl. | + | + |
| PS-498 | | | | 18.10.42 | Führer Order on Commandos | + | + |
| PS-503 | | | | 19.10.42 | Jodl Letter supplementing above. | - | + |
| PS-537 | | | | 30.7.44 | Keitel Directive | + | - |
| PS-551 | | | | 26.6.44 | Keitel Directive on Commandos, initialled J. | + | + |
| PS-553 | | AA | | 4.8.42 | Keitel Directive; Parchutsists to SIPO and SD. | + | - |

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| Doc.No. | Exhibit No. | Doc Book. | S/N Ref | Date | Description | Included in briefs on Keitel | Jodl |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PS-556 | US 194 | R | 1309 | 8.9.42 | Order for civilians to work on "West Wall" initialled K. | + | - |
| PS-743 | | | | 5.9.44 | Keitel Directive Economic evacuation of Eastern Territories. | + | - |
| PS-789 | US 23 | L | 275,931. | 23.11.39 | Führer's speech to all Military Commanders | - | + |
| PS-795 | GB 54 | 2 | 1023 | 17.8.39 | Keitel's conference re giving Polish uniforms to Heydrich | + | - |
| PS-865 | US 143 | P | 1196, 1199. | 25.4.41 | Jodl appointed OKW representative for liaison with Rosenberg on Eastern Territories. | + | + |
| | | | | | Correspondence Lammers, Rosenberg and Keitel re Eastern Territories | | |
| PS-870 | | | | Nov.44(?) | Keitel's correspondence with Turboven on anti-sabotage measures | + | - |
| PS-872 | US 134 | P | 1172,3 | 3.2.41 | Conference on Barbarossa. Keitel and Jodl present. | + | - |
| PS-874 | | | | 9.3.41 | Draft letter to Todt on Deception measures initialled K and J | + | + |
| PS-886 | | | | 13.5.41 | Keitel Order on ruthless treatment of Civilians; Initialled Jodl. | - | + |
| PS-1039 | US 146 | P | 1204, 1208 | 28.6.41 | Report on Admin problems of USSR, conference with Keitel. | + | + |
| PS-1229 | US 130 | P | 1164 | 6.9.40 | sgd. Jodl. Activity in the East must not give USSR impression of an offensive. | - | + |
| PS-1292 | US 225 | R | 1373, 1389 | 4.1.44 | Sauckel to get 4,000,000 workers from occupied territories | + | - |
| PS-1456 | US 148 | P | 1215,16 | 20.6.41 | Thomas' memo; Keitel consulted re resources USSR | + | - |

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| Doc.No. | Exhibit No. | Doc Book. | S/N Ref | Date | Description | Included in briefs on Keitel | Jodl |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PS-1519 | | | | 8.9.41 | Reinecke order re Russian Ps.W. | + | - |
| PS-1541 | GB 117 | 5 | 1134 | 13.12.40 | Directive No.20 for Greece copy to OKW | + | + |
| PS-1590 | | | | 1.10.41 | Keitel Directive on shooting of hostages | + | - |
| PS-1642 | | | | 1.3.41 | Secret Map OKW, (Distribution List) | + | + |
| PS-1666 | US 208 | R | 1338 | 21.3.42 | Decree appointing Sauckel signed K | + | - |
| PS-1746 | GB 120 | 5 | 1138, 1143 | 27.3.41 | Conference Hitler, Keitel, on Yugo-slavia. Jodl present. | + | + |
| PS-1775 | US 73 | N | 558 | 14.2.38 | OKW proposals: False rumours etc. | + | + |
| PS-1780 | US 72 | N | 556, 749-75, 1157 | 4.2.37 22.8.39 | Jodl's Diary | + | + |
| PS-1809 | GB 88 | 3 | 1080 | 1 Feb to May 40 | Jodl's Diary | + | + |
| PS-1915 | | X | 1695 | 4.2.38 | 1938 Pt.X L.III RGB | + | - |
| PS-2018 | | C | | 30.8.39 | 1939 RGB Pt. X L 1539. | + | - |
| PS-2031 | | X | 1697,8 | 4.2.38 | 1938 RGB Pt. I L 112. | + | - |
| PS-2194 | US 36 | M.C | 410 | 4.9.38 | R.Defence Law para 10 | + | - |
| PS-2329 | GB 105 | 4 | 1114 | 7.10.39 | Order by C in C Army | + | - |
| PS-2798 | US 118 | O | 911-17 | 15.3.39 | Conference Hitler, Hacha: K present | + | - |
| PS-2865 | US 16 | | 255 | | Statement by Jodl | - | + |
| PS-3019 | | | | | Das Archiv Vol 18 L860. | + | - |
| PS-3020 | | | | | Das Archiv Vol 76 L386. | + | - |

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| Doc No. | Exhibit No. | Doc. Book. | S/N Ref | Date | Description | Included in briefs on Keitel | Jodl. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-2 | US 90 | O | 766 | 1.10.38 | OKW Directive for counter-propaganda in cases of violation of International law. | - | + |
| C-6 | | | | 30.12.39 | Order signed Keitel for intensified sea and air measures | + | - |
| C-10 | GB 108 | 4 | 1116 | 28.11.39 | Keitel Order for 7th Flieger Div | + | - |
| C-39 | US 138 | P | 1180 | 6.41 | Timetable for Barbarossa signed Keitel | + | + |
| C-48 | | | | 30.11.44 | Keitel's Directive against relatives of saboteurs | + | - |
| C-50 | | | | 13.5.41 | Keitel's Directives for ruthless action | + | - |
| C-51 | | | | 27.7.41 | Keitel's Order for destruction of C50 | + | - |
| C-52 | | | | 23.7.41 | Keitel's Order for terror methods | + | - |
| C-59 | GB 121 | 5 | 1138 | 19.2.41 | Order by Warlimont (Jodl's Deputy) for Marita | + | + |
| C-62 | GB 106 | 4 | 1115 | 9.10.39<br>15.10.39 | Directive No.6 by Hitler.<br>Directive by Keitel | + | - |
| C-63 | GB 87 | 3 | 1079 | 27.1.40 | Keitel sets up planning staff for Norway | + | - |
| C-64 | GB 86 | 3 | 1076 | 12.12.39 | Raeder's report on meeting, Jodl present, Keitel present | + | + |
| C-72 | GB 109 | 4 | 1117 | 7.11.39 to 9. 5.40 | Postponement for D-Day for Fall Gelb, signed K & J. | + | + |
| C-75 | US 151 | Q | 1227 | 5. 3.41 | OKW Order No.24 re Japan, initialled Jodl, signed Keitel | + | + |
| C-78 | US 139 | P | 1170, 1183 | 9.6.41 | Schmundt's Order convening Conference on Barbarossa on 14.6. Jodl and Keitel to participate | + | + |

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| Doc No. | Exhibit No. | Doc. Book | S/N Ref | Date | Description | Included in briefs on Keitel | Jodl. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-102 | US 74 | N | 560 | 11.3.38 | Hitler's Order initialled by Jodl and Keitel | + | + |
| C-103 | US 75 | N | 561 | 11.3.38 | Directive signed by Jodl on conduct towards Czech or Italian troops in Austria | + | + |
| C-120A | GB 41 | 2 | 997 | 3.4.39 | K Directive for Fall Weiss | | |
| C-123 | | | | 7.10.41 | Jodl Order on Leningrad | - | + |
| C-126 | GB 45 | 2 | 1005 | 22.6.39 | K Directive for camouflage of Fall Weiss | + | - |
| C-134 | GB 119 | 5 | 1137 | 19/20.1.41 | Jodl's report of conference Hitler and Mussolini, Keitel present | + | + |
| C-136 | US 104 | O | 807 | 21.10.38 | Directive counter-signed by Keitel | + | - |
| C-137 | GB 33 | 2 | 988 | 24.11.38 | Supplement to above signed Keitel | + | - |
| C-138 | US 105 | O | 808 | 17.12.38 | Supplement to above signed Keitel | + | - |
| C-148 | | | | 16.9.41 | Keitel Order 50-100 communinists for one German soldier | + | - |
| C-152 | GB 122 | Q | 1230, 1249 | 18.3.41 | Meeting. Raeder, Hitler, Keitel, Jodl | + | + |
| C-167 | GB 122 | 5 | 1139 | 18.3.41 | Report by Raeder on conference with Hitler. Keitel, Jodl present | + | + |
| C-182 | US 77 | N | 576 | 11.3.38 20.45 | Directive from Supreme Commander Armed Forces, initialled Jodl | + | - |
| C-194 | US 55 | M | 461,2 | 6.3.36 | Order for Air Recce during re-occupation Rhineland | + | - |

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| Doc No. | Exhibit No. | Doc Book | S/N Ref | Date | Description | Included in briefs on Keitel | Jo. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EC-177 | US 390 | K,X | 1699 | 22.5.33 | Minutes of R.D.C working committee | + | - |
| EC-194 | US 214 | R | 1343,4 | 31.10.41 | K Directive. USSR Ps.W for War Industries | + | - |
| EC-338 | | | | 13.9.41<br>23.9.41 | Keitel's note on Canaris objection to PS 1519 | + | - |
| EC-405 | | K | | 26.6.35 | 10th Meeting Working Committee Reich Defence Council Jodl speaks | - | + |
| EC-406 | | | | 6.12.35 | 11th Meeting Reich Defence Council | + | + |
| EC-407 | | | | 14.5.36 | 12th " " | + | - |
| L-79 | US 27 | L | 359,408, 930, | 23.5.39 | Conference attended by Keitel and Jodl's Deputy Warlimont | + | + |
| L-90 | | AA | | 12.12.41<br>2.2.41 | Keitel Nacht u Nebel Directive | + | - |
| L-158 | | | | 28.3.44 | SIPO Orders re Russian Ps.W | + | - |
| L-172 | US 34 | M | 403-7, 930, 1161 | 7.11.43 | Jodl's Lecture | - | + |
| L-211 | | | | 19.4.38 | OKW Circular. (App. only.) | + | - |
| UK-20 | | | | 26.5.43 | Keitel Order on treatment of De Gaulleists | + | - |
| UK-57 | | | | 4.1.44<br>21.4.44 | Keitel Directives on Commandos | + | - |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 137-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2850/40 secret Adj. Chief OKW

(Please indicate above file number, the date and
short contents in the answer)

Berlin W 35, 5 July 1940
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone: Local 218191
Long distance 218091

To the Supreme Commander of the Army,
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in Holland.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg has requested from the Fuehrer to have:

1) The State libraries and archives searched for documents (Schriften) which are valuable for Germany.

2) The chanceries of the high church authorities and lodges searched for political activities which are directed against us, and to have the material in question confiscated.

The Fuehrer has ordered that this plan should be complied with and that the Secret State police - supported by the keepers of the archives of Reichsleiter Rosenberg - should be entrusted with the research. The Chief of the Security Police, SS Lt. General Heydrich, has been notified; he will get in touch with the responsible military commanders to carry out this order.

This measure should be carried out in all the territories of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France which are occupied by us.

It is requested that the subordinate agencies should be notified.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

(Signed) KEITEL

To Reich leader Rosenberg
Copy for information
(Signed) Illegible

Captain (Rittmeister) and executive officer.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 137-PS

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt. (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 137-PS.

Willard E. Skidmore
Lt. (jg), USNR
391590

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 138-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Berlin W 35, 17 Sept 1940
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel: 21 81 91

2 f 28.14 W.Z. No. 3812/40 g

TO the
Chief of Army High Command for the Military Administration
in Occupied France.

In supplement to the order of the Fuehrer transmitted at the time to Reichsleiter ROSENBERG to search lodges, libraries and archives of the occupied territories of the west for material valuable to Germany, and to safeguard the latter through the Gestapo, the Fuehrer has decided:

The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the declaration of war on 1 September 1939, shall be the criterion.

Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers completed after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid (for example, Polish and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions of the Palais ROTHSCHILD or other ownerless Jewish possessions). Reservations regarding search, seizure and transportation to Germany on the basis of the above reasons will not be recognized.

Reichsleiter ROSENBERG and/ or his deputy Reichshauptsellenleiter EBERT has received clear instructions from the Fuehrer personally governing the right of seizure; he is entitled to transport to Germany cultural goods which appear valuable to him and to safeguard them there. The Fuehrer has reserved for himself the decision as to their use.

It is requested that the services in question be informed correspondingly.

signed: KEITEL

For information:
Attention: Reichsleiter ROSENBERG

certified true copy
Berlin 15 December 43
(Dr Zeiss

Rosenberg special
purpose staff seal

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 138-PS

11 November 1945

I, FRED NIELBERGALL, 2nd Lt, Inf, O-1335567 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 138-PS.

FRED NIELBERGALL
2nd Lt, Inf
O-1335567

H1157 - 0009

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 138-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C O P Y

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Berlin W 35, 17 Sept 1940
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel: 21 81 91

2 f 28.14 W.Z. No. 3812/40 g

TO the
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certified true copy
Berlin 15 December 43
(Dr Zeiss

Rosenberg special
purpose staff seal

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 138-PS

11 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt, Inf, 0-1335567 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 138-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt, Inf
0-1335567

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PS 375

General Staff of the 5th Section
(German Air Force)
(Genstb. 5. Abteilung)
No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2)
For Commanders only (CHEF-SACHE)

Berlin, 25 August 1938

2 copies
2nd copy

THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY

TOP SECRET

Subject:- Extended Case Green (GRUEN - code for Czechoslovakia)
Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.

A) Initial Political Situation:

1) The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green.

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured.

2) The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western Powers.

3) It is not expected for the moment that other states will intervene against Germany.

The Dutch-Belgian area assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.

4) The United States of America will immediately support the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.

5) Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan are regarded as benevolent neutrals.

B) Initial Military Situation:

1) The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance only in the case of an unprovoked attack. At least an agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved. If only for political reasons we have to consider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In case of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.

2) It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities will only take place after the French armed forces have been tactically deployed. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day. This to
a) use the deployment as a means of political pressure,
b) and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.

3) The war aim of the Entente Powers is to be considered as the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other words through a long war.

4) The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:

a) to man and hold the Maginot Line.
b) to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr territory.

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All suppositions support the first alternative.

5) The French Air Force will probably attack both economic and German Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.

6) The French Navy will probably cooperate through operations with the British sea power to supplement the North Sea blockade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean.

7) The British Air Force is assumed to be committed from English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.

A camouflaged aircraft reporting network in Belgium and the Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be transferred to France.

8) Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground organizations during the course of the war at least by part of the attacking British Air Forces.

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving advanced elements of the air defences of London (light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.

9) Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active participation of Soviet Russia will be largely restricted to the prosecution of the war in the Baltic.

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as possible.

10) The basic assumption in respect to our own prosecution of the war is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers.

C) Task of the German Air Force:

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.

D) Enemy War Plane Forces

1) The French Air Force will have on the 1st October some 640 war planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy.

It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at

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the beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets (air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipments.

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia.

2) The British war plane force will consist of some 850 war planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally serviceall in the face of modern defences.

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations are not in a position to carry on a vigorous air war from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war planes need be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected at the earliest, after several weeks of war.

If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area becomes probable.

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft need not be reckoned with:

a) because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed to fit them for specific naval tasks;
b) because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do not exist in this instance.

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.

E) Enemy Aircraft Industries:

1) The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the expansion of French military aircraft industry during the years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Force. It must be assumed that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.

A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be expected from spring 1939 on.

2) In Great Britain existing plants have been extended since 1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried out by 1941.

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Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft of all types (commercial and military aircraft) a month. It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range reconnaissance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.

3) North American aircraft industry (United States and Canada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place, but is possible. A possible expansion would have no practical effects in 1939.

250 aircraft of all types (commercial and military) a month for the home and foreign market may be stated as the present production rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.

4) Position with regard to preparation of target data:

1) It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the following target data for France:

a) Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, airforce fueldumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.

b) Fuel Supply.
100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).

c) Ammunition Supply.
An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.

d) Power Supply.
All the large power plants are included.

e) Key Industries.
In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.

f) Targets in the Paris area.
An adequate number of targets for attacks on Paris proper have been included.

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets, are accumulating currently.

In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.

2) Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.

As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).

These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.

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Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September.

3) The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Belgium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.

4) In General it must be emphasized that contrary to Czechoslovakia there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.

G) Recommendations for our own Prosecution of the Air War.

1) A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitments of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.

2) From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.

3) As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.

4) As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.

Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.

Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a breakthrough or outflanking.

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:

a) against transports, troop concentrations and movements,
b) against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed forces in great numbers.

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications, a further measure would be to concentrate fighter forces scattered in the West on the decisive ground front.

Attacks against objectives in the British Isles are to be regarded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.

Should the enemy remain on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements arrive.

5) As soon as strong forces are freed for the prosecution of the war

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in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at reaching a decision.

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:

a) Fuel refineries and dumps;
b) gunpowder and high explosive factories, main ammunition depots and ammunition depots;
c) the most important parks handling imports which are also centres for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.

Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable degree.

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.

No large-scale operations against targets in the British Isles could be carried out in addition to this task.

Everything should however be prepared to make reprisal attacks against London possible at any time.

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London success in such attacks is only likely if strong forces are committed.

In addition occasional harassing attacks against targets in South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.

6) Should still stronger war plane forces - at least 3 air forces - be available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against the food supply of Great Britain, notably of London. It must however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air attacks.

H) Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy:

1) The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and possibly against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system.

2) The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot line itself and accessible to air attack.

3) The Navy should hamper imports through the French Atlantic Ports to as great an extent as it compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.

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4.) Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.

signed: For: WOLTER

1 inclosure

Distribution:

Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)
1. Copy with 1 inclosure
2. Copy with 1 inclosure

H1157 - 0018

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

(pencil note)

S.O. Only

"FALL GRÜN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

H1157 - 0019



ITEM 1

<u>- - - ? of the Fuehrer</u>: (semi-illegible)

1). Does MUSSOLINI regard his work as completed or not.

a). if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia West then wait and see. "Return with the bag empty."

b). if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2). MUSSOLINI, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with that.

3). Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4). Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5). State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:

a). Deliveries of ores: France -- 600,000 tons
Germany - 2 million tons.

b). Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launching not for 2 years.

c). Out of date air force equipment.

6). <u>No</u> general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.

7). Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8). Replacement of officers doubtful.

* * *

Schm

(M. Schmundt's writing and initialled by him)

ITEM 2

S.O. Only

Berlin, 22 April 1938

BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General KEITEL of 23 April:

A. Political Aspect

1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. Military Conclusions

1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2) and 3). Case 2). is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3). "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force is to support the individual columns. (e.g. divebombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4). Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army.(e.g. via Pi past Pr) (Pilsen, Prague).

5). If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.



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H1157 - 0021



C. Propaganda

1). Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).

2). Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm

(initialled by Schmundt)

Written by an officer

H1157 - 0022

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 2

22 April

A). POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1). Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2). Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3). Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B). MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1). Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in/a direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe, cooperation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.)

2). "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstance. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via ELISEN. Hamper mobilization.

3). Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a). in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b). but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle : Create Accomplished Facts so that

a). help comes too late - other powers do not intervene

b). Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)

c). State collapses from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans
Threats to others

Submit: 1). Fortifications (strength in detail)

2). Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.

H1157 - 0023



ITEM 5

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 20 May 1938
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Tirpitzufer 72.76
L Za No. 33/38 S.O. Only

S O. Only Schm (initialled by
access only through Officer Schmundt)

My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer

(signed) Keitel

H1157-0024



ITEM 5 written by an officer

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only Berlin, 20 May 1938

MOST SECRET
S. O. Only
access only through officer

DRAFT

for

3 Copies
1st Copy

THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"

(Provisional) - pencil note

1). Political Prerequisites:

It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2). Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:

An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a). after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b). by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

b). is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3). Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen";
which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a). and 2 b)..

a) For Armed War it is essential to create-- already in the first 4 days - a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b). The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand,

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give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c). The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed War. I myself will determine the date.

Z (initialled at end by Zeitzler)

For paragraphs 4)., 5)., and 6). see under ITEM 11

H1157 - 0026



ITEM 8

1). INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE-ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2). INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A). THE FUEHRER; IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1), HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANOEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B). THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST

(NOTE FOR K KPT V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1). AND 2). AFTER USE)

H1157 - 0027



ITEM 11

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L I

Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy

S.O. Only

3 Copies
1st Copy

Access only through Officer

Written by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directivesmust be expected during the next few weeks.

by order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

1 Appendix

sgd. Keitel

To: C-in-C Army — Copy 1

C-in-C Navy — Copy 2

C-in-C Air Force — Copy 3

OKW Section L — Copy 4 - 5

Certified a true copy

Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

H1157-0028



ITEM 11

MOST SECRET

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S. O. Only L Ia
dated 30.5.38.

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Written by an Officer

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Access only through Officer

## II. Two front war with main effort in the South East (strategic concentration "Gruen")

1). Political Prerequisites.

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorabe opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2). Political Possibilites for the Commencement of the Action.

The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a). suitable obvious cause and, with it
b). sufficient political justification,
c). action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceeding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part - which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent - before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

3). Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a). For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland

H1157 - 0029



ITEM 11

and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially in France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b). The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4). Tasks of the Armed Forces.

Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a). The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b). For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c). The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force* before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

*For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.*

5). Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces

a). Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or

(* - * passages between asterisks occur only in this version not in Item 5)

H1157 - 0030



ITEM 11 (cont.)

airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of *frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen". *Independent of this, a first security garison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia, are to the Reich only weakly protected. But, alway depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

b). Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see 5c) The most important task of the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army and agains the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the direction of the government and Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial successes of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout BERLIN, the central German industrial area and the RUHR area,* and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c). Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the DANUBE-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

H1157 - 0031



ITEM 11 (cont.)

is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, be avoided.

6). Tasks of the War Economy:

In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war- economic strength - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works instalations - insofar as military operations permit - can be of decisive importance to us.

7). *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.*

signed ADOLF HITLER

Certified copy

signed Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

ITEM 14

L I a

Berlin, 18 June 1938

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

1. DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE

(1st copy)

In three parts.



H1157 - 0032

H1157 - 0033



ITEM 14 MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

Written by an officer.

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

PART I

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the armed forces must cover:

a) thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b) Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c) Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See part 3.

d) Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

H1157-0034



ITEM 14

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offered without any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the overeagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K (Initialled by Keitel)

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1157-0035



ITEM 14

Written by an officer MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

S. O. only

Access only through officer

Part 2

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1. Action against Czecho-Slovakia ("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S. O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special matters, Administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West ("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for the Navy in "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

J
K (Initialled by Keitel and Jodl)

H1157-0036



ITEM 14

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

MOST SECRET Berlin, 7 July 38

2 copies
1st copy

S. O. only

access only through officer

Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part 1, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" - contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a)

If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.

H1157-0037



ITEM 17

Chief Section L  Written by General Staff Officer

MOST SECRET

S.O. Only  Berlin, 24 August 1938

access only through Officer

1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provcation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numbrous manoouvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

H1157 - 0038



ITEM 17 (cont'd)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 26/8

Notes:

Submitted on 30.8

The Fuehrer will act on these lines.

On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8 Col. Jodl

(initialled by Jodl)

H1157 - 0039



ITEM 19

S. O. Only

MOST SECRET

DISCUSSION

Nuremberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.

Present: Fuhrer
General oberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below (?)

General Halder states reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia - Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of OLMUTZ and BRUUN to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz forces. Several defensive lines favorable by terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz retreat, and to retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps. Olumtz will be reached on the second day. OPPA is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. FREUDENTAL only 35 men garrison? So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist party of Mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the GLAZ mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9 ?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armies will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10th Army faces PILSEN RIEGEL which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. [illegible] must break through here and establish bridgeheads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.

H1157 - 0040



ITEM 19.

The Fuhrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuhrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

BRAUCHITSCH: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt(late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified

/s/ SCHMUNDT

Major on Gen. Staff

ITEM 20

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Nuremberg, 10 September 1938

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

TOP SECRET

1). The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2). The Chief of OKW decides on the First commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competeney he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3). For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

T 9.9

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reichsminister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danchwerts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Adwin Office (VOA)

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H1157-0041

H1157 - 0042



ITEM 21

Berlin, 14 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

12 Copies

Stamp
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938
Reg. No. 198/35
Despatched Schm
Clerk (initialled by Schmundt)

SUBJECT: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht.

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1). The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.

2). Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis. HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.

3). a). The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).

b). Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the Country's Kultur etc. will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls (AWJ) is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c). It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named in a). and b). above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

4). The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1. and 3 direct.

II). 5). Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6). The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.

H1157 - 0043



ITEM 21 (cont'd)

7). In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.

III). 8). Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe, in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed Keitel

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HOFMANN

Oberst (Reserve)

H1157 - 0044



ITEM 22

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 16 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia — 7 Copies
5th Copy

S.O. Only

19.9.38
Schm

Access only through Officer

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the LIMES-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed Keitel

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Major Schmundt

5

H1157 - 0045



ITEM 24

Berlin, September 16, 1939

MOST SECRET

30 Copies T 9.9
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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/ L IIc

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938,
Enclosures
Reg. No. 199138
Despatched
Clerk

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)

1). The following RAD forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

| | |
|---|---|
| From the area of the IInd Army Korps (.Ks) | 7 Battalions |
| IIIrd | 2 Battalions |
| IVth | 31 Battalions |
| Vth | 1 Battalion |
| VIth | 78 Battalions |
| VIIth | 1 Battalion |
| IXth | 65 Battalions |
| Xth | 84 Battalions |
| XIth | 33 Battalions |

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2). The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Jodl

Distribution:

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H1157 - 0046

Adj to the Fuhrer

(Note in pencil)

28/7
Schm.

Item 31

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin 27.9.1938

MOST SECRET — 1920 hours.

WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II — 45 copies
16th copy

The Fuhrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the TODT organization.

It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.

CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Signed. Keitel

Distribution: II.

C 000473

H1157 - 0047

Stamp:
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached
To the Führer and
Reich Chancellor
Recd. 3 Oct 1938
Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
cont.

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Item 32

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

Berlin 27 Sept 1938

Subject: Mobilization Measures:

Most Secret

To : The Deputy Führer via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of German Police Express
attn: S.S. Oberführer. 47 copies
18th copy

As a result of the political situation the Fuhrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organisations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:

1) The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.

2) Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School KREISCHWITZ - SILESIA).

3) Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organisations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL

Further:
Distribution II

H1157-0048



Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant initialed Schm.
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938

Reg. No.: 261/38 Most Secret

Item 34

Adj. to the Führer

Berlin, 28 Sept 38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a

45 copies
16th copy.

MOST SECRET

To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely onto the army, that is onto the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should -- in their own interests -- get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.

H1157 - 0049

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Reg. No: 260/38 Secret Schm.

Item 36

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, Sept 28, 1938
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

45 copies
16th copy

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Batallions subordinate to the C in C Army.

To : Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. MOST SECRET
(SS Central Office) (36 copies)

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia)

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office)

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Jodl

Further:

Distribution II

H1157 - 0050



L II b

Item 37

28.9.38.

MEMORANDUM

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:

Reichsfuhrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsfuhrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.

J. (initialled by Jodl)

H1157 - 0051



ITEM 38

Stamp = as usual
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET

Adjutant to the Führer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a

Berlin 30.9.38
1600 hrs

120 Copies
16th copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsführer-SS and the Chief of German Police.

It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsführer SS.

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.

2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz.Krone:

The following rate of exchange will apply for all translations and payments: 100 Cz.Kronen = 10.00 Marks (1 Cz.Krone = 10 Rpfg)

THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES

Distribution III
and Special Distribution
(including Henlein Volunteer Corps and Reichsführer SS through OKW/L II )

Keitel

H1157 - 0052



ITEM 39

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 265/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The fuhrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces

OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret
WFA/L I A

Most Secret
60 copies
16th copy

DIRECTIVE #1

Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.

1. The sectors separated from Cz will be occupied by the Armed Forces as follows:

The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to Oct 10.

The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.

2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West, Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.

The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation "Grun".

The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international committee.

a. Army: First of all the following units are available for the invasion:
Training Bn's.
Motorized and Armoured Units
Adolf Hitler 35 Bodyguard Regiment
I and II Bn's of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayen)
Henlein Free Corps
All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.

b. Air Force:
Those ground installations (including supply and signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the air defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Grun", in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under the command of the Army.

H1157 - 0053



ITEM 39

3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harrassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

KEITEL

Distribution: III

H1157-0054

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 440
PS
Office of U.S.Chief of Counsel

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

OKW/WFA No. 213/39

Top Secret, only for General
Officers, Dept. L (I)

Berlin, November 20 1939

8 copies only

Pencil Marks.

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Only for general officers
By officer courier only! (Stamped)

DIRECTIVE NO.8

FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1) The state of alert must be maintained for the time being to continue at any time with the deployment which has been initiated. Only in this way is it possible to take immediate advantage of a favourable weather situation.

The parts of the armed forces will make preparations so that the attack can still be stopped, even if the order for stopping the attack should arrive at the higher command only at A-day minus one at 2300 hours. The code word

"Rhein" ? = carry out attack

or

"Elbe" (= stop attack)

will be transmitted to the higher commands not later than at the above-mentioned time.

The supreme command of the Army and the supreme command of the Airforce are requested to report immediately after the designation of attack day to the Supreme Command of the Armed forces, department Airforce the hour at which the beginning of the attack is planned by mutual agreement.

2) Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended against Holland may be carried out without a special order when the general attack will start.

The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated ahead of time. Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the character of a peaceful occupation.

3) The operations on land are to be conducted on the basis of the deployment order of October 29th. The following statement will apply:

a) All arrangements are to be made, as soon to shift quickly the the main effort of the operations from Army group B to Army group A, in case faster and greater successes should develop at Army group A than Army group B, as one might well conclude from the present distribution of enemy forces.

b) At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Yrebbe-Hass line.

(1876)

4) Blockade measures against the Belgian and, contrary to earlier orders, also against the Dutch harbours and navigable waters are authorised for the navy, namely for submarines during the night before the attack and for surface fighting craft and airplanes from the time of the attack of the army. The span of time between the beginning of the blockade operations and the time of the attack on land, must however be kept as short as possible for the deployment of the submarines.

Battle actions against Dutch naval forces are authorized only, if they take a hostile attitude.

The navy will take over the artillery defence of the coast against attacks from the sea, in the coastal territories which are to be occupied. The preparations for that are to be made.

5) The missions of the airforce remain unchanged. They are supplemented by special orders, which the Fuhrer has given orally, about airborne landings and support of the Army in the seizure of the bridges West of Maestricht.

The 7th Airborne Division (7. Fl. Div) will be committed for the airborne operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert-Canal has been assured. The quickest transmission of this message is to be assured between the supreme command of the Army and the supreme command of the airforce.

Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without compelling military reasons, neither in the Dutch, nor in the Belgian - Luxembourgian area.

6) Shutting of the borders:

a) Until the beginning of the attack the traffic and news service across the border is to be maintained in its present size across the Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourgian border, in order to assure the moment of surprise. Until the beginning of the attack, civil authorities are not to participate in the preparations for a border closing.

b) With the beginning of the attack, the Reich border against Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg is to be blocked for all non-military traffic and news service across the border. The supreme commander of the army gives the orders in that respect to the military and civil offices concerned. With the beginning of the attack, the supreme Reich authorities concerned will be informed by the Supreme Command of the armed forces that the measures for the closing of the border are ordered directly by the Supreme Commander of the Army - and that this also applies to the Dutch border not in the area of operations.

c) On the other Reich Borders opposite neutral countries, there will at first be no restrictions in traffic and news service across the border after the beginning of the attack. Further measures which have been prepared for the supervision of the traffic of persons and news service will be put into force, if necessary.

BY ORDER OF:
signed, Keitel
authenticated: (illegible signature)
Captain.

1877

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I, 1st Lt. Seligson, A.U.S. Ord. O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 440-PS

Seligson
1st Lt. A.U.S
O-1558904

1878)

H1157-0057

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

WFSt/Abt.L(I) No.33 356/40 g.K.Chefs

Only by Officer

Fuehrer's Headquarters
12 November 40
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Directive No. 18

The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:-

1. Relations with France

The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power" :- she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the de Gaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on - apart from the current work of the armistice commission - entirely by the foreign office (Auswartiges Amt) in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW).

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.

2. Spain and Portugal

Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:

a) Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
b) The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:

Section I

a) Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.

b) Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.

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c) The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.

Section II

a) Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favourable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.

b) Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.

Section III

a) Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.

b) Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.

Section IV

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:

Army

The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominantly of a mobile nature.

Air Force

Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibralter to guarantee substantial success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.

Navy

Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of single coastal batteries.

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An Italian participation is not envisaged.

As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.

3) Italian Offensive against Egypt

If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Mersa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:-

Army

Holding an armoured division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).

Navy

Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.

Air Force

Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.

4) Balkans

The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.

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The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favourable treatment.

5) Russia

Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.

6) Landing in England

Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seelöwe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavour to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.

7) I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.

signed: ADOLF HITLER

initialled: Jodl

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OF DOCUMENT NO. 444-PS

15 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 444-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

H1157 - 0061

Translated from the German.

Form 46.

TOP SECRET.
FOR ARMY CHIEFS - To be dealt with by officers only.

The Führer and
Supreme Commander of the
Wehrmacht.

F. H. Q. 18. 12. 1940.

Instruction No. 21

Case BARBAROSSA.

The German Wehrmacht must be prepared, before the war with England is terminated, to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single rapidly conducted campaign (Case BARBAROSSA).

The Army, with this object in view, will employ every available unit after allowing, however, for due protection of the occupied territory against surprise.

The essential object for the Luftwaffe will be to set free for the Eastern campaign in support of the field army, sufficient strength to allow of our anticipating the conclusion of ground operations within a short period of time and to reduce the damage inflicted upon Eastern Germany by hostile attacks from the air to the smallest possible dimensions. The formation of this point of gravity in the East is conditional upon the affording of adequate protection to the whole of the fighting and armament area under our control against air attacks and the maintenance of offensive operations against England and especially against her import trade.

The main effort of the Navy, even during the Eastern campaign, will be directed against England.

I shall give orders for development against Soviet Russia to take place, if necessary, 8 weeks before the planned commencement of operations.

Preparations requiring more time must - if this has not already been done - be at once started and completed by 15. 5. 41.

The prevention of any discovery of our intention to attack is, however, of essential importance.

The preparations of the Supreme Command will be based upon the following principles:-

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1. General intention.

The main body of the Russian army grouped [illegible] in Western Russia must be annihilated in a series of bold operations in the course of which arrow-head formations of tanks will push far ahead and prevent the withdrawal of such bodies of troops as are still capable of fighting, into far distant Russian territory.

A line must be reached, by means of a rapid pursuit from beyond which the Russian Air Force cannot attack on home territory. The final object of our operations must be to protect ourselves against Asiatic Russia along a line running roughly from the Volga to Archangel. If necessary, Russia's last remaining industrial area, in the Urals will be levelled to the ground by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Fleet will soon lose its bases and thereby be put out of action.

Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force must be prevented at the outset of operations by a series of rigorous blows.

II Probable allies and their duties.

(i) The active intervention on our side on both wings of our armies by Roumania and Finland may be anticipated. The manner in and the extent to which the forces of these two countries will be under our orders, when they attack, will be agreed upon and determined by the Wehrmacht in due season.

(ii) Roumania's task will be, by means of the forces deployed by them, to hold the enemy engaging them and, in addition, to perform auxiliary duties on the lines of communication.

(iii) It will be the duty of Finland to cover the development of the German northern flank, landed from aircraft and coming from Norway (part of Group III). She will, furthermore, have to neutralise Hango.

(iv) It may be anticipated as possible that Swedish railway lines and roads will be available for the deployment of the German northern group, at the beginning of operations at any rate.

III Conduct of operations.

The Army (In approval of the reports submitted to me).

As regards the theatre of operations which is divided by the Pripet

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Marshes into a northern and southern half, the point of main effort will be formed in the northern part of this area. Two army groups must be provided here.

To the southern of these two army groups - centre of the entire front - faces the task of advancing with specially strong tank and motorized units into the area round and to the north of ORSHA (?) to rout the enemy strength in White Russia. Thus a basis must be made for turning strong parts of the enemy forces to the north in order, with the co-operation of the Northern Army Group from East Prussia operating in the general direction of Leningrad, to annihilate the enemy strength fighting in the Baltic area. Only after priority has been given to this most urgent task, which must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are the offensive operations to be continued for the capture of the important communications and armaments centre, Moscow.

Only an unforeseen swift and sudden collapse of the Russian powers of resistance could justify any attempt to strive simultaneously for both objectives.

The chief duty of Group XX remains as before to guard Norway during the operations in the East. Forces over and above those required for this task are to be employed in the North (Alpine Corps), first of all to guard the Petsamo area and its ore mines and the Polar Sea Road and afterwards, in conjunction with the Finnish forces, to attack the Murmansk railway line and prevent supplies from reaching the Murmansk area by the land route.

Whether an operation of this kind can be carried out by a strongish German force (2 - 3 Divisions) from the area of Rovaniemi and to the south of it depends upon the willingness of Sweden to place her railways at our disposal for a deployment of this kind.

It will be the task of the main Finnish army to conform its movements to those of the advancing German north wing and to hold by attack as large a Russian force as possible to the west and on both sides of the Lake and thus obtain possession of Hango.

The Army Group engaged to the south of the Pripet Marshes should direct its main activities against the area of Lublin, and generally speaking, the country in the direction of Kiev with a view to penetrating with

H1157-0064

strong motorized forces rapidly into the deep flank and in the rear of the Russian forces and eventually "rolling them up" along the Dnieper.

The German Roumanian group on the right flank will have the task of:

(a) protecting the territory of Roumania and incidentally this flank of the entire operation.

(b) While the offensive of the northern wing of the army group is in progress, of paralysing the opposing hostile forces and as it further develops, of pursuing them in conjunction with the Luftwaffe and preventing their orderly retreat across the Dniester.

In the north, Moscow must be reached rapidly. The capture of this town will be a success of decisive political and economic significance and will, in addition, neutralise the most important railway junction.

B. The Luftwaffe.

The Luftwaffe will have the task of paralysing and eliminating, as far as is feasible, the action of the Russian Air Force and of supporting the main operations of the army, especially those of the central army group and the decisive operations of the southern Army Group. Such Russian railways as are of operational importance will be cut or alternatively the most important neighbouring objectives (such as railway bridges over rivers) will be captured by parachutists and glider troops.

In order to ensure the employment of our utmost strength against the hostile Air Force and to afford immediate support to the Army the armament industries will not be attacked while the main operations are taking place. It will not be till after the conclusion of operations in the field that any idea of attacks of this nature, principally upon the Ural area can be entertained.

C. The Navy.

It will be the task of the Navy during the war against Soviet Russia, while ensuring the safety of our own coast, to prevent hostile naval forces from breaking out of the Baltic. As the capture of Leningrad will mean the loss of the last remaining base of the Russian fleet, which will then be in a hopeless predicament, operations on any considerable scale, should, in the meantime, be avoided.

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As soon as the Russian fleet is neutralised the essential task of the Navy will consist in keeping the Baltic open to maritime traffic to the fullest extent and also in ensuring the arrival by sea of reinforcements for the northern wing of the army (Mine clearing).

IV. Any dispositions to be made by commanders of troops in conformity with these instructions must bear unmistakable evidence of being precautionary measures to be taken in case Russia should change the attitude she has hitherto observed towards us. The number of officers to be detailed at the outset to carry out preliminary work must be restricted to a minimum and the assignment of future assistants be deferred to as late a date as possible; the latter, moreover, must only be taken into our confidence so far as is essential in view of their activities. Otherwise there is a risk of knowledge of preparations, the date of execution of which is not yet settled, being noised abroad and entailing both from the political and military points of view the most serious inconvenience.

V. I look forward to receiving reports from Commanding Generals as to their further intentions, having regard to these instructions.

The preparations contemplated by all branches of the Wehrmacht and the rate of progress of the same are to be reported to HQ of the Wehrmacht.

(Signed) : ADOLF HITLER

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

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Section L (IV/Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
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Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940

Directives for Special Areas

To Order #21

(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of Operations and executive power

1) The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 18 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2) The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a) The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c) As soon as th area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its geological basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

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3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.

a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4)
c) Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d) Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e) Traffic regulations.
f) Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4) The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rü Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/WiRüAmt.

5) The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.

6) The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7) Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8) As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him

shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10) Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights.

Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11) Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.
Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

12) Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
signed: KEITEL

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 447-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 301590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 447-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
301590

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H1157 - 0069

GB 118

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Fuehrer and Supreme of the Armed Forces.
OWK/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs

F. H. Q. 11th Jan
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Order No. 22

Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

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The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.

Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.

I order therefore, the following:

1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli. (starting approximately 20 February)

2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranian. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army groupof Graziani.

The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" (Sperrgebiet) in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air Corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.

3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.

The duty of the German forces will be:

(a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;

(b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:

To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,

To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.

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DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS

4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Arican and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.

5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.

Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

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F. H. Q. 29th Jan 41

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OKW/WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V.
11th Jan 41.

The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:

Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume"
Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

By Order
(Signed) Warlimont.

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| OKH/genistaff of Army, operations | | 1st cy |
| OKM/SKL | | 2nd cy |
| Ob. d. M./Lw Füst | | 3rd cy |
| OKW/WFST | | 4th cy |
| Section L | 5th to | 9th cy |
| WNV | | 10th cy |
| Foreign/Intelligence | | 11th cy |
| Armed Forces, Transportation Ch. | | 12th cy |
| German General with the Italian high Command. | | 13th cy |

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS.

17 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 448-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt. 33779426.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 498-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt

Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942

12 Copies
12th Copy

1.) For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2.) For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British a nd their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3.) I therefore order:

From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4.) If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5.) This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute a fter battles.

6.) I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and

H1157-0072

H1157 - 0073



officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

ADOLF HITLER

| Distribution: | Copy No. |
|---|---|
| O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army / General Staff of the Army) | 1. |
| O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy / Naval War Staff) | 2. |
| Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fü.St. (C in C Air Force / Air Force Operational Staff) | 3. |
| W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander, Norway) | 4. |
| W.B. Südost (Armed Forces Commander, Southeast) | 5. |
| Ob. West (C in C, West) | 6. |
| Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) | 7. |
| Ob. Süd (C in C, South) | 8. |
| Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) | 9. |
| Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police) | 10. |
| OKW/WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces / Armed Forces Operational Staff) | 11.-12. |

I, Mark S. Schafer, Pvt. 42090012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 498-PS.

MARK S. SCHAFER,
Pvt. 42090012.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

High Command of the Armed Forces.
No 55 1781/42 g. K. CHefs. W F St/Qu

F.H. Qu.,19 October 1942

Top Secret
By officer only

22 copies
21st copy

Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (OKW/West No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.

The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.

The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

By order of
Jodl

1 enclosure
(distribution list--over)

Distribution list:

General Staff of the Army - 1st copy
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" " " " " The Netherlands - 6th copy
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((GEB.) AOH 20) )
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Armed Forces propaganda section (PR) - 20th copy
Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive file copy - 21st copy

War Diary (KtC) - 22nd copy

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Top Secret
By officer only

The Fuehrer
and Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces

18 K

I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.

As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

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H1157 - 0075



territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps (Organisation Todt), the labor service, etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for days the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against these horrible as well as wily sabotage activities have failed, simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front and thereby the entire conduct of the war.

It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organise special units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS formations.

Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.

<u>In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part.</u>

As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and become purposeless.

Even though under a different name, England and America have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the activites of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:

1) to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of willing natives,
2) to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary weapons and explosives,
3) to undertake sabotage activites which by destruction of traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communications system.

Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole industries into idleness.

The consequences of these activites are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
Continued

that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activites.

England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.

If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.

This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.

The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.

I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and non-commissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances-when there is danger in delay-to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.

These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.

(signed:) A. Hitler

---

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 503-PS

26 November 1945

I, ARNE OLSEN, 2nd Lt.,AUS, O-2015976, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 503-PS.

ARNE OLSEN
2nd Lt.,AUS
O-2015976

H1157 - 0077

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

D R A F T.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht.

009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu.(Verw.1)

The Fuhrer"s Headquarters
30 July 1944.

TOP SECRET

re: Treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured together with partisans.

In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as speculated in the Special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not ot be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuhrer's order are the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW WFSt. 003830/42 g.Kdos).

This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being made record.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

KEITEL

Distribution:

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|---|---|
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| Staff RF Attention Major General and Major | |
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS

16 October 1945.

I. WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 537-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1157 - 0078

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT
OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1) Chef OKW -(in pencil)
of
(initial) J

26 June 1944
TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp)
5 copies
1st copy

Checked before Release) in pencil
Chef WFSt )

Remark 1) in pencil
OB. WFSt )

KR - Teletype

To
1.) Supreme Commander West
2.) Chief of Army General Staff
3.) OKL/Lw Fü. Stab
4.) OKM/1.Skl.
5.) Reichsführer SS - Command Staff
6.) Military Commander, France
7.) Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France
8.) Armed forces Commander, Netherlands
9.) OKW/WR
10.) Supreme Commander Southwest (in pencil).

Reference: 1.) Führer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 1942 OKW/WFSt
2.) Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/WFSt).

Subject: Treatment of Kommando Participants.

1.) Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Führer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct 1942 remains fully in force.

Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the Corps Commands, according to #5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, remain excempted.

2.) All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.

3.) All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy, are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives, issued for it.

4.) Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous Kommando undertakings in the same manner.

(Initial) W (Warlimont)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
Cont'd.

(signature) Keitel

CKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1)
Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret

Addition for Supreme Commander Southwest )
Similar action is to be taken in the Italian ) (Written by hand).
theater of war. )

(initial) J (Jodl)

After forwarding:

| | |
|---|---|
| Qu (Verw.1) Simultaneously teletype | 1st copy. |
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| Op (M)/ (L) / Ktb. | 3rd copy. |
| VO Foreign | 4th copy. |
| VO W Pr | 5th copy. |

Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF
DOCUMENT 551-PS

7 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, It (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpt from Document No. 551-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590.

H1157 - 0080

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 553-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Memo secret 7/4
(Annex 2 to H.Dr.g.1
Page 7 current 1910.4)

High command of the armed forces
WFSt. (Org.1) amt AUSL./ABW/Abt.Abw.III
Nr. 8725/7. 42 g. (III. 2)

Berlin, 4 August 1942

S E C R E T !

Combatting of single Parachutists
4. Aug. 1942.
Unaltered reprint
1943
Reference: OKW/WFSt/ Abt.L(II) Nr. 1858 geh,v. 10.8.40

1) In case of enemy landings by air, a difference has to be made between:

A) Parachute troops and airborne landing troops committed to fighting activities.

B) Single parachutists and small groups of parachutists who are dropped in order to execute missions of sabotage, espionage, terror or disruption.

to a ) The combatting of enemy airborne forces, is the exclusive mission of the armed forces, according to the reference orders.

to b ) For combatting single parachutists, in alteration of fig. 7 v. a. the following is decreed:

1. Small territories(Reich territories and occupied territories) the combatting of single parachutists is in mission of those agencies of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service (SD) designated as executive; in this matter it is immaterial whether the parachutists are in uniform or civilian clothes.

2. To what extent armed and agencies of the armed forces should be committed for these missions is to be decided directly by the District Commanders (Wehrkreisbefehlshaber) or by territorial commanders(territorialen Befehlshaber) endowed with the powers of District Commander with the competent agencies of security-police and SD.

3. So far as single parachutists are captured by members of the armed forces, they are to be delivered to the nearest agency of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, without delay; simultaneously reports must be made to the competent intelligence agency("ABWEHRSTELLE"). The same procedure is also valid for combat actions directed against parachute troops or airborne-landing troops, in case that the troops realize that they have to do with saboteurs or spies. If it should be discovered that the parachutists brought to security police by armed forces, or captured directly by members of the police are soldiers, the SS Reich leader and Chief of the German Police will take care that they will be transferred to the competent air forces' agencies after the completion of the necessary inquiry.

4. Reports concerning confirmed single parachutists are to be submitted without delay to the nearest agency of the Chief of Security Police, and of the SD simultaneously informing the counter-intelligence agency in charge which immediately has to forward the report to District Command Headquarters, Commander as well as the airforces command. Moreover, in principle, fig. 4 of the reference order is applicable.

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5. In territories not mentioned in fig. 1, present regulations remain valid. (transfer to secret Field Police).

II. With regard to the use of (utilization of items(tools?) captured or discarded, in the case of parachutists, as far as these items are sabotage material, or radio equipment---a supplementary order to fig. 9 v.a is decreed:

1. Captured sabotage material to be delivered to the nearest security-police agency and SD.

The army will dispose of sabotage material, captured by troops in the Eastern theatre. With regard to further utilization of sabotage material delivered to or reverting to the Security Police, agreements made between the Chief of Security- Police and SD and foreign Section Counter-Intelligence remains valid.

2. Further utilization of captured radio equipment, including the directions for operation, code-material, voice material( Spruch-Material) in plain and in code text, are immediately to be delivered via local counter intelligence agencies to OKW(Ag WNV) FU III) for use. The agencies concerned will be informed of results. After completion of investigations, the captured radio equipment is considered by either counter-intelligence(ABWEHR) or Security Police, then the delivery of the equipment might be omitted, upon agreement each time with Ag. WNV/Fu III, however, in this case photostatic copies ("ABLECHTUNGEN"!!!) of the directions for use, the code keys, etc. as well as technical descriptions of the equipment are to be forwarded quickly to Ag-WNV/Fu III.

The Chief of High Command
of the Armed Forces
KEITEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 553-PS

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 553-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391090

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Translation of Document 556-2-PS

The Fuehrer

and Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmach

Fuehrer Hq
September 8, 1942

The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers should be committed and should give the fullest extent of their productive capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA (Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz) in agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.

A Hitler

initialed K (Keitel)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 556-2-PS

15 Oct. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document no. 556-2-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) USNR
391590.

H1157 - 0082

H1157 - 0083

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 743-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

WFSt/Qu. 2 (Ost)

(illegible pencil marks)

SSD (Stamped)

September 8th. 1944.
(illegible pencil marks)
Secret (Stamped)

SSD - tele type

To

1) Gen. St.d.H./Gen.Qu./Chefgr. (Anna)
2) Gen. St.d.H./Gen.Qu./K.Verw. (Anna-Bu)
3) Ob. Heeresgruppe Nord HMfX (in pencil)
4) Ob. Heeresgruppe Mitte
5) Wi Staab Ost
6) Wehrkreiskommando I.

With addresses (Anschriftenübermittlung)

Subject : Utilisation of the soil in parts of the Reichskommissariat Ostland.

1.) The Führer has ordered the district leader (Gauleiter) Koch to carry out the utilization of the soil in the parts of the Reichskommissariat Ostland which are occupied by the Army Group Middle (Heeresgruppe Mitte). Further, the Führer has ordered that all German and local administrative authorities are bound by the directives of Gauleiter Koch. Concerning the exploitation of natural resources and other products, Gauleiter Koch has to keep in touch with the competent supreme authorities of the Reich.

2.) All quarters of the Armed Forces are to give Gauleiter Koch their utmost support in the execution of this order.

3.) The order of September 5th. 1944, concerning the full powers given by the Führer to Gauleiter Koch is hereby cancelled.

(illegible pencil remark)

(signed) Keitel.

OKW/WFSt/Qu. 2 (East)

number 0 6891/44 secret
(in pencil)

5031 (in pencil)

(illegible pencil remarks)

BOC - OKW-1620 (in pencil)

Further distribution :

Further Distribution :

Head of the Party-office (Leiter der Parteikanzlei
Minister of the Reich and Head of the Reich - office
(Reichsminister u. Chef d. Reichskanzlei)
Gauleiter Koch, Königsberg
General Staff of the Army (Gen.St.d.H./Gen.Qu./K.Verw. (Anna)

(pencil note on the right side); ab 9/9.44 (initials)

(2 stamps; see original

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 743-PS
(Cont'd)

SECRET (stamped)

Tele type S S D ( in red pencil)

Führer Headquarters, 5.9.44.

Secret (in red pencil)

12F (in pencil)

To :

1.) Gen. St. d. H / Gen. Qu.
2.) Ob. Heeresgruppe Nord
3.) O.B. Heeresgruppe Mitte (in pencil)
4.) Wi Stab Ost
5.) Wehrkreiskommando I.

The Fuhrer will instruct Gauleiter Koch, East Russia, with the economic evacuation of the Ostland occupied by us and will give him all full powers necessary for that purpose. Apart from bringing foodstuffs back we mean, to seize useful products, machines etc.

All quarters of the Armed Forces have to support Gauleiter Koch as far as possible.

The Chef OKW

Certified copy
Schlossmann
Army Major.

(signed) Keitel (in pencil)
(stamped)

SSD + FS WNOF + Number 4563+
arrived September 5th, 1944 2240 o'clock
forwarded on . . . . . o'clock
to . . . . . by . . . . .

(illegible pencil remarks)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 743-PS.

20 October 1945.

I, Hieronim TROMBALA, Capt. Gen. List, 204771, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 743-PS.

HIERONIM TROMBALA.
Capt. Gen. List.
204771.

3679.

H1157 - 0084

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Pencilled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearance of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task; to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out; secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way; adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That



1626.

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means the greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave us strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favour of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favourable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for along time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persoan Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponent by America is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is



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yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favourable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only be the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavourable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Iona Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no change until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
Tank corps.
Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better that the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Leige. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colours. Of what importance is a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I cannot hear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

1628.

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We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongestarmaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is void. Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The Man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat. Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favourable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favourable instant. The military conditions are favourable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.



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I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unashamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 789-PS

3 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf.
O-1335567

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PS-795

(Identified by General Keitel as
a memorandum of Admiral Canaris)

CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KEITEL
on 17 August 1939

I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had not informed him and had only let him know that we were to furnish HEYDERICH with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special action. In regard to Dirschau he has decided that this action would be executed only by the army.

I then reported my conference with ROATTA. He told me that he thought it very good if MUSSOLINI would tell the Fuehrer in definite terms that he would not enter the war. He personally is of the opinion that MUSSOLINI would join anyhow. I answered him that I believed this improbable by reason of the conference between CIANO and RIBBENTROP which I reported to him once more in detail. He says that the Fuehrer had told him contrarywise. Based on my reports he had to conclude that the Fuehrer does not tell him - KEITEL - everything. Furthermore, I told him that I had learned from Count MIROGNA that the King of Italy had told King Alfonso a few days ago that he would not sign under any circumstances if MUSSOLINI should present the order for mobilization.

In connection with this KEITEL expresses the opinion that it is quite interesting to note that even a country like Italy which is governed by a dictatorship does not think much of war. How much more so must it be in the democratic countries? He is confident that the English would not interfere. I tried to contradict his views and say that the English would certainly at once institute a blockade and would destroy our merchant shipping. KEITEL believes this to be of no great importance as we would receive oil from Rumania. I answered that this is not the deciding factor and that we could not resist a blockade for a long time and that England would fight against this with all their means if we should use force against the Poles and if it were to come to bloodshed. I told him that the English would have acted in precisely the same manner, had any bloodshed occurred when we marched into Czechoslovakia. I tried to explain to KEITEL the consequences of economic warfare for Germany and tell him that we have only very few means to counteract it. Just a short while ago I had heard that we could only send 10 submarines into the Atlantic Ocean. KEITEL thinks that it should be easy to force Rumania to surrender her oil after the conquest of Poland. I called his attention to the actions of the English in the Balkans and tried to explain to him that the English would certainly have everything prepared in the Balkans for such an eventuality. Bulgaria would not be useful to us as an ally as it would be attacked at once by Rumania and Turkey.



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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

I name Reichsleiter Alfred R o s e n b e r g as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region.

An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby ertrusted to him.

The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellory Treasury in a lump sum.

Fuehrer's Headquarters 20th April 1941.

The Fuehrer
signed Adolf Hitler.

Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellory
signed Dr. Lammers.

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The Reich Minister and the Head of the
Reich Chancellory

Berlin W8 21st April
1941
Vossstrasse 6
At present Fuehrer
Headquarters, mail
without exception to
be sent to the Berlin
address.

To:
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
General Field Marshal Keitel .

TOP SECRET

Personal. By curier.

My dear General Field Marshal.

Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest coopration of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities ... to conferehces. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose co-operation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year plan, the Reich Minister of Economies and you yourself.

Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to place your co-operation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him.

It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office, with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual reputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.

I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.

Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely
Dr. Lammers.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
cont'd

The Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.

25. April 1941.

Most Secret.
By curier.

To:
The Head of the Reich Chancellery,
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers.

Personal.

Dear Reich Minister.

I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.

Heil Hitler.
Yours very sincerely
K.
25/4.

---

The Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.

25th April 1941.

Most Secret.
By curier.

To:
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
Personal.

Dear Reichsleiter,

The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only.

Heil Hitler,
Yours very sincerely
K. 25/4.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 865-PS

November 23, 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 865-PS.

EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371.

H1157 - 0093

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 870 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Stamp:

TOP SECRET

Copy to Rk. 1952 German Secret Reich matter.

Information for the Fuehrer

I report the following, concerning the sabotage plot, through which at the two largest Oslo dockyards 23500 was sunk and 25800 tonnage was damaged:

I. Backgrounds:

1) the personnel of both dockyards had the reputation of being extremely radical marxistic before the war. Both dockyards strike was declared in September 1941. At the second day of the strike I have taken measures so harsh and decisive that starting there and then, and until this plot happened, peace and order prevailed at both enterprises.

2) In connection with the withdrawal of the 20. (mountain) Army, England has given out the following order to the personnel of the dockyards: "Either you blow up the ships or we shall be forced to shell town and port." The efficiency of that order of the day is confirmed not only by the plot itself but also statements. Therefore it is clear that the saboteurs do not only have active helpers or groups of helpers amongst thr personnel, but that they also enjoy passive support respectively protection by the rest of the crowd.

II Countermeasures.

1) My old method is entirely out of question. Counter sabotage in Norway is useless on account of lack of objects. Counter terror in this instance would by-pass its goal and in addition would lead to the most disadvantageous consequences, according to the opinion, shared by Reich Leader of SS Himmler and chief of the Security Police Kaltenbrunner.

2.) A permanent and sufficient boarding of the ships by military guards must fail because, on account of lack of forces. Navy and army state that they cannot furnish additional units. Guarding by police is impossible, because only six under strength battalions of about 400 men are at my disposal in the entire country.(Pencilled note of Keitel:" No, the Armed Forces can guard its ships its self"?).

3.) As much as a stronger and permanent military guarding of every ship is desirable this measure would inync way exclude the possibility of further attacks, because such guards are not able to judge, if the Norwegian specialists handle their jobs right or wrong # Pencilled note of Keitel. But the Marines can do that.

4.) Just now I received a cable of Field Marshall General Keitel, in which the issue of a decree is demanded according to which members of the personnel and if the occassions arises their next of kin (liability of next of kin) are collectively kept responsibke for cases of sabotage occurring in their departments.

This demand makes only sense and promises success only, if I am actually allowed to perform executions by firing squad. (Pencilled note of Keitel: "Yes, that is the best.) If this is not possible, such a decree would cause exactly the opposite reaction.

a) The Norwegian expects German defeat within a very short time. An arrest therefore, does not only frighten him, but gives him security on the one hand, and on the other hand an alibi with the Emigrant Government.

b) This decree would only add fuel to the fire of the Swedish agitators and would not be crowned by success. But such shootings by firing squads are prohibited by the Fuehrer-decree. On the other hand, if I would get renewal liberty of action in this regard, and if I could use my old methods again, without considering Sweden, then such a decree would gain the necessary weight and, with that doubtlessly lead to success.

III Suggestion:

1.) A military guard is ordered for every ship. The main dockyard committee has to submit specific suggestions regarding the respective strength and the methods of duty patrolling.

2.) So many workers, foremen, technicians and engineers are to be taken from German dockyards that we are able to plant amongst personnel of the most important Norwegian dockyards at least 10 per cent of German specialists. The dockyard main committee only can also order the method of planting If, on account of this - at the worst- the production capacity German Dockyards decrease accordingly, one would consider, that by such measures the tenfold of this waste will be secured on the Norwegian side, (Pencilled note of Keitel:") I regard this measure as expedient, if decrees 3 and 4 should be declined. (K) For, only by employing those Norwegian Specialists forces it will be possible, to keep the Norwegian experts under such permancontrol at their work, that it is made quite impossible for them, to commit acts of sabotage.

3.) Establishing of the three shifts-system, in order that at any day or night time Norwegian personnel is on board and, in case, is also blown into the air. It is up to the Dockyard main committee to decide if and to which extent this system is workable.

4.) In this connection the dockyard main committee should be charged in principle with the central responsibility for the security in the dockyards: for the main committee in its competence has at its disposal the defisive prerogatives, which can warrant that security. Thereby it goes without saying , that it has at its disposal the securitie police with all its facilities and that the Armed Forces put at the disposal of the guards to the ordered extent.

5.) While accomplishing these measures one has to take into account the possibility of a strike. As I posses only limited liberty of action at present towards this would be more than unpleasant. In spite of this I am of the opinion, that taking the danger into the bargain the measures suggested should be ordered.

signed: Terboven,
Reich Commissioner.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 870-PS

1.December 1945.

I, MAX MANLIN XO46150 hereby, certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No 870-PS.

MAX MANLIN
X)46150

H1157 - 0094

H1157 - 0095



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 872-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

Most Secret

Armed Forces Ops Staff 3.2.41.

S. O. only
Access only through officer

5 Copies
5th Copy

44089/41 Most Secret S. O. only

Conference of "Fall Barbarossa" and Sonnenblume.

The following persons attended:

The Fuehrer
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
C-in-C Army
Chief of the Army General Staff
Chief of Army Op. section
Colonel Schmundt
Major Christian
Major Engel

Chief of Army General Staff (JD) 1) Enemy strength approximately 100 Infantry divisions 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized divisions.

Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality.

In estimating the leading personalities, Timoshen is the only outstanding figure. The only one, that, is, according to Gen. Koestring.

Details of the strength and organisation of the Russian divisions are important only in that even the Infantry Divisions include a comparitively large number of tanks, though the material is bad and merely thrown together.

In the case of mechanized divisions, we have superiority with regard to tanks, weapons (schuetzen) and artillery. The Russians are superior in numbers, we in quality.

The Russians are normally equipped im artillery. Materials likewise inferior. The Command of the artillery is insufficient. The Russian Operational intentions are unknown. Strong forces are at the fronier. Any retreat could be only on a small scale since the Baltic States and and Ukraine are vital to the Russians for supply reasons. Fortification work is in progress especially on the North and Southern flanks.

There is no fresh information on the communications system.

Directives to Army Groups so given that the Russian front will be split into 2 sections and a Russian retreat on the Dnjeper-Duena Mine prevented.

The Army Group North and Centre ordered to press forward across the Duena in a north-easterly direction with concentrated armoured forces iin 3 armoured groups (the strongest in the South).

The most northerly group is to press on up to the region of Lake Peipus, then advance further to the East in cooperation with the other two armoured groups, who will be attacking Smolensk.

The Army Group South is to advance across the Dneper in a south-easterly direction. Army Group North and Centre is to carry out operations North of the Pripet Marshes. Army Group South will be to the South, that is, separate and independent. The main sector lies in the North, army reserves are massed there.

6 armoured divisions are required from the Marita operation; of these the 2 training divisions are for the 1st line, a further 2 from Roumania itself for the Southern Group, the last 2 divisions as reserves for the Northern Group. It all depends on the Balkan situation (Turkey's attitude).

Führer — When the die has been cast, the Turks will not make any further moves. No special protection of the Balkans is therefore necessary. One dangerous moment will be if North Africa is cleared by the British, thus enabling the British to operate in Syria with unhampered forces.

Chief of Army General Staff — Attacking Forces.

Northern Group 50 divs, 13 armoured divs, 9 motorized divs.
Southern Group 30 divs, 5 armoured divs, 3 motorized divs.
In addition: Supreme Command of the Army Reserves.

The assigning of Pioneers is not entirely satisfactory. This is made good by additional bridge-building units (Brückenmaterial).

Führer — agreed with the large dispositions.

Chief of Army General Staff — It is proposed to isolate a large number of Russian troops in various places, at the time the split is effected. The early use of reserves is necessary for this purpose.
Note: The Pripet Marshes are not definitely tabu.

Führer — mentioned the Russians tactics of flank attacks.

Chief of Army General Staff — The cavalry divisions are particularly dangerous in this respect.

Orders issued to date:
Orders for Army Group are binding
Orders for Armies set out the targets
Orders for Units leave possibility for changes.

He expounded on the orders issued to Army groups etc. up to the present.

Führer — mentioned that the operational areas were enormous, that the enemy troops could be successfully encircled, only if the encirclement were complete (Cavalry divisions) (At the moment, there is a very biassed play on in Moscow about Suwarow). The immediate surrender of the Baltic States, including Leningrad and the Ukraine cannot be expected at once. It is, however possible that, after the initial defeat, the Russians, knowing our operational aims, willretreat on a large scale and prepare for defence further East behind some barrier.

In this case, the North, regardless of the Russians in the East, will be cleared. From there, (a favourable supply-



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base) a thrust in the rear of the Russians without a frontal attack. It is essential to wipe out large sections of the enemy and not to put them to flight. This will be accomplished if we occupy the flanking areas with the strongest possible forces. Then, with the enemy held in the centre, he can be manoeuvred out of it from the flanks.

Chief of Army General Staff

The Falkenhorst army can advance on Petsamo with 1½ divisions, by using Swedish railways, with a further 1½ divisions (including 1 SS Brigade). The aim is the protection of the Finnish northern industrial area, trapping and cutting off the Murmansk forces.

The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South with 4 Army Corps (Aks) of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake Onegin, 2 divisions against Hangö, they need strong support. There are 15 Russian divisions on the Finnish front, approximately 1 division in Murmansk.

Führer

assumed that Sweden would join with us at a price. The price: the Aaland Islands (not our possessions). There is no question of a union between Finnland and Sweden as this would not suit the European New Order.

Norway must be under protection, no repercussions are desired from that quarter. Artillery reinforcements are required.

In the South: The most important task is the protection of the oil fields, therefore speedy action from Roumania is necessary.

Chief of Army General Staff

Position of Hungary. If Hungary is not to participate, we must withdraw from Hungary. The destination of the march will be given as Roumania. At the last minute the direction will change towards the Russian frontier. Hungary will permit anything so long as she is given the corresponding political assurances. Agreements with all states taking part (with the exception of Roumania) can be made only at the eleventh hour. With Roumania it is a matter of life and death.

Chief of Army General Staff

Armoured reconnaissance forces are still scarce.

Flak question is still unsettled, it depends on the conditions of the roads (to follow in writing).

The Air Force commands 30 Flak battalions, in addition 30 batteries set up by the Army.

The Navy must hasten the opening of supply routes to the Baltic.

Supply is a road transport problem as the gauge has to be changed on the railroads here. A system of long-distance trucks, which can bring supplies to supply-bases.

Agreement with the Air Force that all transport is to be used to the full.

Supply-areas, shifted to the region of East Poland, are at present being developed. (Possibilities in Roumania are still being explored).

In connection with Marita, the difficulties of transporting back those forces urgently needed for Barbarossa were stressed.

The intended time period was discussed with a plan.

1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front-Germany - East
2nd " " " " from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. 3 deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained.

In industry the full capacity time table is in force. No more camouflage.

From 25.IV - 15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seelöwe can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognisable.

The full capacity time table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.

Führer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.

Chief of the Air Force General Staff joined the conference.

Führer discussed the Italian situation in the Mediterranean.

He stated that the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy.

Britain can hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her either to make peace and retain everything or after the loss of North Africa to be bombarded. This would be to our disadvantage. British forces in the Mediterranean area will not be tied down. We ourselves have a weak base there through Southern France. The British have the free use of a dozen divisions and can employ them most dangerously, i.e. in Syria.

We must make every effort to prevent this. Italy must be given support.

We are already doing this in Marita. We must, however, attempt to render effective assistance in North Africa.

The Italians are of the opinion that they can put up a defence now only at Tripoli. This is not feasible. The Air Force cannot operate there. Therefore the position cannot be held. There must be some larger protection zone. Our blocking units can also be effective only in larger protection zones.



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He discussed the connection between successes, even defensive successes there and Balkan events, possibly a peaceful settlement in the Balkans.

What can be done?

Land units will arrive late even if not too late. Graziani must receive some kind of support. Therefore the Air Force must be employed if possible with Stuka groups.with jumping-off bases and home-fields in Lybia.

If this can bring the British advance to a standstill, the intended blocking unit is still insufficient and must be reinforced by a mobile unit (strong armoured division).

The British personnel and material must have been exhausted during the advance. If the British encounter fresh and well-equipped German forces, the situation will soon alter.

Query from C-in-C Army. Can we spare an armoured division for this?

C-in-C Army — unwillingly from Marita.

Führer — out of the question.

C-in-C Army — If it comes to that, Barbarossa is also in need.

Führer — If we send help to North Africa, we must do so at once before the Italians. (We have made the offer to the Italians).

The primary consideration is: can the Air Force intervene now.

The time required for the transport of Air Force supplies, blocking unit and armoured divisions must be established at once.

Then, what are the climatic conditions?

C-in-C Army — It is important that British supplies by land and sea are stopped. This can be done only by the German Air Force.

Führer — The Italians must be asked how long they can allow for the transport of the above mentioned German troops.

If necessary, transport groups must be employed.

Proposal: General Jeschonek III/KG for special duties, from Foggia.

C-in-C Army — proposed that the blocking unit should first be reinforced by 1 armoured regiment. The rest to follow. The Führer agreed.

Chief of Air Force General Staff — spoke of the position of the ground-organisation in North Africa. Only in Benghazi are Stuka-Forces ready within range for operations.

Fighter forces will naturally be sent there also, or Italian fighters be placed under German orders.

It is most important that the air base of Malta be subdued.



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Führer agreed. The Italians are to withdraw Italian fighters from the Channel coast (He will speak to the Duce).

The Air Force must test immediately, the possibilities of intervening in North Africa. The Army is to see to the transport for the blocking unit.

The transport must be speeded up. Reinforcement by an armoured regiment, further reinforcement up to an armoured division will be withdrawn from Marita. Flak forces on ahead.

C-in-C Army proposed a united command of all mobile forces under 1st General Headquarters. Cooperation with the Air Force which also commands the Italian naval air forces.

Conclusions:

1). Barbarossa

a). The Führer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.

b). The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.

c). Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.

d). It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila. (auxiliary measure)

e). The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seelöwe and the subsidiary measure Marita.

2). Sonnenblume

a). The Air Force must intervene as soon as possible with Stuka and Fighter forces. Bases and jumping-off bases in accordance with decisions made in North Africa.
It is desired that the Italian fighter forces be placed under German orders.

b). The 10th Flieger Korps is to take over the task of protecting the transports to East Africa, in the closest cooperation with the Italian Air Force and Naval Commander in Catania.

c). The 10th FliegerKorps is to strike a strong blow against the British troops in Cyrenaica as soon as possible. (with the use of the heaviest bombs)

The main task is to disrupt British supplies by land and sea, next, to combat the British fleet.



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First of all, attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.

d). The Army is to continue the transport of the blocking unit. This is, however, to be reinforced at once with armour. Preparations for adding one Armoured Division, (II Staffel from Marita). Flack forces on ahead. 1st General Headquarters to be established immediately. United German Supreme Command over all mobile forces will be proposed to the Italians.

Distribution:

Chef L
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IV

Certified

- - - - - -(illegible)

Captain

- - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 872-PS

7 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R.N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 872-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 874-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

Top Secret

The Chief of the
Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces.

Hq.of the Fuehrer 9 March 41

DRAFT

Honorable Reich Minister!
(TODT)

For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary manoeuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the organization Todt.

(Initials of)
Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 874-PS

I, WALTER SELIGSON, 1st Lt., 01558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 874-PS.

WALTER SELIGSON
1st Lt.
01558904

H1157-0102

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 886-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SECRET

Enclosure to 32/41 g.Kdos.Chefs.WR.
1st Copy.

The Führer
and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces

Führer headquarters, 13 May 1941
(Initialed "J 10/5")

Top Secret

Decree
for the practice of court-martial in the
district "BARBAROSSA"
and for special measures of the troop (written in ink)

The armed forces court-martial serves primarily the purpose of maintaining discipline.

The great expanse of the Eastern theatre of operations, the kind of warfare necessitated on that account, and the peculiarity of the opponent present tasks to the armed forces courts-martial which they can accomplish during the course of the war and until the first pacification of the conquered territory - being short staffed - only if the court-martial is limited to its main task.

This is only possible if the troop itself defends itself ruthlessly against any threat by the enemy civil population.

Accordingly, the following is decreed for the territory "Barbarossa" (theater of operation, rear army area and area of the political administration):

I

Treatment of punishable offenses of enemy civilians.

1. Punishable offenses committed by enemy civilians do not, until further notice, come anymore under the jurisdiction of the courts-martial and the summary courts-martial.

2. Guerillas are to be killed ruthlessly by the troop in battle or during pursuit.

3. Also all other attacks of enemy civilians against the Wehrmacht, its members and employees are to be fought by the troop at the place of the attack with the most extreme means until annihilation of the attacker.

4. In cases where measures of this kind were neglected or not immediately possible, elements suspected of offense will be brought at once before an officer. He decides whether they are to be shot.

   Against villages from which the Wehrmacht was insidiously and maliciously attacked, collective punitive measures by force will be carried out immediately under command of an officer with the rank of at least a battalion commander, if the circumstances do not permit an immediate identification of individual perpetrators.

5. It is expressly prohibited to hold suspected perpetrators in order to transfer them to the courts upon reinstitution of their jurisdiction over civilians.

6. The commanders in chief of the army groups can, in conjunction with the competent commanders of the air force and the navy, restore the Wehrmacht jurisdiction over civilians in districts which are sufficiently pacified.



H1157-0103

For the area of the political administration this decree is issued through the chief of the high command of the Wehrmacht (marginal ink correction; C-i-C of army in agreement with C-i-C of other branches is inked out).

II

Treatment of punishable offenses of members of the Wehrmacht and its employees against the native population.

1. For offenses committed by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees against enemy civilians, prosecution is not compulsory, not even if the offense is at the same time a military crime or violation.

2. While judging offenses of this kind, it should be considered in every case, that the break-down in 1918, the time of suffering of the German people after that, and the numerous blood sacrifices of the movement in the battle against national socialism were dedidedly due to the Bolshevist influence, and that no German has forgotten this.

3. The judge examines therefore whether in such cases disciplinary action is justified or whether it is necessary to take legal steps. The judge orders the prosecution of offenses against civilians through court-martial only if it is considered necessary for the maintenance of discipline or the security of the troop. This applies, for instance, to cases of serious offenses which are based on sexual acts without restraint, which derive from a criminal tendency, or which are a sign that the troop threatens to mutiny. The punishable offenses of destroying senselessly quarters as well as supplies or other captured goods to the disadvantage of the own troop should, as a rule, be judged as more leniently.

The order of the inquiry proceedings requires in every individual case the signature of the judge.

Extreme care must be exercised when judging the authenticity of the statements of enemy civilians.

III

Responsibility of the troop commanders.

The troop commanders are, within the sphere of their competence, personally responsible for the following:

1. that all officers of the units subordinated to them are very thoroughly and promptly instructed about the fundamentals of I,

2. that their legal advisors be promptly informed about these instructions and about the verbal statements with which the political intentions of the leadership had been explained to the commanders-in-chief,

3. that only such sentences will be confirmed which are in accord with the political intentions of the leadership.

IV

Protection of secret.

After end of camouflage the decree is to be considered only as secret.

For
The chief of the high command of the Wehrmacht

signed KEITEL

Note: (in pencil)
This should, if possible, not be passed on before 1 June 41.
certified



H1157-0104

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 886-PS

28 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 886-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738.



H1157-0105

Report
on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions

Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Führer's decree of 20. 4. 41 a conference with the chief of the OKW (armed forces high command) took place. After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of the OKW explained that a deferment (UK-stellung) would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation (Abkommandierung) by command of the chief of the OKW Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements: He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office. A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with any representatives of the people of the East - European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups along the deserts would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.

Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has been done.

Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Funk, who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff (Wirtschaftsführungsstab) East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary (Staatssekretär) Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was reached in the easter questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the Führer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economics, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.)

H1157-0106

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1039-PS
(Continue)
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Scibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Brautigam, who is known to me for for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations wich if necessary will be placed before the Führer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners.

The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department "Enlightenment and Press" (Aufklärung und Presse) and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (Gebiet) Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Main-Government. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (Kreise). In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above named command of the Chief of the OKW.

In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich Physicians Leader (Reichsärzteführer) Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the whole Construction Service.

Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for printing shops are present.

Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader (Korpsfuehrer) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) of the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders for this gigantic territorry, which he agreed to do. The personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich organizational leader (Reichsorganisationsleiter), who has instructed the commander of Krossinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Krossinsee for schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member Mezzenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in conjunction with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also in connection with the economic leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under certain conditions.

Monthly discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer (SS Lt Gen) Heydrich which do not appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision.

Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press, without issuing any statements.

The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1939, Statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan, Extensive works are in preparation for the foundation of legal administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine influence of the German language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.

As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party and

the State.

I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at-all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General- and Chief commissariats more than 200 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic spaces - not only an auto park but a great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 days, therefor all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer's decree.

The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer's order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the details. A political department has been founded for the execution of the substantical work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Scibbrandt (deputy General Consul Dr. Drautigam), who prepares the various books and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed by him which will then have to be scattered over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all those, with the exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic - political cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter Mallotke. A department of "Law, Finance, and Administration" has been taken over by Regierungspresident Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this question does not appear urgent. Also the department "Enlightenment and Press". It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press Chief (Reichspressechef) for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible.

Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer for reaching preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. I039-PS 9. November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT. 35779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document I039-PS

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT. 35779426

H1157-0110



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1229-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

T O P S E C R E T

(stamped) (illegible pencil mark)

Supreme command of the Armed Forces
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)
Armed forces Fuehrer Staff (WFST)/
/department (Abt.) L number 33 264/40
top secret, for general officers only. (Chefs)

Fuehrer headquarters, September 6, 1940.

73 (in pencil) (illegible pencil mark)

7 copies
4th copy
(in pencil)

SUBJECT: Material for the intelligence service
(Unterlagen fuer den Nachrichtendienst)
SUBJECT: Counter intelligence (/Abw.) III
number 398/40 top secret of August 26 1940.
OKH General Staff of the Army (Gen. St.d.H.)
operational department Ia number 150231/40
top secret of September 2, 1940.

TO : Counter intelligence service abroad
(Ausl./Abw.)

The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the Status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.

These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realise that strong and highly trained German Troops are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protektorat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests - espec. on the Balkan - with strong forces against Russian seizure.

For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence servcie, the following directives apply:

1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.

2) The impression is to be created that the centre of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant.

3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, espec. of the armoured divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1229-PS
cont'd

4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.

5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes etc. it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.

The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i.e. numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons etc. will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.

The chief of the supreme command of the armed forces

by order of

signed. JODL

A certified copy
F.M. (in pencil)
Captain

Distribution:

Counter intelligence service abroad (Ausl.-Abw)
1st copy (with map)
Supreme command of the Army (Ob.d.H.) (Operational department)
2nd copy
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Supreme command of the Armed forces (OKW) :

Armed forces Fuehrer staff (WFST) 4th copy
Department L
Chef, IH, IL 5th-7th copies

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1229-PS

I, FRED NEIBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., 01335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1229-PS.

FRED NEIBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
01335567

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1292-PS
OFFICE OF THE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

To Rk. 13402 c
Double

Fuhrer Headquarters, 4th Jan 1944

Ref.: Allocation of Labor 1944

1. A conference took place with the Fuhrer to-day which was attended by:
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel,
The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel,
General Field Marshal Milch,
The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary Backe,
The Minister of the Interior, Reich Fuhrer of the SS, Himmler,
and myself.
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the Conference, but the Fuhrer did not wish their attendance.)

The Fuhrer declared in his introductory remarks:

"I want a clear picture:
(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German War Economy
(a) For the [illegible] of present output?
(b) [illegible] tput?
(2) [illegible] be obtained from Occupied Countries, or how [illegible] ed in the Reich by [illegible] means (increased [illegible]
For one [illegible] matter of [illegible] for losses by death, infirimity, the constant [illegible] workers, and so forth, and further it is a matter of procuring additional workers."

The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3 Million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off. Reichminister Speer declared that he needs an additional 1,3 Million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of Iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxilliary indusdries already working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in France in industries mentioned above, must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuhrer agreed with the opinions of Reichminister Speer and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from Armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers would only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.

The Fuhrer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone 2000 - 2500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2½ million workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.

The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers. Until



H1157-0112

now, he has always kept his promises as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends primarily on what German enforcement agents will be made available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents.

The Reichfuhrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The Reichfuhrer SS made immediately available 2000 to 2500 men from concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna.

Generally all participants in the conference agreed that it will be possible to treat additional manpower even at home by activation and intensification of available labor, especially the Prisoners of War, provided they are given awards in form of additional food, clothing, and so forth. State Secretary Backe will examine to which extent help can be given with additional food. Field Marshal Milch remarked that especially in agriculture, many women, who are really able to work, evade it because they receive family - allotments from their husbands who were inducted into the Armed Forces, and the wages for work done would be deducted from the family allotment. In their primitive way of thinking they therefore believe that they would have to work for nothing. [illegible] on one hand, wages should not be deducted from the family [illegible] other hand, it should be ruled that women who refuse [illegible] ce, receive no family allotment, or only a reduced [illegible]
The [illegible] did not [illegible] during that he would [illegible] go into details any longer.

Results of the Conference:

(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.

(2) These workers may not be taken from armament and auxiliary industries in actual production in the occupied territories.

(3) It is to be examined by what means the output of workers now on hand can be increased and intensified, especially that of Prisoners of War.

(4) The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor shall get in touch with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs before taking any action.

(signed) Dr. Lammers.

II. Reichsleiter Bormann has received a copy of paragraph I.

III. To the State Secretary for cognizance.

IV. Original to Mr. C. Please return. (Arrival at Fuhrer Headquarters, 6 January 1944.)



CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1292-PS

26 November, 1945

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt, 33799122, ~~hereby certify~~ that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages, and that the above is ~~a true and correct translation~~ of Document No. 1292-PS.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/Sgt.
33799122.

H1157-0113

H1157-0114



PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1456-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Chief of Agency for Armament Economy
(Chef Ri-Rue Amt)

Berlin, 20 June 1941

Colonel Jansen

MEMORANDUM

Following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:

Par. I

The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarkical endeavors. It is impossible, to try and manufacture everything by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is impossible, to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these autarkical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must conque The commitment of men which is necessary one single time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the runningof the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to secure all territories, which are of special interes to us for the war economy, by conquering them.

At the time the 4-Year-Plan was established, I issued the statement where I made it clear that a completely autarkical economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great.Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves for missing stocks resp. to secure the delivery in wartime through economic alliances.

Par. II

In a conference between Todt - Pleiger - Thomas, it was determined:

Matter: "Detailed orders to the mining industries".

Par. III

Todt suggests the construction of heavy special machinery at Krupp's and Skoda's.

(Signed) THOMAS

- - - - - - - - -

PARTIAL CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1456-PS

I, Paul W. FRIEDMAN, S/SGT. 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1456-PS.

PAUL W. FRIEDMAN
S/SGT.
33799122

H1157-0115

P. 17 Chef WiRüAmt Berlin, 20 June 1941.

Note for the files signed by Thomas

.....

para 2 The progress of the war shows that we went too far in our plans of autarchy. It is impossible to attempt producing, by synthetic processes or other measures, all materials which we are lacking. For example, it is impossible to expand our fuel oil industry to such an extent that we can rely upon it completely. All plans of autarchy demand a tremendous number of men, which simply cannot be supplied. Another course must be taken and one must conquer what one needs but does not have The supply of men which will be required for that one action, will not be as large as the supply which would be needed constantly for operating factories producing synthetic materials. Thus, the goal must be to secure, by conquest, al territories which are of special interest to us from the view point of military economy.

.....

H1157-0116

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PS 1456
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Contd.)

Chef Wi Rü Amt Berlin, 20.3.41

P. 20 para 1 Report to Reichsmarschall Göring, 19.3.41

The following matters were the subject of the report:

1) Organization Barbarossa

The Reichsmarschall fully agrees with the organization which was proposed to him.

The following persons shall become members of the Executive Staff (Führungsstab): Körner, Backe, Henneken, Alpers and Thomas.

The Wi Rü Amt will be the executive office (Geschäftsführung).

The Reichsmarschall considers it important that a uniform organization be created.....

P. 23 para 1 Note for the Files on Report Made to the Reichsmarschall on 26.2.41, Initialed 'T.H.'

Berlin, 27.2.41

The Reichsmarschall agreed with me, that an occupation of the Ukraine alone would be without any value, but that the oilfields of Baku would also have to be conquered under all circumstances. He was of the same opinion as the Führer that with the invasion of German troops into Russia, the entire Bolshevik nation would collapse, so that we would not have to expect destruction and devastation of supplies and of the railroad to a great extent, as I was afraid would happen. It is important immediately to liquidate quickly the Bolshevik leaders.....

P. 24 para 1 middle of page With special emphasis, the Reichsmarschall told me that he wants the exploitation of occupied Russia for the purposes of military economy to be different from the way in which the exploitation has so far been handled in the West and in Poland. He demands that OKH be stripped of those functions and that a completely independent organization under his command be established, which should enter the country together with the frontline troops, executing very specific orders previously formulated.

P. 143 para 2 Note for the Files, OKW, Entitled "Aktennotiz über die Entwicklung der Rüstungslage im Sommer, 1940" - (Development of the Armament Situation in the Summer of 1940)

It was reported by General Field Marshall Keitel at the end of July that the changes in the armament of the army could hardly be completed in this manner. When I reported in Berchtesgaden on August 2, General Field Marshall Keitel informed me definitely that the Führer is judging the entire situation differently now and that we must be prepared for any development of the political situation in 1941.

P. 144 para 1 Of course, the preparations made for the invasion of England (project "Sea Lion") are of the greatest importance.

H1157-0117

Next to that it is necessary to execute the three essential programs. Finally the Führer recognizes that an army of 120 divisions is not sufficient but that we must have at our disposal a far greater army for the year, 1941. We must be prepared for our armament program, ordered with letter No... to be replaced by a new armament program that will increase our army to approximately 180 divisions. All stop orders given, especially in the field of ammunition, are no longer to be executed, and everything is to remain on the present rate of production until new orders are issued.

This new directive of the highest leadership seems to be based on the idea that:

i. Possibly we cannot expect the collapse of England in 1940 any longer.
ii. It is possible that America will be involved in the war in the year, 1941.
iii. Relations with Russia may be modified in the year, 1941.

---

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
DOCUMENT NO. PS 1456

26 November 1945.

I, MARTIN SCHAFHEIMER, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extracts from Document PS 1456.

Certified by:

SIDNEY B. JACOBY

MARTIN SCHAFHEIMER

H1157-0118

H1157-0119

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1519-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The National Socialist German Workers Party

Party Chancellery

The Director of the Party Chancellery

Führer Headquarters
30.9.1941

Stamp
Gau Training Office, Franken

NO. 2131 Received 8 Oct. 41
Sent

Confidential

Circular No. 21/41 Confidential

(not for publication)

Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War

For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of War. This regulation is confidential!

Heil Hitler!

sgd. Bormann

One appendix overleaf

Certified:

- - - -

Distribution:

Gauleiters
Kreisleiters

H1157-0120



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Az. 2f 24.11 General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I)
No. 3058/41 Confidential

2 Appendices

Berlin - Schöneberg, 8.9.1941
Badenschestrasse 51

Confidential!

Subject: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.

Reference:
1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government).
2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941.
3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17.7.1941.
4. OKW/P.W. $I^5$ No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941.

Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by OKH/Gen. Qu. for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order, any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By Order

Reinecke

H1157-0121



Appendix to Diary - No 3058/41
Confidential
dated 8.9. 1941.

Confidential

Regulation

for the treatment of Soviet PWs
in all prisoner of war camps.

I. .Treatment of Soviet PWs in general.

Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany. For the first time, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the sametime, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious to the people. The fight against National-Socialism has become part of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage, seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German Armed Forces, that every German soldier should hold himself severely aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be visible even in public.

The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of bolshevic fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must immediately be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts and and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply under the assumption that conditions will be generally peaceful. With Soviet PWs it is already necessary, for reasons of discipline, that the use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable.

PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in particular H. Dv. 38/11, page 13 etc., are invalid with regard to that point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However, caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal.

Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented. This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered impossible.

Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire

H1157-0122



fence, the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use of this kind of weapon by German soldiers is absolutely forbidden. With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the work of the German guard personnel.

II. Treatment of members of racial groups.

In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been divided up, according to their race, in the "Home Organisation" (heimatorganisation) (General Government and Service Command I) as well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are concerned:

Racial Germans
Ukrainians
White Russians
Poles
Lithuanians
Latvians
Esthonians
Roumanians
Finns
Georgians.

In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in particular, to PWs newly captured in the area of the Armed Forces Commanders.

Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home:

Racial Germans
Ukrainians, White Ruthenians
Latvians
Esthonians
Roumanians
Finns.
Lithuanian

Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to be effected.

Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release and will be dealt with in accordance with section III.

III. Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken during the Eastern campaign.

1). Intentions.

The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign demand special measures which can be carried out on their own responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences.

2). The way to reach the appointed goal.

A). Apart from directing PWs into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also members of racial groups) and any civilians in the camps are to be divided as follows:

H1157-0123



a). those politically undesirable

b). those politically harmless

c). those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas).

B). Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank etc., is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsführer-SS has assigned

Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security Service

for the work of classifying PWs according to their political opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, have received special training for their special duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD.

There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants, especially their defence officers, and the special purpose units.

3). Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No.2.

A). Military personnel.

The special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as being "politically undesirable elements." Should individuals, considered as suspicious, later prove themselves to be unsuspicious, they should be sent back to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the special purpose units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with. Officers will very often be liable for segregation as "political undesirables". Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as military personnel.

BO. Civilians.

If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time this is to be brought about, with the approval of the competent office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown or in specially created labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as under A.

C). Reliable persons are to be separated from politically undesirable persons and directed into some other work of camp administration.

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(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite possible that, even among those, there may be elements that must be considered as "politically undesirable").

Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from the point of view of defense.

IV. Employment of Soviet PWs.

1). General.

Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are those where the PWs can work under the constant supervision of the guard personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons, out of consideration for a third person.

2). Special regulations for employment within the Reich.

The main principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the assured security of German life and German property.

The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the sole responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs.

Therefore, employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions, but the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the civilian population cannot be complied with by a civilian place of work employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith.

In addition, the instructions OKW/PW ($1^5$) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be severely punished.

3). Guard duties.

The best possible trained, energetic and prudent guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp (A. O. des M. Stammlagers).

At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must, however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail consist of no more than 10 men, 2 guards must

H1157-0125



be employed to guard them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or sub-machine guns.

Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried out to the letter.

The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for thorough and detailed perusal.

The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the supervising authorities.

V. Final remarks.

PW - commandants are to be made personally responsible that under all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the content of the regulations.

H1157-0126



Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept./ PW section No. 3058/41 Secret dated 8.9.1941 (for free distribution!)

## Notes

## on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War

### Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany

For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.

The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:

1). Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience!
Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance.
PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.

2). Any conversation - even on the march to and from the place of work - unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions, is utterly forbidden.
No smoking at all is allowed on the march to and from the places of work - as well as during work.
In the same way, all conversation between PWs and civilians is to be prevented, if necessary by force of arms - even against the civilians.

3). At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always keep at a sufficient distance from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use his weapons without delay. Never turn your back on a PW.

4). Slackness is out of place even with a PW who is obedient and willing to work. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own conclusions.

5). When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.

6). The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.

H1157-0127



CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1519-PS

9 November 1945

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1519-PS.

EVE GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Military Secret

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
Command Staff/ armed forces
Section L Nr. 33 406/40

Top Secret

Matter of Chief
Only through Officer

Fuehrer#9
13 December 1940

(illegible notations) 12 Copies
9th copy

Direction Number 20
Operation Marita

1.) The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is double necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create an bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

2.) My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.

(b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.

3.) For the concentration of the task force in Rumania are necessary:

(a) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.

(b) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final wave to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.

(c) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).

(d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumania soil.

4.) The Operation Marita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:

(a) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.

(b) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.

(c) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.

(d) It will be the mission of the Air Force to support the drive of the Army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.

(e) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.

5.) The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.

The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported

step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania.

Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.

6.) After the completion of the operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces use therein for a new undertaking.

7.) I anticipate reports of the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetable for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recallings from the armament industry, (reconstruction of Furlough Divisions).

Signed: Adolf Hitler.

Witnessed
(Signature unreadable)
Captain in the General Staff

Distribution

| | |
|---|---|
| Commander of the Armies (Operational Section) | 1st Copy |
| Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction) | 2nd Copy |
| Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff | 3rd Copy |
| Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania | 4th Copy |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces: | |
| Command Staff | 5th Copy |
| Section L. | 6-9 Copies |
| WNV | 10th Copy |
| Chief of Army Transport Forces | 11th Copy |
| Foreign Counter Intelligence Office | 12th Copy |

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1541 PS

10 November

I, PFC ERNST W. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1541 PS.

ERNST W. COHN,
PFC 33925738.



H1157-0129

H1157-0130

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1590-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(several illegible notations)
Re: Taking of hostages.

5 copies
-- copy

OKH Received: 1 Oct. 1941

OKH/Gen. Qu.
(W. Bfh. Suedost)
Military Commander
South-East

Attacks on members of the Armed Forces lately committed in the occupied territories gave reason to point out that it is advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely:

1) Nationalist
2) democratic-bourgeois, and
3) communist

It is important that among them shall be well-known leading personalities or members of their families, whose names are to be made public.

Depending on the membership of the culprit, hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.

It is asked that commanders be accordingly instructed.

(partly illegible notation)

Chief of the Armed Forces
High Command

Complied with in
France and Belgium.

(signed) Keitel.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1590-PS

November 23, 1945.

I, VIRGINIA VON SCHON, 046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1590-PS.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
046318

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1642=PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Distribution List for the Secret map of the Soviet Union
(European part)

| | |
|---|---|
| OKW = (Supreme Command Armed forces): | |
| Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, Munch, Wedell, Canaris. | 6 |
| Office for the Four year plan : | |
| Koerner, Neuman, Gramsch and 12 others | 15 |
| Foreign office : | |
| Grosskopf | 2 |
| OKH=(High Command Army) : | |
| Brauchitsch and Quartermaster=General | 3 |
| OKM =(High Command Navy) : | |
| Raeder and 1 other | 2 |
| Propaganda Ministry : | |
| Goebbels, Gutterer | 3 |
| Reichs Ministry for Economy : | |
| Funk | 11 |
| Police : | |
| Himmler and 3 others | 4 |
| | 36 |
| Own Ministry: | - |
| Sch.,Mall., Leibl, Siew., Korpp, Meyer, Dreyer, | 8 |
| | 44 |
| (illegible) | 2 |
| | 46 |

and 5o persons

---

Title of map :

Union of the Socialist
Sovietrepublics
European part
scale 1 : 4oooooooo kilometer

---

H1157-0131

Map I

OKW/ (Supreme Command of the armed forces)
Office for Economy and armament/ Economy
(Wi Rü Amt/Wi)
1.March 1941

(Explanatory note : The map was found among the Rosenberg documents in a red folder carrying the remark "Frontiers", with a distribution list in Rosenberg's own handwriting. This distribution list refers apparently to plans worked out by Rosenberg for the administration of the occupied territories as the map shows lines in blue pencil indicating possibly the extent of the intended administration through the Rosenberg Ministry.)

(P.S.) 23 photostat copies of a part of this map are available under the same number.

17 November 1945.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.1642= PS.

I, WOLFGANG E.THORMANN, M/SGT. 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1642 = PS.

WOLFGANG E.THORMANN
M/SGT.
33779426.

H1157-0132

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 179

Decree by the Fuehrer, concerning a
Plenipotentiary-General for the Utilization of Labor
of 21 March 1942

Erlass des Führers
über einen Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz
vom 21. März 1942

In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited (erworben) abroad and of prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the occupied territories, should be mobilized.

Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz SAUCKEL will carry out this task within the framework of the four-year plan, as plenipotentiary general, for the employment of manpower. In that capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for the four-year plan.

Section VII (war economy) and Section V (utilization of manpower) of the Reich Defense Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the plenipotentiary-general for the accomplishment of his task.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 21 March 1942

The Fuehrer
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces
Keitel

- - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1666-PS

28 September 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1666-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1157-0133

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1666-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 180

# Ordinance for the Execution of the Fuehrer's Decree concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz of 27 March 1942

# Anordnung zur Durchführung des Erlasses des Führers über einen Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz vom 27. März 1942

In pursuance of the Führer's Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I decree as follows:

1. My manpower sections (Geschäftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz) are hereby abolished (Circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St. M. Dev. 265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor conditions (Arbeitsbedingungen)) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.

2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.

3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws require to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.

4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the General-Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations.

In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance a report is to be submitted to me, in advance.

Berlin, 27 March 1942

The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
Goering
Reich Marshal

- - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1666-PS

22 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1666-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1157-0134

H1157-0135

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. 1746-PS.

PART II
(partial translation)

Conference of Hitler and the German High Command
on the situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27, 1941.

PAGE 1 - PAGE 4, LINE 13:

W F St

Berlin, March 27, 1941

Top Secret

1st copy W F St
2nd copy L
3rd copy W Kr G

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by
officers only.

Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia

Present:

(stamp)
OKW/W F St
Dept L (I M I)
29 March 1941
No 44391/41 top secret
(illegible)

(several pencil marks and initials)

Führer
Reich Marshal
Chief OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Chief W F St
Major General Bodenschatz
Colonel Schmundt
Commander von Puttkamer
Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff
Major von Below
Major Christian

Later on the following persons were added:
Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H.)
Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)
Colonel Hensinger
Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth
Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador Hewel
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Waldan
Colonel Schmidt
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.

BDC-OKW-1631
(remark in pencil at right lower corner of first page)

The Führer.

describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which is always inclined to start a coup d'etat. In the present time, the country had only one strong man, namely Stojoldinowitsch, and Regent Prince (Prinzregent) Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.

The present moment is for political and military reasons favourable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.

H1157-0136



The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a message will still be addressed to the Duce.

Politically, it is especially important that the new blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lighning like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favourable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states: the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

This plan assumes the we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.

In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa operation will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.

The military operations are to be carried out in the following way:

1). Begin of the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin of Saoloniki and to win the high terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march (Ausholen) across Yugoslav territory.

2). Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.

3). Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction towards Nis, then towards Belgrade, in cooperation with

4). Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and Klagenfurt in direction South East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslavian army.

PAGE 5, LINE 3 - 9:

5). The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrad in attacks by waves; besides, the air force has to support the advabce of the army.

For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground installations.

PAGE 6, LINE 7 - 12.

The Fuehrer orders the immediate starting of all operations. He expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the evening of March 27th. General von Rintelen is orderedto receive the message and verbal orders from the Fuehrer during the night of March 27th.

(illegible pencil initial)

H1157-0137

1746-PS

PART V
(full translation)

SUBJECT: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia. Dated March 28, 1941.

The Chief of the leading staff of the Armed Forces (Wehrmachtführungsstab) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, March 28, 1941.

(in pencil)
(Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on March 28, 1941 at 4 p.m.)

K.T.F St
Group
(Several pencil marks)

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by officers only

Tentative Plan

for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia.

(several pencil marks)

1. In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.

2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed:

a) One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the danger for the rear of the Italian frontin Albania.

b) One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circumstances also in Southwest Hungary, in order to penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.

c) Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.

3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.

4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the Italian armed forces:

a) Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing towards the line Split-Majelo, with forces as strong as possible.

b) Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.

c) Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.

d) Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in Albania.

H1157-0138



For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy troops fighting there.

5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be expected:

a) Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd.
b) Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
c) Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.

(illegible initial)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 1746-PS

19 November 1945.

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st. Lt., Ord., O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. 1746-PS.

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st. Lt., Ord.,
O-1558904.

The OKW is asking the Fuhrer's decision, concerning the following proposals:

Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.

1.) To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

2.) Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

a.) through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria,

b.) through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,

c.) through travelling agents.

3.) Such news could be:

a.) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K.

b.) (Rolling stock) is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.

c.) Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is the case).

d.) The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have called up reinforcements.

e.) Custom officials report about the immenient maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden.

4.) Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

5.) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

6.) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.

7.) An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the Reich-Chancery.

Signed - Keitel.

14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone, that the Führer has given his approval in all points.

Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellory

9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in Munich



H1157-0139

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1775-PS

8 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1775-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.



H1157-0140

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

# Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary

## 1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and ( illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgetreide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)) and by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

## 1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

H1157-0141

14 February:

At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates th different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstosse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are ~~developed which~~ force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt General Goering.

H1157-0142

11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

H1157-0143

of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

21-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

H1157-0144

Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

H1157-0146

16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 23 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

25 September:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head (Totenkopf) SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 September:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1513 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast..

27 September:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

28 September:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

H1157-0147

29 September:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939

23 August:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts in Document No. 1780-PS.

Ludwig Hartman
T/4
37446052

H1157-0148

H1157-0149



Translation of Document 1809 PS
Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

Copy.

Translations of General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February to 26 May 1940.

1 February 1940:

The Fuhrer wants Major Kieritz to be sent from here in good time with special mission.

Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.

Results:

1) Morale and discipline - excellent.
2) Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot cover more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the other hand, think the weather excellent for overcoming the difficulty of floods.
3) In all divisions formerly committed in the East, the position with regard to mechanised vehicles is very bad. Up to 40% are lacking. Each of these 40 divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.

1700 hours General Jeschonnek.

1) Behaviour of parachute units. In front of the Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th Div. intends to drop units near the town.
2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.
3) Walcheren Island will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
4) In case of immediate action, further arrangements required.
To be eliminated:
Commitment of K against Eben Emael against bridge C.
"Fieselor Stork" airplane in front of Army Group A.
The ground forces will take up position during the hours of darkness, if possible.
7th Air Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up position without further orders.
5) Question about general intentions? Time.
6) Is it not possible to tackle H alone; this would be a tremendous improvement from the point of view of those conducting air operations.
7) The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of merchant shipping in the 30 mile-zone as well as everything anywhere which is armed: French vessels, transports.

2nd February

Fuhrer is furious about performance by Ordnance Department which needed 8 days to demonstrate to him - not by actual trial but only theoretically - that the Czech 4.7 cm anti-tank gun is not usable with armoured car 3.

Fuhrer decides as to Jeschonnek's questions of 1 February:

a) one has to employ against the Hague (d.H.) forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there.
In order to achieve this, one of the landings can be made in the centre of the Hague.
Unlimited use of arms against airfields and anti-aircraft guns is authorized.
Relative to an attack against all ships found between the English East Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by the Air Force, the Foreign Office is still to be consulted.
Chief of Home Defence (Chef L. Translator's note: WARLIMONT) also Admiral Schuster) 17.00 hrs) states in this matter that he does not want any exception.

H1157-0150



[redacted]

February 5 1940

Special staff "Weser Exercise" meets, is welcomed by Chief of Armed Forces High Command, and gives instructions. Still no Air Force Representative.

26th February 1940

Fuhrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case "Yellow".

Chief of Home Defence (Chef L) charged with examining this problem. Fuhrer decides that Navy will have to wait to commence mine-laying from the air until employment of a large force of planes is possible. (transmitted to Chief of Home Defence.)

3rd March 1940

Fuhrer expresses himself very sharply about the necessity of swift entry into Norway with very strong forces. No delay by branches of Armed Forces. Very rapid acceleration of attack is necessary.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to subordinate Air Force units to 21st Army Corps.

Fuhrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case "Yellow", with a few days interval.

May 8th:

Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service (Abwehrmeldungen) the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.

According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don't work hand in hand with the English or whether they really want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the general situation, but development of fog in the next days must still be reckoned with.

Führer does not want to wait any longer.
Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. Führer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer.

Departure of Envoy Kiewitz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May 9th.

In the evening, I agree with him on the various telegrams.

May 9th:

Führer decides that he will definitely make a start on May 10th. Departure with Führer train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug.

After report by Joschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 21.00 hrs.

The same to Chief of Home Defence (i.e. WARLIMONT)

May 11th - 13th:

The operations take a course favourable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gennep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the individual units hold out. On the R., the junction of the 9th armoured division with them is effected. The citadel of Liege has been broken into.

Feb 6th:

...New idea: Carry out "H" and "Weser Exercise" only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war.....

Feb 21st.

Führer has talked with General v. Falkenhorst, and charges him with preparation of "Weser Exercise". Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.

Proposal by Fromm, to take only units with German equipment. These would be 7th parachute (Flieger) Division, 22nd Division, 1 regiment of 1 Mountain Division, two divisions of the 7th wave, a motorised brigade (rifle brigade 11 with one armoured vehicle).

Feb 28th:

I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer, that case "Yellow" and "Weser Exercise" must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. Führer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible.

15.00 hrs - Staff Falkenhorst reports on preparations so far. In this connection, I explain to him the new basis for preparations.

Proposals for forces to be employed for:

| | |
|---|---|
| N (Norway) 4 parachute companies. | 22nd Inf Div or 16th Inf Regt. |
| 2 mountain divisions - | 2 divisions of 7th wave. |
| D (Denmark) 1 corps headquarters. | Police division. |
| | 1 division of 3rd wave. |
| | L of C division. |

It is still under consideration, whether reinforced rifle brigade 11 should go to Group D (task force for Denmark) and then to N (Norway) or straight to N (Norway).

Proposed number of combat planes too high.

Feb 29th:

15.00 hrs. Report of Staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen, Kraus very satisfactory to the Fuhrer. He agrees with the proposals.

Fuhrer also wishes to have a strong task force (Gruppe) in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont (Chef L) instructed to make out immediately the order to the Army, Navy and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces, Central Office, to make out a similar order re strenghtening the Staff.

Mar. 3rd:

Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a sift entry into N (Norway) with strong forces.

No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary.

C-in-C of the Air Force opposes any subordination of unity of the Air Force to 21st Army Corps.

Führer decides to carry out "Weser Exercise" before case "Yellow" with a few days interval.



H1157-0152

H1157-0153

5th March.

1500 hours. Big conference with the three Commanders-in-Chief about "Weser Exercise". Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are worthless.

Result:
a) Stronger forces to Narvik
b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim).
c) Christiansand can be left out at first.
d) 6 divisions envisaged for Norway.
e) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen.

7th March.

Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations are now taking firm shape. The Führer signs a directive containing all changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be changed anymore now.

13 March.

Führer does not give order yet for "W" (Weser Exercise). He is still looking for an excuse.

14th March.

English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines, doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Führer has not yet decided what reason to give for "Weser Excerise". Wrong news report in American Press.

C.in C. of the Navy is doubtful whether it is still important to play the (word missing) in N (Norway). Open to question whether it would not be better to undertake case "Yellow" before "Weser Exercise". Danger that in that case the English would immediately land at Narvik, as we would have been the first to violate neutrality.....

28th March.

The Norwegians are interning U21, seemingly because of maladroit statements of the commander, who did not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be that a mistake was made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.

In the evening the Fuhrer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on land forces.

29th March.

Talk with Commander in Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants decision about use of air mines.

Führer talks to him alone about retention of ships. Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) rejects Narvik, but wants to examine whether Trondheim cannot be set up as a base immediately.

2nd April.

1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Führer. All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise for April 9th.

H1157-0154



4th April

Fuhrer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence 1 (Chef Abwehr 1) returns with good results from the talks with Quisling in Copenhagen.

9th April

The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.

Bluecher sinks after a heroic fight, Commanding Admiral and Commander 103 (Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.

Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.

Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand surrendered to attack by planes and Karlsruhe.

19th April

Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Fuhrer's opinion, force has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal (Goering)? is moving in the same direction. He criticos as defects, that we didn't take sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population, that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn't supply enough troops. The Air Force can't do everything. Field Marshal works in the same direction; he criticizes the [illegible] against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that it was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough [illegible] brought up by the Navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything.

21st March

Misgivings of Task Force 21 (= reinforced 21st Army Corps) about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuhrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up, it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken, and even exaggerate them.

2256)

H1157-0155

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1915-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 111

Decree concerning the leadership of the Armed Forces.
4 February 1938

Erlass über die Führung der Wehrmacht
vom 4 Februar 1938

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From now on, I take over directly the command of the Whole Armed Forces.

The former Armed Forces department in the Reichs War Ministry will come directly under my command with all its tasks which it fulfilled under the jurisdiction of the "supreme command of the Army" and my military staff.

At the head of the staff of the supreme command of the Armed Forces is the former Chief of the Armed Forces department as "Chief of the supreme command of the Armed Forces". He is equal in rank to Reichs Minister.

At the same time, the supreme command takes the responsibility for the affairs of the Reichs Ministry of War, and by my order, the chief of the supreme command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority formerly belonging to the Reichs Minister.

It is the supreme command of the Armed Forces' duty to carry out in peace time in accordance with my instructions, the preparation of the defense system of the Reich.

Berlin 4 February 1938

The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister and Chief of the
Reichs Chancellory Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces Keitel

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1915-PS

11 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd. Lt., Inf. 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1915-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt, Inf,
0-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2018-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1539

# Führer's Decree Establishing a Ministerial Council For Reich Defense

30 August 1939

"Erlass des Führers über die Bildung eines Ministerrats für die Reichsverteidigung"
vom 30 August 1939

---

For the period of the present foreign political tension, I decree the following for the uniform leadership of administration and economy:

I

(1) A Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall be established as a standing committee out of the Reich Defense Council.

(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall include: General Field Marshall Goering as chairman, Führer's Deputy, Commissioner General for Reich Administration, Commissioner General for the Economy, Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory, Chief of the High Command for the Armed Forces

(3) The chairman may draw on other members of the Reich Defense Council including further plenipotentiaries for duties

II

The Ministerial Council for Reich Defense may issue decrees with statutory effect, in so far as I have not provided for the passing of a law by the Reich Government or the Reichstag.

III

The authority of General Field Marshall Goering under the Decree for the Administration of the Four-Year Plan of October 13, 1936 (RGBl. I 887) including his power to issue instructions shall remain unaffected.

IV

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory shall supervise the business of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense.

V

I shall determine the period for the expiration date of this decree.

Berlin, 30 August 1939.

The Führer
Adolf Hitler

Göring
General Field Marshall

The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory.
Dr. Lammers.



H1157-0156

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2018-P S.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.



H1157-0157

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2031-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, No. 10

distributed on 5 February 1938, Page 112

Decree relating to the Establishment of a Secret Cabinet Council of February 4, 1938

("Erlass über die Errichtung eines Geheimen Kabinettsrats")

As my advisary board in the direction of the foreign policy, I hereby install a secret cabinet council.

I appoint as President of the secret cabinet council the Reichminister Freiherr von Neurath.

I appoint as members of the secret cabinet council:

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop
The Prussian Minister - President, Reich Minister for Aeronautics and Supreme Commander of the "Luftwaffe" General Field Marshall Herman Göring.
The Deputy of the Führer, Reich-Minister Rudolf Hess
The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Goebbels.
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory, Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers
The Supreme Commander of the Army, Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch,
The Supreme Commander of the Navy, General Admiral Dr. h.c. Erich Raeder,
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, General of the Artillery Wilhelm Keitel.

The current affairs of the secret cabinet council will be conducted by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory.

Berlin, February 4, 1938

The Führer and Reich Chancellor

ADOLF HITLER

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory,

Dr. LAMMERS

20 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NUMBER 2031PS

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2031 PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON
0-46312

H1157-0158

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2194-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berchtesgaden, the 4, September 1938

Note to the Reich Defense Law

1. The Publications of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938, remains suspended.

2. The following laws and cabinet decisions are repeated effective immediately.

A. Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935.

B. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 April 1933 to form a Reich Defense Counsel.

C. Rectification and completion of 13 Dec. 1934 of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 Apr. 1933.

D. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on activity of the CB in peace times.

The Leader and Reich Chancellory,
(Signed) Adolph Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief
of Reich Chancellory
(Signed) Dr. Lammers

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2149-PS

I, A. BREINER, X-046349, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2194-PS

A. BREINER
Civilian
X-046349

H1157-0159

H1157-0160

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 2329-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SECRET Stamp

Top Secret
Through Officers only

The Commander in Chief of the Army
Operations Section (Ia)
General Staff of the Army
No 4402/39 Secret

HQ, Army High Command
7, October 1939.

11 copies
2nd copy

General von Beck takes over command of the newly formed Army Group B on 10th October 1939 at 12.00 hours.

Task of Army Group B is the protection of the German boundary from the mouth of the Ems to the line of demarcation with Army Group C. For this task Army Group B holds the western fortifications: the resistance begins on the border.

The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.

At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so demands.

The order for the occupation is given by the Army High Command until then, any border isolation Dutch or Belgian territory must be avoided most carefully.

signed von Brauchitsch

certified Hinsinger.

(signature) Jaiymyer

Distribution
Army Group B) by telegraph
Army Group C)

Handwritten notes

Chief J.N.W
8-10-39

Supreme Hq
Chief of Army Signal Corps
Chief of Quartermaster IV
Org Department
Gen of Air Force with Commander in Chief of the Army operation

Insp F 9/10 Ie 10oo2/39 g.K.
Ju 8-10

Department (1a, 11 111,

Hand written notes)
Archives of the Army.

21st Army Group 6623 (9) F A III

H1157-0161

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2798-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Conversation between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15 March, 1939, 1315 to 1415 hours.

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Others present were:

General Field Marshal Goering
General Keitel
Secretary of the State von Weizsäcker
Minister of the State Meissner
Secretary of the State Dietrich
Councillor of the Legation Hewel

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President Hacha greets the Fuehrer and expresses his thanks for being received by the latter. He states that he has long wished to become acquainted with the man whose remarkable ideas he has often read and followed. (They are seated) Hacha: He had been unknown until a short time ago. He had never taken part in politics, but had been a legal official in the Vienna Administrative Department, as as such he purposely had not paid any attention to politics, in order to remain impartial to the parties toward whom he had to act as a judge. In 1918 he was called to Prague and in 1925 was appointed President of the Administrative Court of Justice. As such he had had no connection with the politicians, or as he would rather say, to the "politicasters", and very seldom came into contact with them. He must mention at once that he had hardly any relations with the government, and that his communications with the members of the government were restricted to a minimum. He never had been "persona grata". He met with President Masaryk only once a year at a supper for the Judges, and he met Benes even more rarely. The one time he had met the latter, they had had a misunderstanding. Otherwise the whole regime was strange to him, so strange that immediately after the revolution, he had asked himself if it was fortunate for Czechoslovakia to be an independent state. This fall the task fell to me of heading the state. He was an old man. His misgivings were overcome when it was represented to him as a patriotic duty to take over the position. In taking over this position he was faced with the most difficult task of his life, and thus he had been bold enough to ask the Fuehrer to receive him.

He was convinced that the fate of Czechoslovakia was in the hands of the Fuehrer, and he believed that its fate was well cared for in his hands. He had no grounds for complaint in what had recently taken place in Slovakia. He had long been convinced that the various populations in this body-politic cannot live together. Although their language was quite similar, they had developeddifferently and Czechoslovakia was more closely related to Germany than to Slovakia, which leans more toward the Hagyars. The Czechs had had relations only with the Protestant Slovaks while they had repulsed the Catholics. For these reasons a good understanding could never have been reached, and he was glad that matters had developed in this way. He was not alone in this opinion, which surely was shared by 80% of the population.

H1157-0162



Half an hour ago he had received the announcement that the Carpatho-Ukraine had declared itself independent. He believed that the Fuehrer will have none too favorable experiences with the Slovaks. The Fuehrer had probably heard rumors in the last few days that Prague had committed a violation of the constitution. This violation of the constitution would then have to be blamed on him. But he a Jurist knew that the government was dismissed on a strictly legal basis. For the Constitution itself had not been observed by a portion of the Czech Government. In this connection, unfortunately events occurred which he regreted, but which were brought about by application of measures to enforce order. They had not been intentional. But, otherwise, he was not shedding any tears over Slovakia.

But now he came to that which moved him most, the fate of his people. He believed that the Fuehrer was the one who'd understand him if he stated the opinion that Czechoslovakia had the right to want to live a national life. The geographical location of Czechoslovakia naturally required the best relations with Germany. This was the basis of its existence as an independent nation. This conviction was shared by the larger part of the Czech people. There were of course, several exceptions, but it must be considered that the new Czechoslovakia had been in existence for only 6 months. Czechoslovakia had been reproached for still having many adherents of the Benes system. But they are not the ones who are named as such. Only in journalistic circles did this system still have friends. The government was trying, by every means, to shut them up. This was about all that he wished to present.

The Fuehrer replied that he regretted that he had to require this journey of the President. But this morning, after long consideration he became convinced that this journey, in spite of the advanced age of the President could be of great advantage to his country. For it was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene. The German Reich, on principle, feels no enmity toward any other nations. We are fond of, or at least uninterested in nations that do not wrong us. The German people have no hatred for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, however, had a very different attitude towards us. The Fuehrer gives various examples to illustrate how this attitude has shown itself in connection with great political events as, for instance, during the occupation of the Rhineland. At that time Czechoslovakia had addressed a note to France saying that Czechoslovakia would be also ready to join in, in the case that France would take military steps against Germany. Czechoslovakia had done so, notwithstanding the fact that the territory in question was originally German. This same attitude she had shown many times, for instance, against Italy during the Ethiopian conflict, etc.. In 1938 the situation had become unbearable. On 28 May he had decided to draw the consequences. He did not feel hostility against any nation but he was the most ruthless defender of the rights of his own people and in this fight he was determined to take any step. In regard to this he was the front soldier who ruthlessly and without scruples stands up and fights for his conviction. His loyal attitude alone was responsible for the remaining part of Czechoslovakia. He took the risk of turning the friendly attitude of Hungary towards him into a hostile one by stopping Hungary's political ambitions and forcing her to solve the problem according to ethnographic principles as Germany did. He did this despite the fact that the craziest economic and tariff situations followed. He took the responsibility for these restrictions not because he could not have acted otherwise but because he was convinced that it was the right thing to do.

For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really stand up for Czechoslovakia.

H1157-0163



Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him.

If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to Germany but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the little Carpathian Mts. He did not want to draw the final consequences in the autumn because he had believed that it was possible to live together. But even at that time and also later in his conversations with Ch alkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benesch's tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many other things which, to him, were a symbol of the total positive. At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since, Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer endure life as it was.

"This it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday. I sent for the Hungarian ambassador and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this country". We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkowsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the Germany army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain national liberty.

H1157-0164



We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him because if his instinct of self-preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he was reading the foreign press. It would leave the impression on him which could be summarized in a German proverb: "The moor has done his duty, the moor may go".

That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory to the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his just mentioned suggestions.

That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the blood shed would aslo force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.

The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech batallion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire with Chvalkowsky.in order to discuss what should be done.

Hacha states that the situation was quite clear to him and that in this case any resistance was senseless. But he would ask the Fuehrer how he would go about, to restrain in four hours all of the Czech people from resisting. The Fuehrer says he should hold council with his men. The now rolling military machine could not be stopped. He should turn to his offices in Prague. It was a great decision but he could see the possibility for a long period of peace between both nations. If the decision would be different he could foresee the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Hacha asks whether it was the whole purpose of the invasion to disarm the Czech army. This could perhaps also be done in a different manner.

The Fuehrer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He did not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other gentlemen whether they shared his opinion which was answered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech army was by the German army.

Today this was for Hacha the hardest step of his life, but he believed that already in a few years this decision would be viewed as comprehensible and in 50 years probably as a blessed one.

H1157-0165



After that both Czechs are retiring.

After the conference between Hacha and Chvalkowsky with our gentlemen at the conclusion of which one had come to an understanding on the wording of the agreement, the gentlemen mentioned at the beginning of this memorandum come once together to a final discussion in the Fuehrer's study.

Once again the military situation is being thoroughly discussed and the General Fieldmarshall describes the situation once more in detail. The Fuehrer thinks that perhaps Hacha's message may have not gotten through to some places where clashes of arms may be expected, but one could by and large figure on an invasion without incidences.

The Fuehrer continues that according to his belief inspite of all the embitterment which could be caused by the invasion and occupation by Germany nevertheless the conviction would slowly dawn that a living together of the two nations for centuries was advantageous. The idea that the two people were compelled to fight each other would disappear. Czechoslovakia was surrounded by Germany and every reasonable person would have to admit that a close living together of the two nations whould be the watchword. Furthermore the problem of denationalisation played no part since such an idea was complete foreign to the Germans and to Nationalsocialist ideology. We don't desire nor aim at denationalisation. The ones should live happily as Czechs and the others as Germans.

Hacha replies that this remark of the Fuehrer was of the greatest importance to him.

The Fuehrer continued that only in economic, military and political matters could no opposition be allowed. Czechia should keep her own head of state, and his principles which he will carry through formed the basis for a pacification of this territory for centuries to come.

Hacha interjected and remarked that in other words this was not a plan for purchasing souls like it was during Austrial rule, and asked whether, economically, a custom's union was planned.

The first point the Fuehrer denied with a smile. The second point was answered in the affirmative by the General Fieldmarshall stating that Germany and Czechia were one territory economically speaking. Furthermore Czechia would receive orders which would certainly double her production.

The Fuehrer said that the Czech people would again economically through the union with Germany because they would become a part of the great German economic territory. He did not want to destroy Czech economy but would enliven it tremendously.

Hacha asked whether detailed directives to that effect had already been prepared.

The Fuehrer replied that this was the responsibility of an economic commission because for him, too, the whole affair had come very suddenly. A few weeks ago he did not know a thing about the entire business. He talked again about the past and the tactics employed by Benes and finally mentioned the 28 May on which date he had announced his decision to act to a small circle. The Fuehrer concluded that this settlement which now would be made was to be final, bearable, and should leave no doubts. In any case the Czechs would obtain more rights than they had ever granted to the Germans within their territory.

Thereupon the agreement was signed by the Fuehrer, the Reich's, for Foreign Affairs, Hacha and Chvalkowsky.

Signed: Hewel

H1157-0166



CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2798-PS

21 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/Sgt, AUS, 33,812,169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of document No. 2798-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/S AUS
33,812,169

JODL

Positions and dates at which they were held.

Operations Department of the Army (Heer), 1932- 35.

Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the Armed Forces (Abteilung Landesverteidgung im OKW), 1935 - Oct. 1938.

Artillery Commander ("Artillerie Komandeur") of the 44th Division, Vienna and Brno, Oct. 1938 - 27 Aug. 1939.

Chief of Operation Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Wehrmachtsfuhrungstabes in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), August 1939 - 1945.

Dates of Promotion:

1932 - Major and Lieutenant Colonel

1936 - Colonel

1939 - Generalmajor

1940 - General der Artillerie

1944 - Colonel-General

Certificate

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing list of offices and positions held by me (Alfred Jodl), together with the respective dates, is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ A. Jodl
Defendant

/s/ Dr. Exner
Attorney for Defendant

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2865-PS

20 November 1945

I, JAMES H. MATHIAS, Capt., JAGD, 0-2052475, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2865-PS.

JAMES H. MATHIAS
Capt., JAGD
0-2052475

H1157-0167

H1157-0168

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3019-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DAS ARCHIV

Vol. 18, p. 860

General Major Keitel, formerly VI Infantry Commander, was appointed successor to General Major von Reichenau as Chief of the Wehrmachtsamt in the Reichs Kriegsministry.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 3019-PS

21 November 1945.

I, KARL E. LACHMANN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3019-PS.

KARL E. LACHMANN.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3020-PS OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Excerpt from the Fuehrer's speech in the Reichstag on 19 July 1940 on page 386 of "Das Archiv" Reference Book for Politics-Economy-Culture. Edited by Alfred-Ingemar Berndt published by: Publishing House of Otto Stollberg, Berlin W 9.

. . . . . .

In my High Command of the Armed Forces I promote Colonel General Keitel to the rank of Field Marshall and Major General Jodl to the rank of General of the artillery.

. . . . . .

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3020-PS

12 December 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, 01335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true partial translation of Document 3020-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
0-1335567

H1157-0169

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1103.38 Most Secret Ausl. VI.

1.10.38

7 Copies
7th Copy

To:

OKH (Section 6. Army General Staff)
OKM (Naval War Staff, 1st Division for the attention of Min. Rat. Dv. Eckhardt)
Reich Minister for Air and Civ C. Air Force (Air Force General Staff for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Mueller)
Foreign Office via the Foreign Office Representative (VAA)

Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the violations of international law which may be expected on the part of fighting troops.

Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, colums C 1 and C 2 had to be filled in directly here for the time being.

The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an opinion here so that a final version may be drawn up.

The same is requested of the Foreign Office.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

By Order

sgd. Burkner

3 Enclosures:

H1157-0170

MOST SECRET

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCIDENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROPAGANDA HANDLING

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law (Gruppe Voelkenvecht) | | (d) Explanation by propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) Judgement by international law | (2) Justification by the laws of warfare | |
| (1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations. | | I) Art. 25 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare of 1907 forbids attacks and firing on undefended towns, villiages, dwellings and buildings by whatever means. Bombing by aircraft is to be included in the special qualification "by whatever means | | |
| 1a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas | 1a) In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed | Giving the supposit ion that no orders for the bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas will be given by us under any circumstances, the actionin the case in question would have been carried out by mistake | An accident of this kind can best be explained publicly by the fact that the British Embassy is in the immediate vicinity of military installations, the bombing of which was an indispensible military necessity. If, therefore the British Embassy was hitby mistake, it is to be described as a regretable accident. | |

H1157-0171

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incident | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Explanation by propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| | | | such as are unfortunately unavoidable in war. The German Government will pay compensation for the damage. | |
| 2) Injuring or killing of subject os neutral states outside the actual war zone. | Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed. | Since it must be assumed that the deaths or injuries were caused unintentionally by our troops, there is no question of a violation of international law. | the deaths and injuries caused unintentionally are to be excused as being unavoidable accidents which the events of war can cause even to non-belligerents. Compensation is to be guaranteed. | |
| 3) Bombingand shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches, and cultral monuments. | 3) The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague. | Art. 17 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare lays down that during seiges and bombardments all necessary steps mustbe taken to spare, as much as possible, any building dedicated to religious services, art, science, welfare, also historical monuments, hospitals and centers for sick and wounded provided that they are not at the same time being used for | It seems appropriate, in this case, to make a public announcement with the corresponding justification after the attack. | |

H1157-0172

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incident | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of International Law Group | | (d) Explanation by propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| | | military purposes. The elucidation of the last named reservation above is always very difficult and lengthy. Unless such a case is undisputedly established, it cannot be judged by international law. Deliberate firing on protected buildings which are above suspicion is contrary to International Law in any case. Under the supposition that the Prague Hradschin, as the seat of government, is used for military purposes, which include, among other things, the maintenance of the military power of the Czech people, air attacks upon it are justified. | | |
| 4) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions or of new types of war weapons such as gas, flame throwers chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances. | A) On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered. | According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare. | If the assertion, that the opponent - in this case the Czechs - used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the | |

H1157-0173

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | (d) Explanation by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | Justification by the laws of war |
| | | that they consider themselves exempt from the prohibition should the opponent use gas. Therefore, the burning question of who violated the prohibition first will always arise when the decision is made. Whether this can be established is doubtful. | firing of gas projectiles is justified and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly important to furnish the proof. If the assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way did the Italians in the Abyssinian War. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must also be proved. |
| 5) Retaliatory measures against enemy civilians who take part in combat or are guilty of | 5) Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of | If the inhabitants of an enemy territory under our occupation commit hostile acts against us or our allies, they are guilty of war treason, | If Czech civilians, who are not recognizable as soldiers, are seized, while committing the acts |

H1157-0174

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT [redacted] 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Explanation by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| espionage. (Passing of intelligence) | important bridges. destruction of food stuffs and fodder are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot. | which must be judged by German law (Armed Forces Penal Gazette). The right to punish enemy civilians for committing hostile acts against the occupying power derives from Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land and Warfare which allows the occupying power to carry out public administration and expressly assigns to it the responsibility for the maintenance of public order and public life. | and crimes mentioned in the case 5b, and shot out of hand, this of retaliatory measure is justifiable and permissible under International Law only if the lives of our own troops were endangered. If offenders of this kind are taken prisoner, they may not simply be put against a wall, butmust be tried according to the decrees relating to the case. This procedure can take place briefly and summarily in the field. The experiences of the World War have taught us that this procedure offers, the enemy no opportunity of attack, whereas executions without trial are the best foundations for the enemy's propaganda. Encroachments actually made on our part will have to be explained either as the necessity for our | |

H1157-0175

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Explanation b the propaganda mi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| | | | troops to defend themselves or by the assertion that the Czechs attempted to escape. | |
| 6) Forcing of prisoners and civilians into employment in war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment in the transport service etc) | 6) Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions. | Art. 31 of the agreement signed on 27 July 1929, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, forbids the directing of prisoners of war into work which is directly connected with war measures. Enforcement to do such work is, in any case, contrary to international law. Prisoners of war and civilians may be employed in road building but not in the production of munitions | The use of such measures can be justified as a necessity of war, or with the assertion that the enemy acted in the same way first. | |
| 7) Measures against the population connected with the requisitioning of billets, supplies of food stuffs, fodder and live-stock etc. | 7) For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want. | Art. 52 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare allows the occupying powers to claim payment in kind and service from the communities and inhabitants of an occupied territory. These payments must be in relation to the resources of the country. Harsh oppression of the civil population is justified only if the occupying power is itself in need and must live. Oppression and the enforced delivery of goods unless they are a due military neccisty are not only contrary | Necessity is the only reason justifying excessive requisitioning of toilets and the deliveries of food stuffs and fodder. Mention that the troops are suffering from the same shortage would be appropriate. Moreover it must be added that women, children, and invalids will be provided for as far as possible. | |

H1157-0176

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example- | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Explanation by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | Justification by the laws of war | |
| | | to international law, they are also unworthy. | | |
| 8) Compulsory evacuation of the population from their homes. | 8) Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area. | According to Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare and if military necessity urgently required it. The removal of inhabitants to the rear of the operational zone is authorized by international law. | The most advisable justification is that the inhabitants must be protected against bombardment. | |
| 9) Measures which affect religious and church life | 9) Churches are used for military accomodation. | German soldiers will use churches as military accomodation for men and horses only in the most extreme cases of need. | If the urgent military necessity exist, justification under International Law is granted and must be given out in public with this as the reason. Experience has shown however, that the use of religious buildings for such purposes offers effective propaganda material to the enemy. | |
| 10) Violation of neutral territorial rights by aircraft flying over or by bombing. | 10) In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft. | According to Art. 1 of the 5th Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is <u>not to violated.</u> A <u>deliberate</u> violation by flying over this territory is a breach of International Law, if the neutral powers have declared. | An attempt at denial should first be made if it is unsuccessful, a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds of miscalculation of position to the Polish Government and compensation for damage guaranteed. | |

H1157-0177

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Explanation by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| | | an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of International Law, provided that this action is not expressly permitted. | | |
| 11) Measures of naval warfare which are part of the mine-U-boat war, the blockade and the war on merchant shipping (on the basis of material available to the Naval War Staff) | 11a) Stationing of U-boats and war activity within the approaches to the Baltic or within neutral coastal water.<br>b) Prize laws measures as part of the war on merchant shipping, which are objected to by the enemy anestor by neutral as contrary to international law.<br>c) Use of armement by armed merchant ships.<br>d) Announcement of declared areas. | No judgement by international law, of the questions listed here, can be made without concultation with OKM, as it is not known here, what measures are intended should the occasion arise. | | |
| 12) Measures aimed at stiffening the will to resist on the part of national minorities | 12) Proclamations over the German radio to Hungarian, Slovak and Polish minorities who are opposed to the Czech Government. | The spreading of news by whatever means with a view to raising the moral forces of peoples in the enemy territories who are racially related or connected is included in the ruses of warfare. | Justification of our own measures is not necessary, in any case the opponents will reply with their own i.e. counter propaganda. | |

H1157-0178

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | Explanation by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by Int ernational Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| either foreign or of German origin in enemy countries (by the distribution of leaflets by air, proclamations, broadcasts, training and arming), | | allowed under Art. 24 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. | | |

H1157-0179

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C[illegible]
Continued

MOST SECRET

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| 1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations. | | Judgement by International Law as in Section I No. 1 c 1 | | |
| 1a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas. | 1a) In an air raid on Berlin, the French Embassy is destroyed | In no case are extra-territorial buildings military objectives, therefore according to Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, they must be spared asfar as possible. | If it is at all possible, claim that the enemy carried out deliberate precision bombing and what is specially to be condemned is that the French Embassy contains valuable art treasures and that subjects of enemy states are staying there, having found asylum there. Moreover that the French Embassy made efforts to avert the conflict. | |
| 2) Injuring or killing of subjects of neutral states outside the actual zone. | American Subjects are injured and killed in an air raid on Dresden. | Subjects of neutral statesoutside the actual war zone are protected by International Law. | It will be difficult to prove that the enemydid this with intent. The only other possible assertion is to that as the buildings and persons were clearly distinguishable by indications of American territory, or white flags, therewas no excuse for attacking them. There were no military objectives near the scene of the on-slaught. | |

H1157-0180

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Counter mea by the propaga minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by the International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| 3) Bombing and shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches and cultural monuments. | 3) In an air raid on Vienna, hospitals are destroyed and Red Cross personnel and patients killed. | Judgement by International Law as in Section I No. 3 c 1. | Accuse the enemy of having violated Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare by omitting to provide suitably for the protection of the hospitals in Vienna, which by day and night were marked sufficiently distinctly by the Red Cross. In this case also, the intention of precision bombing must be imputed as much as possible. | |
| 4) Destruction of villages, settlements, agricultural areas, industrial and communications installations which serve no military purpose. | 4) Detonators are placed in the Aussig Dam in order to destroy the surrounding area and the inhabitants by flooding. | Prohibition of international law exist only with regard to the destruction and removal of enemy property, other than in those cases where this destruction or removal is made urgent by the necessities of war. (Art. 23g of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare). | Such destruction as the blowing up of the Aussig Dam can only be branched as the most inhuman, senseless, and useless method of taking revenge on innocent people. Compare similar cases of barbaric action in the Hussite Wars and in the behavior of the Czech Legion in Siberia, 1918/1920. | |
| 5) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions and of new types of war weapon such as gas, flame-throwers, chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances. | When Czech troops withdrew from the Sudeten-German area, wells in many places are contaminated. | Judgement by International Law as in Section II par 5 C 1. | Making wells unfit for use by throwing in stable manure for example, is an authorized means of war, International Law forbids only the poisoning of wells. Contamination by bacteria, on which this example is apparently based, is forbidden by International Law both in the Hague Ruling for Land Warfare and in the Convention of 1925. A propaganda | |

H1157-0181

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

| (a) Incident | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Countermeasures by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| 6) Underhands means of waging war, continuing the fight after the enemy hasapparently surrendered - camouflage by abuse of German or neutral national markings. | In Postelberg, Czech trucks and locomotives have been camouflaged by GermanNational markings and swastikas. | Underhand means of warfare as, for example, feigning death and shooting from the rear at advancing troops, showing white flags and firing with hidden machine guns on the approach of the unsuspecting enemy justify immediate reprisals without mercy. The misuse of the flag of truce, the national flag or of the military badges or uniforms of the opponent or of the Red Cross is forbidden. (Art. 23e Hague Rules for Land Warfare) but it becomes misuse only if enemy operations are undertaken under the camouflage; there enemy operations also justify immediate reprisal measures. The camouflaging of Czech trucks and locomotives by German national markings and swastikas isnot contrary to international law. It becomes contrary thereto only if they are employed in enemy operations, under this camouflage. | The enemy must be accused of employing unchivalrous means of warfare, and he will gain little advantage by means which are dishonorable and repugnant to an honest soldier. attack is therefore justified. | |

H1157-0182

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | (d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war |
| 7) Maiming or killing of wounded, prisoners, defenseless persons, women and children. | When being taken into the Eger hospital, a seriously injured Sudeten-German motor cyclist shot by Czech soldiers, who said: "The German swine will die anyway." | Killing or injuring one's own subjects does not come under the judgement of international law- killing or injuring of defenseless persons, wounded and prisoners of enemy nationality is expressly forbidden by International Law. | In this case, propaganda can only be directed once more against Czech brutality in general. In addition it must be stressed that those injured and killed were subjects who belonged to Czech state only because they were forced to and whose return to the Reich had already been promised. |
| 8) Use of prisoners of war for war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment in transport service etc) | German prisoners of war are employed under guard as truck drivers for tranferring back raw materials of war. | Judgement by International Law as in Section I para. 8 C 1. | Discretion must be used in reproaches of this kind, for it is possible that similar accusations could be made against us by the opponent if the fact is to be made use of for propaganda purposes, all that can be asserted is that our prisoners wereemployed by the opponent for transporting munitions behind their front lines. |
| 9) Terrorism measures against national minorities aimed at surpressing and breaking their consciousness of nationality, their religious life, and church and cultural activities. | Officials of the Sudeten Party are arrested and abducted, their homes seized andlooted. | The oppression of one's own subjects in Czechoslovakia does not come under the judgement of International Law, but to the judgement of the Treaty of 1919 regarding t he protection of minorities. In every case, this would have to be consulted in the judgement of the case. In addition see concluding sentence of para. 7C2 | The arrest and abduction of officials of the Sudten Party and robbing and looting them can be branded only as outbreaks of Czech brutality. (similar outbreaks have already been employed for propaganda purposes). |

H1157-0183

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C
Continued

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by International Law | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| 10) Compulsory evacuation of national minorities from their homes, and confiscating their food stuffs, fodder and live-stock etc. | Members of the Polish minority are compulsorily evacuated to the interior of the country in military transports. | A judgement from the standpoint of International Law does not come into the question. | Also, all that can be referred to in propaganda are Czech acts of brutality. | |
| 11) Measures for inciting, arming, and taking control of the the civilian population (Franc-tireur war-fare) | In localities on the Czech-Silesian frontier summones to fight German troops are issued and arms distributed to the civilian population. | Measures for incitfng one's own subjects, for arming and conducting guerilla warfare, are allowed. The national warning itself must nost exceed the limits prescribed by International law (Art. 1 and 2 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare) i.e. prescribed badges recognizeble at a distance bearing arms openly etc. | In this case it would be appropriate to give warnings referring to the civilian warfare of August 1914 in Belgium, which caused the death of thousands of inhabitants. Cunning snipers without uniform and soldiers in civilian clothes, after pretending to be acquiescent, attacked soldiers on the march and in their billets and provoked the reprisals justified by such actions. For use in propaganda, it must be particularly stressed that the above-named conditions justifying a national uprising were not fulfilled and the outward identification marks of armed civilians were lacking. | |

H1157-0184

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example- | (c) Attitude of the International Group | | (d) Counter measures by agenda mini |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1) Judgement by InternationalLaw | 2) Justification by the laws of war | |
| 12) Violation of neutral territorial rights by flying over or bombing it. | Czech airmen drop bombs on the German-Polish frontier destroying the town.hall in Lissa and a church in Rawitsch. | It is contrary to International Law for combat aircraft to fly over the territories of neutral power. | The violation of the neutrality of Polish territory and the destruction of non-military buildings of which the church in Rawitsch is specially protected by International law, constitute a serious breach of International Law which must be correspondingly use to the full in propaganda. In addition it is necessary to point out that it was obviously a deliberate air raid. | |
| 13) Slanderous propaganda by false reports on themeasures of the German command and on the combat elements, by accounts of atrocities in press reports, news picture broadcasts, etc. | The Melnik Radio Station spreads reports that dumdum projectiles have been used by German troops Polish newspicture, show falso photographsof this. | Meeing the eremy co ntemptible is a stratagem of war allowed by international law, even if is so doing many lies and misrepresentations are made. The efforts made by different powers, Germany's amongst them, to form an international agreement to restrict the propaganda of war atrocities, failed in 1932 | Remedy in this case is possible only by correcting the reports and better still by counter-attack, in which of course, we can also make use of the spreading of atrocity stories shows that nothing more can be done than to attempt to beat the opponent at his own game or get equal with him in some way or other. | |

H1157-0185

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C 2

19 November 1945

I, CLAREBOULTER, P/O.WRNS. 59549, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. C2.

CLARE BOULTER,
P/O, WRNS
59549

H1157-0186

H1157-0187

C.6.

SEC24-1/C-6

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin 30.12.1939.

No. 222 48/39 Most Secret, S.O. only WFA/Section L.I.

10 Copies
5th Copy.

Subject:
Intensified Measures for Sea and Air Warfare in connection with Fall "Gelb."

In addition to the instructions directly concerned with Fall "Gelb" which have already been issued for the Navy and Air Force, the following intensified measures for the conduct of sea and air warfare come into force with the start of operations in the West:

(Red pencil note referring to underlining. This would be an undesirable limitation. (Note in green pencil referring to red pencil note-) Not intended to be.)

1) The Navy will approve the sinking without warning of all ships by U-boats, in sea areas off the enemy coasts where it is possible to use mines. In this case outward appearances should create the impression that mines have been used. U-boats should bear this in mind when taking action and using arms.

The C-in-C of the Navy decides on the exact limits of these areas, and give notification of them via the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

2) As long as Army operations in the West are in progress the Air Force has the following tasks:

(a) To give direct support to these operations (Directive No. 6 Section 4)

In doing so it is important to attack, outside the actual theatre of operations, troop transports from England to France, Belgium or Holland, including ports of embarkation and disembarkation, as well as British Air Force Ground installations in the home country itself, which are used as bases for operations against the Continent.

(b) To tie up as strong forces as possible of fighter aircraft in the British homeland.

It is not in keeping with the whole conduct of the war, however, to unleash the full force of aerial warfare on our own initiative, before we have created for ourselves favourable conditions for it, and before there are strong forces available suitable for operations against Britain.

For this reason, attacks also, which imperil to any great extent the civilian population, are to be reserved for cases which demand reprisals.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel.

(Translator's note - The whole document is scored through once in pencil and the following note added - "Superseded by OKM No. 22010/40 Most Secret, WFA/L I 6 dated 17.1.40, Skl I Op 64/40 Ia J18/c)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-10
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 221/39 Most Secret, SO only

Berlin 28.11.1939

Stamp: C in C Navy
Op 43./39
Recd. 29 Nov. '39

8 copies
2nd copy.

Subject: Employment of the 7th Flieger Division

S.O. only
access only throught
officer.

MOST SECRET

1. Should the quick breakthrough of the 6th Army, north of Liege, fail, owing to the demolition of the bridges over the Maas and the Albert canal, the intended employment of the 7th Flieger Division against the bridgehead at G will also be cancelled.
Special orders for this event will be issued.

2. The Führer is of the opinion that the 7th Flieger Division must on the first day of the attack be employed on another task and requests that the following possibilities be examined:
   a) The occupation of Watcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbour, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare.

   b) Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur and Dinant with the object of keeping them open until the arrival of the mobile troops employed in the 4th army sector.

   c) securing of the territory north of Carignan and north-east of Sedan, so that the mobile troops employed in the sector of Army Group A may be able to escape from the wooded heights south-west and south- east of Bouillon.

3. It is requested that the above-named possibilities be explored as quickly as possible and that the following state their opinion:
   OKA to 2) a) and b)
   Naval War Staff to 2) a)
   Reich minister for Air and C in C Air Force to 2( a),b) and c)

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces.

Sgd. Keitel.

Distribution:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| C in C Army | Copy | 1 |
| C in C Navy | " | 2 |
| Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force. | " | 3 |
| OKW | | |
| WFA | " | 4 |
| Chef L | " | 5 |
| la | " | 6 |
| lb | " | 7 |
| lc | " | 8 |

H1157-0188

H1157-0189



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-10
Contd.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-10

13 Nov. 1945

I, Eve Glazier, P/C W.R.N.S. 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-10.

Eve Glazier
P/C W.R.N.S.
37371

H1157-0190

Sec 24-4(C-39)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr. 4484Z/41 9.K. Chefs. WSFt/Abt. L (1OP)

Fuhrer's Headquarters
(no date)

21 copies
3rd copy Ob.d.M.
I op. 00845-
41 Received 6.6.
Appendix Nil

The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for "Barbarossa" (invasion of Russia). If alterarions should be necessary the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed,

Keitel.

DISTRIBUTION:-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ob.d.H. | (Gen.St.d.H.) | 1st and 2nd copy. |
| Ob.d.M. | (Seekriegsltg) | 3rd and 4th copy. |
| Ob.d.L. | (Lw.Fu. Stab) | 5th and 6th copy. |
| W.B. Norwegen | | 7th copy. |

OKW

| | |
|---|---|
| Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab | 8th copy. |
| Abt. L. | 9th and 15th copy. |
| WNV | 16th copy. |
| Wpr | 17th copy. |
| Wehrm. Trsp. Chef | 18th copy. |
| Ant Ansl./Abw | 19th copy. |
| Abt Ansl. | 20th copy. |
| Wi Ru Amt. | 21st copy. |

Pencil Note:

Correct I op 00910/41 Pages 6 and 10 destroyed and supplemented.

3666

H1157-0191

Sec 24-4/C-39)

Appendix to OKW/WFSt/Abt. L(I op)
Nr$\frac{1}{2}$ 44842/41 g.k. Chef.

TIMETABLE BARBAROSSA

State of preparations on 1.6.41.

1. General notes

The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22.5.

2. Negotiations with Friendly States

(a) Bulgaria is requested not to weaken her units which are protecting her Turkish frontier.
(b) According to the demand of the Supreme Commander of the German troops in Rumania, the Rumanians have started a camouflaged part-mobilization to defend their frontier against possible Russian attack.
(c) Utilization of Hungarian territory for concentrating parts of Army Group South is only considered if it is necessary to push German units between Hungarian and Rumanian troops. This question will not be put to the Hungarian authorities till the middle of June.
(d) Two German divisions are drawn up in the Eastern part of Slovakia. Reinforcements will be stationed in the area around Prosov.
(e) Negotiations for preparations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25.5.
(f) Sweden has not yet been consulted. Negotiations will be started after commencement of operations.

Translator's note:

(Further pages deal with dispositions of Army, Navy and Air Force for Barbarossa).

3670.

H1157-0192

(Sec 24-5/C-48)

C O P Y.

Teleprinter message to C.inC. Navy received 30.11.44.

Most Secret.

- - - Most Secret.

Re; Sabotage in Norway and Denmark. -

Sabotage to dockyards and ships in the Norwegian - Danish area has increased to such an extent that energetic counter-measures are necessary. -

1.) C.inC. Armed Forces Norway and C.inC. Armed Forces Denmark are commissioned to effect the proclamation of an Order and its carrying out to the Reich commissary for the occupied Norwegian territories and to the Reich plenipotentiary in Denmark through F.O. (Battleships); according to this order the personnel and if necessary those connected with them (relatives) are rendered responsible for the cases of sabotage occurring in their works. Every ship-yard worker etc must know that every case of sabotage occurring in his sphere of work entails most grave consequences for him personally, and if he disappears, for his relatives.

2.) C.inC. Armed Forces Norway and C. in C. Armed Forces Denmark will reinforce the defence against sabotage, which up to the present has been carried out by special detachments of the Navy and the Reich commissary for shipping, by escort forces composed of personnel from all arms of the service in collaboration with F.O. (Battleships) with all means available. For this purpose, in South Norway, the homeward stowage * of troops in the area around Oslo is to be held back. If the numerous troops of the homeward stowage available in Oslo and also in Denmark, and the rear units are energetically made use of, the escort can be tripled. I can, moreover, not allow acts of sabotage of this kind to be accepted as acts of God and inevitable, without the authorities responsible for escort being called to account. Troops of the armed forces destined for defence against sabotage are to be placed in readiness for action at the disposal of the F.O. (Battleships) responsible for them.

Chief of Staff, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces signed Keitel,
General Field Marshall Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Ops,
Staff of the Armed Forces -

Section (?) 2 (North) No. 00139/72/44 Most Secret

3/Naval War Staff.
Section 3 Book No.
Defence 6161/44
Most Secret

30.11.44.

| Copies to: | Serial No. |
|---|---|
| 1/Naval War Staff Ia | 1. |
| 1/Naval War Staff Ib | |
| For the attention of Korvettenkapitän Mejer | 2. |
| Naval War Staff Admiralty Section (?) | 3. |

* Translator's note: Presumably this refers to troops awaiting repatriation.

H1157-0193

Exhibit G13 162
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

SEC24-GEN/C-50.

C-50

Naval War Staff

Berlin 17 June 1941.

Reg. No. 1 SKL. Ia 00149/41 MOST SECRET S.O. Only.

MOST SECRET
By hand of Officer only

ORDER

1. Address to:-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Group North | | Copy 1 - 2 |
| Admiral Norway | | Copy 3 - 4 |
| Baltic Station | | Copy 5 - 6 |
| F.O. Cruisers | | Copy 7 - 8 |
| Liaison Staff Finland) | for | Copy 9 - 10 |
| Naval Command "C" | )inform- | Copy 11 - 12 |
| Naval Command "D" | ) ation | Copy 13 - 14 |

1. Enclosed is an Order by the Führer concerning the application of Martial law in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

2. Make copies of the Führer Order of 13th May and attach 2 copies of each to the document mentioned in 1.

3. I Op.

Naval War Staff

Ii iA Ia

H1157-0194



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Section L (IV qu)
No. 44718/41 Most Secret S.O.

Führer's Hq. 14 [illegible] 1941

Most Secret

Only by Officer

(illegible markings)

23 Copies
7th Copy

Subject: Application of military jurisdiction and procedure in area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

Enclosed is an order by the Führer concerning application of military jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures. If possible further distribution will not be made until 1st June 1941.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By order

(Signature) (Undecipherable)

(illegible notation)

DISTRIBUTION:

| | |
|---|---|
| C-in-C of the Army (Ops-Abt) | 1st copy |
| C-in-C of the Army (Gen Qu) | 2nd-3rd copies |
| Supreme Command of the Army (Chief H. Rüst.u.Bd.E) | 4th copy |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (Lw. Führungsstab) | 5th copy |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (Gen Qu) | 6th copy |
| C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff) | 7th copy |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/WFSt | 8th copy |
| Dept L - Chief | 9th copy |
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| WR | 16th copy |
| Armed Forces Propaganda | 17th copy |
| Foreign/Abw | 18th copy |
| Abw III | 19th copy |
| Reserve | 20th-23rd copies |

H1157-0195



The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Fuhrer's Headquarters, 13 May 1941

(Pencil Note-)
One copy for Group South
sent 15.12.1941. V.W.

Order

Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline.

The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.

This is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area "Barbarossa" (Area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration):

I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.

1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.

2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.

3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible; persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.

On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.

6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled.

For the area of the "Political Administration" this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

H1157-0196



II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.

1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.

2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores of other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.

The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

III. Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:-

1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.

2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.

3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

IV. Security

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret":

By order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Checked

Dressel (?)
Major d.G.

H1157-0197



CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-50

16 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-50.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738.

H1157-0198

SEC-24-G/C-51

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Dep.L(IV/Qu)
Nr. 001590/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer's H.Q. 27 July 1941

TOP SECRET

24 Copies
20th Copy

Reference : OKW/WSt/Dep/L(IV Qu)
Nr. 44718/41 Top Secret 14 May 1941

Re: Military Courts

In accordance with the regulation concerning classified material, the following offices will destroy all copies of the Fuehrer's decree of 13 May 1941 issued in the communication mentioned above:

a) all offices upwards to (the rank of) General Commands inclusive

b) Group Commands of the armoured troops

c) Army Commands and offices of equal rank, if there is an inevitable danger that they might fall into the hands of unauthorized persons (Rules concerning classified materials No. 58)

The validity of the decree is not affected by the destruction of the copies. In accordance with Paragraph III it remains the personal responsibility of the Commanding Officers to see to it that the officers and legal advisers are instructed in time and that only those sentences are confirmed which correspond to the political intentions of the High Command.

This order will be destroyed together with the copies of the Fuehrer's decree.

The Chief of the High Command

(signed)Keitel

Distribution:

the same as referred to in
the communication above.

H1157-0199

EXTRACT TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-52
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret
By Officer only.

Chief, High Command of the Armed Forces — Führer Hq, 23 July 1941
No. 441254/41, Top Secret, by officer only
Armed Forces Operational Staff/Dept. L (I Op)

14 copies
copy no. 2.

(Note: Several hand-written routing notations and rubber stamp)

Supplement to order no. 33

On 22 July, the Führer, after receiving the Commander of the Army issued the following order with a view to supplementing and enlarging Order No. 33:

1 to 5: (strategic measures)

6. In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East, the forces available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient only if all resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of the guilty, but by the spreading of such terror by the occupying forces as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclination to resist amongst the population.

The respective Commanders, with the troops available to them are to be held responsible for maintaining peace within their areas. The Commanders must find the means of keeping order within the regions where security is their responsibility (Sicherungsräume), not by demanding more security forces, but by applying suitable, draconian measures.

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution:

.....
.....

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-52

24 November 1945.

I, PAUL V. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt, 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-52. EXTRACT.

PAUL V. FREEDMAN,
S/Sgt, 33799122.

H1157-0200

SE624-G/C-59

Most Secret

Führer's HQ
19 February 1941

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 44 187/41, Most Secret, "WFSt/Section L (I Op)

10 copies
2nd Copy.

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By Officer only.

On 18 February the Führer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of operation "Marita":

1. The following dates are envisaged:

Commencement of building pontoon: 28 February
Crossing of Danube: 2 March

The final order for carrying out the operation will be given on 26 February at the latest.

It will be decided on 26 February at the latest whether the XIVth Army Corps will march into Bulgaria when bridge-building operations are begun or whether only AA Forces will be moved in.

2. It is for the Bulgarians alone to decide if and when to lay mines off Varna and Burgas.

3. If air attacks are carried out against Bulgaria and Rumania from Greek territory, the Xth Air Corps has freedom of action in operations against Greek territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
signed Warlimont

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H1157-0201

C62

SEC24-G/C-62

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Berlin 9.10.1939.
OKW No. 172/39 SO only. Most Secret WFA/L

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Directive No.6.

For the Conduct of the War

(1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England, and France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to put an end to the war, I am determined to take action and offensive action without letting much time elapse.

(2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending, to the advantage of the Western Powers, or Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to bring Italy to our aid as a brother-in-arms

(3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further conduct of military operations:

a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the western front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried as soon as forcefully as possible.

b) The object of this attack is to defeat as strong sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.

c) The time of the attack is dependent on the operational readiness of the armoured and motorized units, which should be expedited with the utmost effort, and on the state of the weather at the time and the weather forecast.

(4) The Luftwaffe prevents the combined French and British Air Force from interfering with the Army, and, where necessary, gives direct support to its activities. In this connection, it will be very important to prevent the combined French and British Air Force gaining a hold, and also British troops from landing in Holland.

(Note in pencil) - The cutting of the routes supplying the English troops once they have landed will be the task of the Luftwaffe, for U-boats will soon have to cease operating in the Channel on account of great losses.

(5) The conduct of the war at sea must concentrate entirely on being able to give direct or indirect support to the Army and Air Force operations throughout this attack.

H1157-0202



(6) In addition to making these preparations for the start of the offensive in the West according to plan, the Army and the Luftwaffe must be ready at any time and in increasing strength, to be able to make an immediate stand against a combined French, and British entry into Belgium, and this in as advanced a postion as possible on Belgian territory - also to be able to occupy Holland as extensively as possible while pushing towards the West Coast.

(Margin note) - Something like this would be more worth while striving for in every respect.

(7) The disguising of preparations must take the line that nothing more than precautionary measures against the threatening concentration of French and British Forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Belgian frontier are being taken.

(8) I request the C-in-Cs, acting on this order, to submit reports on their intentions to me individually as soon as possible, and to keep me informed through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the state of their preparations.

A. Hitler.

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SEC-24 - G/C-62

MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

BERLIN.
15th October 1939.

W.F.A.No. 20/39 Op Most Secret S.O. only.

Re: "Fall Gelb"

7 copies
copy No.2.

S.O. Only.
Access only through officer.

The enquiries of the Supreme Command of the Army with reference to the carrying out of the directive OKW/WFA/L No.213/39 Most Secret, S.O. only of 14 November 1939, were discussed with the Fuehrer today.

The Result was as follows:

The protection of the Ruhr areas, by moving the A/C Reporting Service and the Air defense as far forward as possible in the area of Holland, is of not inconsiderable significance to the whole conduct of the war.

The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the defense of the Ruhr area be made. This viewpoint must determine the choice of objectives by the Army, even if Army and Navy are not directly interested in such a territorial gain. It must be the object of the Army's preparations, therefore, to occupy. - on receipt of a special order - the territory of

H1157-0203



Holland, in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line. It will depend on the political and military attitude of the Dutch, as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether the objective must and can be still further extended.

Preparations will likewise be made to take possession, with the support of the Navy, of the West Frisian islands, at first with the exception of Texel, as soon as the Northern coast of Groningen is in our hands; These too are of great importance as bases for the A/C Reporting Service and England must be deprived of the possibilities of seizing them for similar purposes.

Keitel

Distribution:

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| Draft | 7 |

H1157-0204

C 63.

[redacted]ief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, 27.1.40

No. 22045/40 MOST SECRET WFA/Section L.

5 copies
2nd Copy.

Re. Study "N"

Ref. 22039/40 Most Secret
WFA/Section L (1) of 23.1.40.

S.O. Only.
Access only through an Officer.

C-in-C of the Navy has a report on this.
Ia/29/i (Ink Note)

Noted by 1 SKL.
(Ink Note).

Note: Noted by
M K A, who takes
over the nominating
of Officers
(Probably Kapitän-
Leutnant z.S. Krulte?)
Ia/1
(Ink note)

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed forces wishes that Study "N" should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.

A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces H.Q. for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future Operational Staff.

I request the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force to nominate one officer each for this staff, suitable for Ia, and if possible possessing a knowledge of organisation and supply matters. The Bureau of Foreign Defence has the placing of the officer for Ic, WFA / , that of the officer concerned with transport matters, Senior Officer for communications and Senior Officer for general questions concerning the administration of the country.

The time of meeting will be announced later.

All further plans will be made under the cover name "Weserübung".

KEITEL.

+The invasion of Norway
Armed Forces Operations Dept.

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| Section L. | 5th Copy |

2258.

H1157-0205

SEC. [redacted]-64

Meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer on 12.12.39 1200 (Keitel, Jodl, Puttkamer).

NORWEGIAN QUESTION

C. in C. Navy had received Quisling and Majelin. Quisling made a reliable impression and reported as follows:

As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway was even stronger than hitherto. England's influence was very great - especially through Storthing - President Hambro (Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha), all-powerful in Norway at the time. Quisling was convinced that there was an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway. In which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England was very great - possibly very shortly. From 11/1/40 onwards Norwegian Parliament and therefore Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament had, contrary to constitution, prolonged its term by a year. This should give an opportunity for a political re-shuffle. Quisling had good connections with officers of the Norwegian Army and had supporters in important positions, (e.g. Railways). In such an event Quisling was ready to take over the Government and to call upon Germany for help. He is also ready to promise preparations of military character with the Germany Armed Forces.

C. in C. Navy realized that with such offers one never quite knew how far the people in Western (?) were furthering their own ends or how much they had the German interests at heart. Therefore tread warily - Norway must be prevented at all costs from falling into England's hands. That would have a decisive effect on the war for Sweden would be completely under England's influence and it could quite possibly bring the war into the Baltic, thus preventing completely the activities of the German Navy in the Ocean and North Sea. The Fuehrer also indicated that British occupation of Norway would be insupportable. C. in C. Navy considered that occupation by Germany of positions on the coast of Norway would naturally produce a strong British countermeasure to stop the export of ore from Narvik, and thus causing surface warfare off the Norwegian coast, to which the German Navy was not equal in the long run. This was the weak spot of the occupation.

The Fuehrer wished to speak to Quisling personally that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter had known Quisling for a long while. C. in C. Navy suggested: should the Fuehrer form a favourable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and execution of the occupation,

(a) by peaceful means, i.e. German forces summoned by Norway, or

(b) to take by force - Fuehrer is agreed.

2. C. in C. Navy requests that a clear policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict be maintained. No help to Finland by the supply of arms (which would mean passing through unreliable Sweden).

The C. in C. Armed Forces stated that the Swedish Foreign Office had been informed that arms would only be sent to Sweden on guarantee in writing by the Government that they were only for the use of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The C. in C. Navy on the other hand is in favour of concessions toward Russia, for example, the supply of oil to Lukina(?), as Russia has also given us practical help, for example, the holding of foreign ships in Murmansk until three days after the "Bremen" had sailed.

The Fuehrer has agreed to both points.

Raeder.

H1157-0206

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-72
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 7 November 1939

WFA/Dept. LI No. 207/39 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
2nd copy
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Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

On 7 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing reports on the meteorological and the railway transport situation, has ordered:-

A-day is postponed for the time being by three days. The next decision will be made by 1800 hours on 9 November 39.

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:
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H1157-0207



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 10 November 1939

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Important Matter

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On 9 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The earliest date designated for A-day is 19 November. The next decision hereon will be made by 1800 hours on 13 November.

signed: KEITEL

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(Cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 13 November 1939

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Important matter

TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

On 13 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after receiving a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The next decision on A-day will be made on Thursday, 16 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Wednesday, 22nd November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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[redacted]reme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 16 November 1939

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TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

1) On 16 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 20 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday, 26 November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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H1157-0210



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(Cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 20 November 1939

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TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

On 20 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 27 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday 3 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Signed: KEITEL.

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TRANSLATION OF DOC C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 27 November 1939

WFA/Dept L No 219/39 Top Secret Important Matter

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Important Matter

TOP SECRET

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On 27 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) All mobile units are to be transported immediately to the transit quarters.

2) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 4 December.

3) Earliest date of next A-day 9 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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(502)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Department for National Defence.

Berlin. 29 Nov. 1939.

No 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter.

5 Copies.
2nd Copy.

Important.

TOP SECRET.

Only by hand of Officer.

Enclosed the time-table for the preparations of the attack in the West No 233/39 Top Secret Important Matter, 2nd Copy.

The time table sent on 8 November 1939 under No. 196/39 Top Secret Important Matter to be destroyed. (Marginal handwritten note:- destroyed).

for the Supreme Command of the
Armed forces.

Signed: JODL

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H1157-0213

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Important Matter - Berlin. 29. Nov. 1939.

Department for National Defence - Only by hand of Officer - 10 Copies.

No. 233/39 Top Secret Important Matter 2nd Copy.

TOP SECRET.

Time Table for the Preparation of the Attack in the West

A-Day = Day of Attack.

| No. | Time. | Army. | Navy. | Air Force. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A-Day minus 5 1800 hrs | Decision by Fuehrer as to A-Day. | | | 1. Next decision 4. Dec. at 1300 hrs. 2. Attack can be stopped until A-Day minus 1 at 2300 hrs if disadvantages will be accepted. |
| 2. | A-day mins 1 during the day | | | Air Force units move to forward airfields. | |
| 3. | A-day minus 1 1200 hrs. | Last moment at which an order of the day by the Fuehrer has to reach the C-in-C of the Army, if it is to reach company commanders before the commencement of the attack (telephone transmission unavoidable) | | | |
| 4. | A-day minus 1 2300 hrs | Latest moment for stopping the attack | | | |

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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin. 4 December 1939.

WFA/Dept L No 226/39 Top Secret Important Matter 8 Copies.
2nd Copy.

Important Matter

TOP SECRET. Only by hand of Officer.

On 4 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hrs on 6 December;

2). Earliest date of next A-day 11 December.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Signed : JODL.

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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 6th December 1939.

WFA/Dept L No 22 230/39 Top Secret — 8 Copies. 2nd Copy.

Important Matter.

TOP SECRET.

Only by hand of Officer.

On 6 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1). The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 12 December.

2). Earliest dateof next A-day 17 December.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Signed: JODL.

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611.

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TRANSLATION OF DOC C - 72.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, 13 December 1939

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On 12 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has ordered:-

1.) The next decision on A-day will be made by 1800 hrs on 27 December.

2.) Earliest date of next A-day therefore 1 January 1940.

3.) Christmas leave to be arranged accordingly by the branches of the armed forces.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Signed: JODL.

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C - 72.
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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin 27. December 1939.

WFA/ Dept L No 22 244/39 Top Secret Important Matter 8 Copies.
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Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer.

On 27 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has made the following decision:-

In view of the general meteorological situation, the date of the attack is further postponed, as far as can be foreseen by at least a fortnight. The next decision will be made at the latest by 1800 hrs on 9 January.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Signed; JODL.

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| OKW: | | Group W advised by teleprinter 1800 |
| WFA | 4th Copy. | on 27 Dec. |
| Chief L. | 5th Copy. | |
| Dept. L Ia - Ic | 6th - 8th Copies. | (Handwritten) NOTE:- |

According to information b (H), the above means that the earliest A-day is the 9 Jan. and the latest day for a decision is also the 9. Jan. Rectification accordingly by Top Secret message No. 2821 on 28 Dec. to Group Wes

Initial

(handwritten)

| Date | Moon Phase. |
|---|---|
| 2 Jan. | last quarter |
| 9 Jan | new moon |
| 17 Jan | first quarter |
| 24 Jan | full moon |
| 31 Jan | last quarter |

616.

H1157-0217

H1157-0218



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 30 December 1939

WFA/Dept L (Ib) No 22247/39 Top Secret Important Matter

To
the High Command of the Navy

Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

Subject: Skl B No 1 Skl Io Op. 512/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Re: Clarification of date for A-day

Your interpretation that the earliest date for A-day is now the 9 January, but that the next decision will also be made at the latest by 1800 hours of the same day is confirmed as correct.

Should the attack take place in the period between the 9 January and 14 January 1940, Naval High Command will receive the necessary notification (warning-order) early, i.e. 9 days before the commencement of the attack.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

H1157-0219



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 9 January 1940

No 22607/40 Top Secret Important Matter OKW/WFA LI 8 copies
2.copy

TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

A decision on the date of A-day will not be made before 10 January 1940.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

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| Chief L | 5th | " |
| Ia | 6th | " |
| Ib | 7th | " |
| Ic | 8th | " |

(handwritten) Note:-

Has been passed by telephone by I/Skl Io O
9 Jan 40 to A I Group West.
Initial

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C.72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 11 January 1940

WFA No 22014/40 Top Secret Important Matter Dept L (I) 9 copies
2nd copy

- Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

Re: Contingency "Yellow"

On 10 January 1940 the Foehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after receiving reports from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, has ordered the following:-

1) A-day and X-hour

A-day is Wednesday, 17 January 40. (Wednesday, 17 in ink)
X-hour 15 minutes before sunrise at Aix-la-Chapelle on A-day = 0816 hours. (0816 in ink)

The code-name "Rhine" or "Elbe" (see instruction No 8 for the conduct of the war, dated 20 November 39, No 1) will be issued before 2300 hours on A-day minus 1, provided the weather forecast permits.

2) Employment of the 7th Air Div.

The operation is to be carried through according to the instructions so far given, with the following modification:

For the 7th Air Div., besides the "North" and the "South" drives, a third drive (code-name: "Einsatz fortress") is to be prepared for obtaining possession of the heart of the Dutch fortress. The Supreme Command of the Army makes preparations to enable it to break quickly into the Dutch fortress beyond the goal hitherto designated, i.e. the Maas-Grebbe line, should the "Einsatz fortress" be the order given to the 7th Air Div.

The decision on the "Einsatz fortress" will be made at the latest on the morning of A-day minus 1. The 'North" and "South" drives can only be considered if by A-day, a sufficient depth of snow improves jumping and landing conditions near Ghent and along the Maas, which at the moment are fraught with difficulties.

3) Air Force Attack on the Enemy Air Force.

If the weather is suitable, the air force will on 14 January 40 attack with all available forces the majority of the occupied enemy air-fields in northeastern and eastern France by surprise, with the principal aim of destroying the fighter and reconnaissance aircraft stationed there. For this attack, the air force is at liberty to fly across Luxemburg and, as far as necessary, also across Belgian and Dutch territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

signed: KEITEL.

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H1157-0220

H1157-0221



TRANSLATION OF DOC.C-72
(cont.)

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 13 January 39.+

WFA No 3/40 Top Secret Important Matter — 5 copies
2nd copy

Re: Contingency "Yellow"

Important Matter

By hand of officer Only

On account of the metereological situation, the Fuehrer has decided to postpone A-day, probably to 20 January 40. Latest time for issue of orders re above is 1800 hours on A-day minus 5.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

6015

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+Translator's Note: The date is a typing error; it is obvious from the context that the correct date is 13 January 40.

H1157-0222



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 7 May 1940

WFA/Dept L No 22 179/40 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
2nd copy

Top Secret

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

1) The Orders:-

OKW/L No 22 176/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated 6 May 40 and

OKW/L No 22 177/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated 6 May 40

are cancelled.

2) The new A-day will be ordered, according to the weather situation, at 1200 hours on A-day minus 1 only. A new X-hour+ will be given accordingly.

Next decision at 1200 hours on 8 May.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

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+ X-hour = zero hour

H1157-0223



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, 9 May 1940.

WFA/Dept L No 22 180/40 Top Secret Important Matter 5 Copies.
2nd Copy.

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer. TOP SECRET.

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

A-day ... 10 May
X-hour ... 0535 hours

The code words "Danzig" or "Augsburg" to reach the branches + of the armed forces by 2130 hours on the 9 May at the latest.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Signed: KEITEL.

Distribution.

| | |
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| Ob.d.L. | 3rd Copy. |
| OKW: | |
| Chief WFA | 4th Copy. |
| Chief L. | 5th Copy. |

+ OKH, OKL, & OKM.

- - - - - - 0 0 0 - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.
OF DOCUMENT C - 72

23 October 1945.

I, Fred NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C - 72.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567.

H1157-0224

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-75
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Only by Officer

Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

Führer's Headquarters
5 March 1941

(Various handwritten notations and stamps)

14 copies
2nd copy

Basic Order No. 24

regarding collaboration with Japan

The Führer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. /Marginal note - "slightly exaggerated."/

2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available.

For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions to himself.

3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

H1157-0225



c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power -- extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.

The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

Signed in draft: Keitel

Correctness certified by
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander

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Mercantile and Economic War, 9th copy
Dept. L, 10 - 14 copies

- - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-75

21 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-75.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

H1157-0226

SEC24-G/C-78

Translation

TOP SECRET

A.D.C. to the Fuehrer Only by Officer at Berchtesgaden
Br.B.No.& a/41 Top Secret 9th June 1941

Top Secret

Re: Conference "Barbarossa"

1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14.6.1941, at the Chancellery, Berlin.

3. Time Table

a) 11:00 hrs......"Silver Fox"

b) 12:00 hrs.....Army Group South

c) 14:00 hrs - 15:30 hrs.....Lunch party for all participants

d) From 15:30 hrs.....Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group "Center" in this order sequal

Participants see enclosed list
(List of names, etc. follow)

(signed) Schmundt

Colonel and Chief A.D.C.
to the Fuehrer

H1157-0227

SEC24-G/C-78

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

I.) Noon and afternoon:

1.) Army: General Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch
Colonel General Halder
Lt. General Paulus
Colonel Housinger
Lt. Colonel von Gyldenfeldt

2.) Navy: Captain Wagner

3.) Air Force: Reichsmarshal Goering
General Field Marshal Milch
Air Chief Marshal Jeschonnek
Lt. General Bodenschatz
Major General von Walden

4.) High Command of the Armed Forces:
General Field Marshal Keitel
General of the Artillery Jodl
Major General Warlimont
Major Christian of the General Staff

5.) A.D.C. of the Armed Forces:
Colonel Schmundt of the General Staff
Captain von Puttkamer (Navy)
Major Engel
Major von Below

II.) Noon:

1.) "Silver Fox":
Army: Col. General v. Falkenhorst, High Command of the Armed Forces, Norway
Air Force: Col. General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5

2.) Group "South"
Army: General Field Marshal v. Rundstedt
General Field Marshal v. Reichenau, High Command 6th Army
Infantry General v. Stuelpnagel, High Command 17th Army
Col. General v. Schobert, High Command 11th Army
Col. General v. Kleitst, Armored Group 1
Air Force:
Col. General Loehr, Air Fleet 4.

III.) Joint dinner of all participants
In addition: Col. General Fromm, Col. General Udet
(arrival: 13:40 o'clock 78 Wilhelmstrasse)

H1157-0228



List of Participants (continued)

IV.) Afternoon:

1.) High Command of the Navy:
Grand Admiral Raeder
Vice Admiral Fricke
Captain Schulte-Moentig

2.) Baltic:
General Admiral Carls, Navy Group North
Vice Admiral Schmundt, Commander Baltic

3.) Group "North"
Army: General Field Marshal Ritter v. Loeb, Army Group North
Col. General Busch, High Command 16th Army
Col. General v. Kuechler, High Command 18th Army
Col. General Hoopner, Armored Group 4

Air Force: Col. General Keller, Air Fleet 1

4.) Group "Middle"
Army: General Field Marshal v. Bock, Army Group "Middle"
General Field Marshal v. Kluge, High Command 4th Army
Col. General Strauss, High Command 9th Army
Col. General Guderian, Armored Group 2
Col. General Hoth, Armored Group 3

Air Force: General Field Marshal Kesselring, Air Fleet 2

H1157-0229

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-102
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-5/C-102

Berlin, 11.3.38.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
OKW/L I a Nr. 420/38 g.Kdos.

30 Copies
11th Copy

Referring to: Operation OTTO

TOP SECRET

1) If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

2) The whole operation will be directed by myself.

According to my instructions:

The Ob.d.H. will direct the land operations with the 8th Army in the formation and strength suggested to me, and with the attachments of the Air Force, the SS and police (see appendix).

The Ob.d.L. will direct the air operations with the forces suggested to me.

3) Operational duties:

a) Army
The invasion of Austria must be carried out in the manner explained to me. The Army's first target is the occupation of Upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Austria, the Tyrol, the speedy occupation of Vienna and the securing of the Austro-Czech frontier.

b) Air Force,
The Air Force must demonstrate and drop propaganda material, occupy Austrian aerodromes for the use of further possible reinforcements assist the Army upon demand as necessary, apart from that, hold Number units in readiness for special tasks.

4) The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

5) The behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms

Austrian units who come over to us, immediately come under German Command.

6) On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.

Signed A. HITLER

Translator's Note: This document bears the initials of Jodl, Keitel and one other which is undecipherable.

H1157-0230



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 102
Continued

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C 102

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 102.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1157-0231

SEC24-5/C-103

T 16/38 "Oel"

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 428/38 Most Secret L. Ia.

Berlin 11 March 1938

40 Copies
6th Copy

Pencil note: - C-in-C Navy
is informed.

Most Secret

Special instructions No. 1
to "The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 427/38
Most Secret L Ia of 11.3.38."

Directive:

for policy towards Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.

1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.

2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution of the Austrian Question.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
JODL

DISTRIBUTION:

as Directive No. 1

(Translator's Note: Distribution in Directive No. 1 as follows:)

| | |
|---|---|
| Supreme Command of the Army | 1 - 5 copies |
| Supreme Command of the Navy | 6 - 10 copies |
| Ministry for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force | 11 - 15 copies |
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| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces | 17 - 21 copies |
| Spare | 22 - 30 copies |

H1157-0232



# DIRECTIVES FROM HITLER AND KEITEL

## PREPARING FOR WAR AND THE INVASION OF POLAND

(C-120/A)

Top Secret
Officer Only

The High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) Berlin, 3 April 1939
WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L Ia

SUBJECT: Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40 5 copies
2nd Copy

The Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

Part II "Fall Weiss" is attached herewith. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.

The Führer has added the following Directives to "Fall Weiss":

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1.9.39 onwards

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL

Distribution:-

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-123
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

MOST SECRET.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 44 1675/41 Most Secret
S.O. only, Ops, Staff of the
Armed Forces /L (I Ops.)

Fuehrer's Hq, 7 Oct 41.

S.O. ONLY
Access only through officer.

14 copies
2nd copy

Reference: Army Supreme Command (Ops. Section)
No. 41 244/41 Most Secret
dated 18 Sep 41

Naval Supreme
Command.
ops. 1690/41
Received: 7.10.
Enclosures: -

Please submit
(pencil note by I a I f.)
(illegible markings)

I.ops
? conference ?
with Group North
etc. supplementary
to our note regarding
Petersburg ?
Ia (initials)
(Almost illegible marginal
note in pencil)

To

Army Supreme Command
(ops. Section)

The Fuehrer has again decided that a capitulation of Leningrad or later of Moscow is not to be accepted even if offered by the enemy.

The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world. Just as in Kiev, our troops were subject to extreme danger through explosions with time-fuses, the same must be expected to a still greater degree in Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviet radio itself has broadcast that the foundations of Leningrad were mined and the city would be defended to the last man.

Extreme danger of epidemics is to be expected.

Therefore no German soldier is to enter these cities. Anyone who tries to leave the city through our lines is to be forced to return under fire.

The Exodus of the population through the smaller, unguarded gaps towards the Interior of Russia to be allowed. Before all other cities are taken, they are to be softened up by artillery fire and air-raids and their population forced to flee.

We cannot take the responsibility of endangering our soldiers' lives by fire in order to save Russian cities,

nor that of feeding the population of these cities at the expense of the German home-land.

The chaos in Russia will be all the greater; our administration and utilisation of the occupied Eastern territories all the simpler the more the population of the cities of Soviet Russia flees to the interior of the country.

All commanding officers must be acquainted with this desire of the Fuehrer. (Leaving things as we find them and of course the purification of the population by reindoctrination would certainly relieve us to some extent of problems regarding the labour we may expect. Therefore it is to be supposed that the above ruling refers to the majority but not to the whole of the population). (Red pencil note.)

Chief of Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed: Jodl.

Checked and found correct

(illegible notations)

FALK
Captain, General Staff

(Naval War Staff
:Book No. 1/Naval War Staff I ops. 1690/41 Berlin, 11 Oct 41.
:Most Secret S.O. only.
:
:
: 1) Inform by writing:
:
: Group North Ser. No. 1
: Naval Liaison Officer Ser. No. 2. Kapitaen
: to Army Group North zur See
: Weygold
: ∴ No.: Naval War
: Staff section (?) Ser. No. 3.
:
: Subject: Future of the cities of Leningrad and Moscow.
:
: As supplement to Naval War Staff Book No. 1/Naval
: War Staff I c 1601/1 Most Secret S.O. only dated 29 Sep 41
: the following instruction of the Supreme Command of the
: Armed Forces to the Supreme Commander, Army is made known:
:
: " ? (bis) aus Eingang"
:
: II) Copy to Ib. Ser. No. 4
:
: III) ? of Reconnaissance Force (?) with I ops.)
:

(Pencil note)

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| Air Supreme Command - Air Ops. Staff | 3rd " |

H1157-0235



Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

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---

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-123

16 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-123.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738.

H1157-0236

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 126
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET F.O. (U/B) & B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Skl. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest.....

(Initialled) F.A.
Skl.
1/Skl.

---

Berlin 22.6.1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re: Preparations for "Fall Weiss".
.....

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Führer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Führer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:-

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It should be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it would be more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

1904

H1157-0237

4. The Führer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Keitel.

---

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA No. 170/39 gk Chefs. L.I.

Berlin, 31 August 1939

MOST SECRET

8 Copies
2nd. Copy

Known to Ob.d.H.

S.O. only (Stamp)
Access only through an officer.

Direction No I for the conduct of the war.

1. Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack - 1 September 1939
Time of attack - 04:45 (Inserted in red pencil)

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.

and Denmark (red pencil note)

The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

The German land frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

According to this Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for

The same applies to warlike actions at sea or any which may be so interpreted.

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should at first be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units.

H1157-0238

Defensive operations should only be permitted over the neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

the time being. (pencil note)

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. If England and France open hostilities against Germany, the task of these sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, against those conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources all. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence attack operations.

Warfare here against Merchant Shipping (Green pencil)

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) (red pencil note)

The Army is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned. - The Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxembourg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

(Undecipherable note in green pencil)

In its warfare on merchant shipping the Navy is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.
The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be submitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy The C - C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the Baltic should be mined for this purposes.

Address to... (undecipherable) General Warning! (Red pencil note)

The primary task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".

In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favourable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English Naval units, especially on battleships and aircraft carriers. The decisions regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

(Sgd) A. Hitler

... (undecipherable)

Warnin... (Note in red pencil)

H1157-0239

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 134
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Führer HQ., 21 January 1941

WFSt No. 8/41 Top Secret

Top Secret!
Only thru Officer!
6 Copies
2nd Copy

Top Secret!
Only thru Officer!

Enclosed please find a short resumé of the speech made by the Führer during the final conference with the Duce on 20 January 41, and a summary on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

J o d l

- 2 enclosures -

Distribution:

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Top Secret

Enclosure 1 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/41 top secret
Top Secret!
Only thru officer!

6 copies
2nd copy

Result on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with the Italian General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41

1. Important Items from the Appreciation of the Situation by General Guzzoni.

1.) Albania

The most important Italian theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to make it certain that the present line can be held against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valona or Berat being lost. 21 divs. now in Albania. Intention is to send another 3 divs. from Italy.

Intention to form a group for attack on the northern flank. Strength about 10 divs. (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 Alpine divs.). Will not be ready for attack

Top Secret

H1157-0240

before another 2½ months, since transport facilities do not make it possible to ship the 3 divs. or the personnel and equipment required for the reinforcement of the remaining divs. any faster. Intention to attack with this group in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry out a flanking movement to Erseke in order to cause the collapse of the northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack in the direction of Florina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Korica (only 1 road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.

2.) Libya

Intention for continuation of campaign:
Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defence of the Derna - Eastern edge of the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Mekili for offensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cyrenaica, in order to strengthen the defence planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making if possible to hold the western part of Cyrenaica.
If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defence of Tripoli.
Italians believe that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that the British will not advance upon Benghazi - Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk.
The following reinforcements are earmarked for Libya:-
Bringing the 3 divs. stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, transferring one armoured div. and one infantry div. (motorized) from Italy to Tripoli. Completion of these transports about 20 February 41.

3.) East Africa

Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defence to the utmost intended. It is desirable to divert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.

4.) Dodekanese

Expected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Dodekanese weak (handwritten marginal note:- these ought to be considerably increased), nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a German attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egypt into the Aegaean).

II. Views on the Italian appreciation of the situation

1.) Albania

Very unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces requited for an attack within the time provided. A support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be discounted. (Handwritten marginal note:- The German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front)

2.) Libya

Whether or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be feared, all the more since from May onWards large - scale operations will no more be possible, owing to the heat (handwritten marginal notes:- the loss of Morzuk (S) is evidently considered trifling. Contitio sine qua non:- no complications out of Tunis).

3.) East Africa

Duration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be estmated.

4.) Dodekanese

No resistance of any significance is to be expected in the case of attack. Offensive action of the Italian Forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on (handwritten marginal note:- ought to be built up in order to form an important complementary operation during the occupation of Greece.)

III. Employment of German units in Libya and Albania

1.) Libya

Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th. light div. (motorized) composed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approximately between 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out transports of equipment before that date.

H1157-0241



2.) Albania
Dispatch of a German unit is described by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps impossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport, dispatch of only one mountain div. with light equipment could be considered. Decision not urgent at the moment. Italian attack - unless strong Greek forces are moved from the Albanian front to the Bulgarian frontier - impossible in any case before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sent before March. Consequently new decision whether a unit is to be sent, at the beginning of March. Preparations for making a unit available will however continue.

- - - - - - - - -

Enclosure 2 to OKW/WFSt. No. 8/41 top secret
Top Secret

6 copies
2nd copy
Top Secret
Only thru officer

Speech by the Führer
on 20 January 1941

I.) On 20 January at 1100 hrs., a report is made to the Führer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and of the Armed Forces Operational Staff in the presence of General von Rintelen on the result of the military discussions with General Guzzoni and General Gandin.

II.) At 1200 hours, the Führer developed before a wider circle his thoughts and views on the situation.

Those present:-

| on the German side | on the Italian side |
|---|---|
| The Minister for Foreign Affairs | the Duce |
| Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces | Count Ciano |
| Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff | General Guzzoni |
| General von Rintelen | General Marras |
| Ambassador Schmidt | General Gandin |
| An interpreter from the Foreign Office | |
| Colonel Schmundt | |
| Freg. Kapt. von Puttkamer | |

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Contents of the Führer's Speech in Concise Form:-

Finland of great importance to us owing to the nickel findings unique in Europe. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any more.

Demarche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in Roumania has taken place and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a time when they cannot be harmed (winter).

The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:-

a) an operation against Greece
b) protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey
c) safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.

H1157-0242



For this reason - as well as owing to the difficulties of tra... which came to light during yesterday's military discussions - it is not advisable at present to dispatch a German unit to Albania. If it rema... stationary behind the front, psychologically undesirable reactions would result: Italians in heavy fighting - Germans look on from behind the fr...

However if the German unit is employed, the war in the southeast, ... will be prematurely started.

As far as can be foreseen, Turkey will remain neutral; it would b... very unpleasant if she declared her solidarity with Britain and put her fields at Britain's disposal (handwritten marginal note:- Constantinople Constanza: 350 km).

General situation in the East can be judged correctly only from the situation in the West. The attack against the British Isles is our ultimate aim.

In this respect, we are in the position of a man with only one round left in his rifle; if he misses, the situation is much worse than before. The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in the case of a failure. Britain would then have no need to worry any more and could employ the bulk of her forces at the periphery wherever she pleases. As long as the attack has not taken place, the British must always reckon with the possibility.

A landing can only be made under certain conditions which, however, did not exist in Fall:- no three consecutive days of good weather.

Apart from that, the general task in the West is the protection of our base from Kirkenes to the Spanish frontier, at the same time always keeping a group of forces in Southern France ready to step in if Britain should gain a foothold in Portugal.

The blocking of the Sicily passage by the air force is only a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar. We had made such preparations as would have ensured success. Once in possession of Gibraltar, we would be in a position to gain a foothold with strong forces in North Africa and thus put an end to Weygand's blackmail. If therefore Italy were after all to succeed in getting France to enter the war, this would be a great success and would basically change the situation in the Mediterranean within a short space of time.

I don't see great danger coming from America even if she should enter the war. The much greater danger is the gigantic block of Russia. Though we have very favourable political and economic agreements with Russia, I prefer to rely on powerful means at my disposal. Very considerable parts of these are therefore tied down on the Russian frontier, thus preventing me from supplying the armament industry with sufficient manpower to bring the armament of the air force and navy to the highest possible pitch.

As long as Stalin lives, there is probably no danger; he is intelligent and careful. But should he cease to be there, the Jews, who at prese... only occupy second and third-rank positions might move up again into the first rank.

It therefore behoves us to be careful. The Russians are continually trying to work out new demands which they read into the agreements. That is why they do not like explicit and precise formulas in these.

It is therefore necessary to keep a constant eye on the Russian factor and to keep on guard, by means of strength and clever diplomacy. Formerly Russia would have been no danger at all: for on land she cannot imperil us in the least, but now in the era of the air force the Roumanian oilfields can be turned into an expanse of smoking debris from Russia and from the Mediterranean, and the life of the axis depends on those oilfields.

In any case we must not dispatch valuable units to places where they will remain inactive. Therefore we shall send to Libya not an armoured but an anti-tank unit, which can be transported more quickly and can still be employed before the hot period sets in. For employed it shall be:- we do not want to act like the British did in France. The tanks and the anti-tank guns in this unit penetrate any British tank which is in action there.

The troops are experienced, have confidence in their weapons and are self-reliant that is very important in the fight against tanks. We have given the name "tank-hunters" to the anti-tank gunners also for psychological reasons. They are to seek out the enemy tank and battle it like the huntsman his quarry.

H1157-0243



General statements on the factors which are decisive for success in modern warfare. In the course of these. reference to the importance of training in up-to-date methods of warfare. which requires much time and effort and a highly efficient body of non-commissioned officers.

Importance of the air force and of the armored warfare. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties it is least possible to form an armoured unit by improvisation. Even the conversion of a fully trained armoured unit to other weapons takes months.

We have not achieved our great successes with armoured troops by working with heavy tanks. We prefer medium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.

Our greatest asset were our panzer-generals who have developed completely new tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.

General reference to the importance of mines in land warfare.
Examples:- mining of our west wall.
Blockade by mines which were laid by the 16th army in the flank of our attack against France.
By means of mines, a field of attack can be completely messed up.

Question of the Führer about mines at Tobruk and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-boats.

Tanks lose all offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Great heroism by the engineer is required to remove or clear minefields.

Views on the war in the air and the comparison of German to British air raids.

It is necessary to have at one's disposal a mighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunition supply for a moment may come when the war will be conducted almost exclusively by the air force and the navy.

Against heavily armed ships. only the dive-bomber is successful.

Führer dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of General Antonescu. He really is a personality.

The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Legion are not good.

Führer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions of which only the Fascist and the National Socialist ones have had an immediately constructive effect. In Roumania the predestined man was murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the legion with him. Thus it came about that the leading may grew out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by glowing fanaticism, is ready for any battle for his country and will wage it with, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.

One man must be the Führer, a head of State and beside him a leader of a movement are not possible. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Legion.

---

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C134

10 Nov 45

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C 134

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

H1157-0244

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-136
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET
By Officer Only

Berlin, 21 Oct 1938

10 copies
3rd copy

The Fuehrer
and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces

OKW L Ia No. 236/38 Top Secret

The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.

2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

3) The occupation of the Memelland.

1.

Securing the Frontiers of Germany
and Protection against Surprise Air Raids

(Translation omitted)

* * * * * *

2.

Liquidation of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia

It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for "Gruen"; they must however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organisation, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organised resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time "Grenzsicherung West" (The Measures of frontier defence in the West) can be carried out.

The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

a. ARMY

The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack.

H1157-0245



Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.

b. AIR FORCE

The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.

3.

Annexation of the Memel District

(Translation omitted)

Signed: Adolf Hitler

Authenticated
/s/ Keitel

Distribution:

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Rdl & ObdL 2nd "
OKM 3rd "
OKW (including stock)
4th to 10th copy

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-136.

24 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document C-136.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052.

H1157-0246

C.137.

Translation

C.137.

Top Secret.

Typed by officer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 24/11/38.

No. 241/38 top secret important L Ia.

Re:- The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 top secret important matter L Ia of 21/10/38.

10 Copies
3rd Copy.

(Handwritten) to be placed before the C-in-C

Important Matter
By hand of Officer Only.

1st Supplement to Instruction dated 21/10/38.

The Führer has ordered:-

1) Apart from the 3 contingencies mentioned in the instructions of the 21/10/38, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ("4). Occupation of Danzig").

The preparations will be made on the following basis:-

Condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favourable situation, not a war against Poland.

No.3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will come into operation.

Occupation by the army has to take place from East Prussia. The troops to be employed for this purpose must not simultaneously be earmarked for the occupation of the Memelland, so that both operations can, if necessary, take place simultaneously.

The Navy will support the army's operations by attack from the sea according to detailed orders from the C-in-C Navy. The forces participating are to be instructed to co-operate with the army. The details of the support to be given by the navy are to be agreed between the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

How far air force units can collaborate in the occupation is to be investigated by the Reich Marshal of the Air Force and the C-in-C Air Force and to be agreed in direct co-operation with the other two branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

The plans of the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH, OKM and OKL) are to be submitted by the 10/1/1939.

2) No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will also apply for the "occupation of the Memelland" (part 3 of the instructions dated 21/10/38).

Distribution:
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OKM = 1 (Copy No.3)
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The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
K E I T E L.

3625.

H1157-0247

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Stampp-) Supreme Command of the Navy.
AI Op. 121 38
Received 20 XII 38
Enclosures -
TOP SECRET
Only through officers.

(Written by Officer)

OBERKOMMANDO DER WEHRMACHT BERLIN, 17.12.38
Nr. 248/38 WFA/L la Top Secret
Superior Officers only. 10 Copies
4th Copy

Ref. (Letter of) the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 Top Secret S.O. only L.I a, dated 21/10.38

(Marginal Hand-written Note

1) Chief to
2) Chief in Office -A
3) (Remainder
4) undecipherable)

## 4. COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.

Reference "Liquidation of the Rest of Czecho-slovakia" the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilisation. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.

Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organisation should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements if any, of single units and particularly of motorised forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.

The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.

For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL.

H1157-0248



Distribution

Supreme Command of the Army - 1 (Copy 1)
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of the Air Force - 1 (Copy 3)
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OKW - 7 (Copies 2, 5 - 10)

(The document is initialed by Frick, Schaiewind and Raeder - Translator's note.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138 18 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. Leo Davenport, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-138.

S/Sgt Leo Davenport
32496587

H1157-0249

U.K.25

[redacted]24-8/C-148

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Führer's Headquarters
16th September 1941

WFSt/Section L(IV/Qu)
No. 002060/41 Most Secret

40 Copies
25th Copy

Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.

(1) Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.

It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.

In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.

This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centres of disturbance.

2) The measures taken up to now to deal with this general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Führer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.

Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.

3) Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:

a) It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.

b) In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50 - 100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.

The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed.



466.

H1157-0250



c) The political relations between Germany and the country in which the disturbance is taking place, are no criterion for the censuring of the military authorities in occupation.

Rather, it should be borne in mind and so represented in propaganda, that stern measures also rid the inhabitants of the Communist criminals, and are thus to their own advantage.

Clever propaganda of this kind will consequently not result in the severe measures against the Communists having an undesirable reaction on the well-disposed sections of the population.

d) Forces formed from the local inhabitants will generally fail to accomplish such acts of violence. They should on no account receive further support, for this involves increased danger to our own troops.

On the other hand, the fullest use can be made of rewards and remuneration for the population, in order to ensure their co-operation in a suitable way.

e) Where, in exceptional cases, court martial proceedings should be instituted in connection with Communist insurrections or other offences against the German occupying Forces, the most severe penalties are indicated.

In this connection only the death penalty can constitute the real deterrent. In particular, acts of espionage, deeds of sabotage and attempts to enter the Armed Forces of a foreign power, should as a matter of principle, be punished by death. Sentence of death should also as a general rule, be passed in cases of illicit possession of arms.

4) The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection.

(Indecipherable initial)

Keitel.

H1157-0251



U.K.25.

SEC24-8/C-148

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468.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-152
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top military secret

Chefsache!

Naval War Staff. Only by officer!

B.Nr.1 op 355/41 g.K.

Audience of Chief of Navy with Hitler on 18 Mar. 1600 hrs.

(present: Chief of OKW, Gen.Jodl, Fregatten Kapitän von Puttkamer.)

Exam. No. 2

11.) Japan.

Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained, unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan, inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Phillipines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.

.....

9. Preparations for Marita.

.....

B). Personnel Position.

.....

f) The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-152

I ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-152.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.
33925738.

H1157-0252

H1157-0253

SEC-24.9/C-167.

C 167

Translated Extract

Report of the C in C of the Army delivered to the Fuehrer 18. 3. 1600 hours.

(Present: Chief OKW, Gen.Jodl, Commander v Puttkamer)

. . . . . .

9. Preparations for Marita.

. . . . . .

(p.6). B). Personnel Position.

f) The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

. . . . . .

Paeder.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-182
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-10/C-182

TOP SECRET

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW L 1 a No. 427/38 Top Secret

Berlin, 11th March 1938
2045 hours.

C-in-C Navy
(pencil note) has been informed

35 Copies
6th Copy

Re: Operation Otto

Directive No. 2

1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.

2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

I expect the set objectives to be reached, by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

signed Adolf HITLER

initialled by JODL
and possibly WARLIMONT

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-182

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 269 PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1157-0254

H1157-0255

SEC24-10/C-194

Attach to T-211

Reich Minister for War and
C in C of the Armed Forces.

Berlin W.35. 6.3.36
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone Bl Kurfurst 8191

WA No. 415/36 Most Secret.L.Ib.
S.O. only

Re: C in C Navy AI Op. Most Secret. dated 6.3.36

Written by an Officer.

To be shown to
C in C Navy
(Pencil note)

To:
C in C Navy.

The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

1) The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the Heligoland Bight, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-day onward, has been approved. C in C Air Force will instruct Air Command VI from midday on 7.3 to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal of the C in C Fleet.

2) The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat reconnaissance line, until the evening of 7.3. The immediate transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has been approved.

3) The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first counter-measures to be taken against military preparations of neighbouring states. It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted.

By order
Sgd. Keitel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC 177
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Reichswehr Minister

Berlin, 22 May 1933

T.A. Nr. 421/33 g. Kdos. T 2 III A:

40 Copies
10th Copy

# P R O T O C O L

## Of the 2nd Session of the Working Committee of the Delegates for Reich Defense.

Time: 26 April 1933

Start: 1000 hours
End : 1230 hours

Place: Large Conference Room in Reichswehr Ministry

Participants:

| | |
|---|---|
| Reichswehr Ministry: | |
| Dept. of the Field Army (Truppenamt): | Chief Lt. Gen Adam |
| T 2 | Chief Col. Keitel |
| | Capt. Schmundt |
| | Capt. Pruetor |
| T 2 Administration | Min. Rat. Dr. Weber |
| T 1 IV | Major Gercke (ret) |
| Dept. of Air Raid Protection: | Capt. Speidel |
| Dept. of the Res. Tng. and Repl. Army (Wehrmacht): | |
| Chief of Staff | Lt. Col. Winzer |
| In 6 " " " | Lt. Col. Guderian |
| In 7 " " " | Lt. Col. Fellgiebel |
| Ordnance Dept. (Waffenamt): | Lt. Col. Stud |
| Wa Wi. | Major Barlimont |
| Administrative Dept.: (V3) | Min Rat. Reich |
| Ministry Office: | |
| " | Col. von Viebinghoff |
| | Capt. Tschache |
| Security | Capt. Wahle |
| Delegates for Reich Defense from the Reich Ministries: | |
| Foreign Office: | Legation Secretary von Buelow |
| Interior: | Ob. Reg. Rat. Erbe |
| Finance: | Gen. Finanzrat Japenhensch |
| Economics: | Min. Rat. Godlewski |
| | Reg. Rat Dr. Barth |
| Labor: | Min. Rat Sieler |
| Postal: | Min. Rat Delvendahl |
| Traffic: | Min. Rat Koffka |
| Justice: | Min. Rat Koffka |
| Food and Agriculture: | Amtsgerichtsrat Bretschneidner |
| Air: | Capt. Bolle (ret) |
| Prussian Ministry of the Interior: | Ob. Reg. Rat Diels |

Minutes:

Lt. Gen. Adam: Welcoming of the delegates especially of the respresentative of the Air Ministry present for the first time.

H1157-0256

Information about the decision of the Reich Cabinet of the 4 April 1933 to form a "Reich Defense Council".

Reference to:

a. Change of the responsibility for the defense of the Reich.

b. The decision to make the activities of the delegates a full-time job, and the necessity for this measure order to master the important and extensive tasks.

With a wish for trustful cooperation in the working committee of the RVR (Reich Defense Council) transfer of the presidency to Col. Keitel (Chief T 2).

Col. Keitel: After welcoming takes up business of the day.

Item 1

Thoughts about a Reich Defense Council

All great European powers which are at freedom to arm, have a RVR. One does not have to refer to history to prove the necessity of this institution. The war has shown conclusively that the cooperation with the various ministries has not been close enough. The consequences did not fail to materialize. The soldier is not in a position to have a say in all matters. The disadvantages of the past system were caused by parallel efforts of the various ministries in matters of the Reich defense. To avoid those mistakes a central agency has been created which occupies itself already in peacetime in the widest sense with the problems of Reich Defense. This working staff will continue its existence in time of war.

In accordance with the cabinet decision of the 4 April 1933 the Reich Defense Council, which until now had been prepared for war emergency, will go into immediate action.

In time of peace its task will be to decide about all measures for the preparation of the defense of the Reich, while surveying and utilizing all powers and means of the nation. To this effect a law placing every German and his personal property at the war service of the nation (Kriegsleistungsgesetz) is being prepared which will be submitted to the committee after its completion.

Composition of the Reich Defense Council:

President: Reichs Chancellor  Deputy: Reichswehr Minister

Permanent Members: Minister of the :

Reichswehr
Foreign Affairs
Interior
Finance
Economic Affairs
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
Air
Chief of the Army Command Staff
Chief of the Navy Command Staff

Depending on the case: The remaining minister, other personalities, e.g., leading industrialists, etc.

In order to regulate the work it is necessary to determine who will do the drafting of the various tasks and in what manner. The Reich ministries will receive instructions in this regard from the Reichswehr Minister

Item 2

Full-time Employment of the Delegates:

H1157-0257

Whether the full-time employment of delegates for the Reich Defense Council necessitates changes of personnel within the permanent committee will have to be decided by the ministries concerned. It is requested to settle this matter with the various ministries and to inform the Reichswehrminister which full-time delegate is slated for the working committee.

Ob. Reg. Rat Erbe (Interior): The solution of this question is rendered more difficult by the fact that each of the delegates has already a large field of work, to which he is deeply attached and which he will part with unwillingly.

Ob. Reg. Rat Diels (Prussian Ministry of the Interior): Is of the same opinion. He himself is in addition, in charge of the Secret State Police. Remedy: Full time assistants.

Min Rat Godlewski (Economics): Recommends the solution of the Reich Ministry of Economics: The delegate keeps his own field of work with addition of the Reich Defense tasks, which are handled by a special official (at present Rat Dr. Barth) exclusively and as a full time job. This way a higher official retains the direction, without being overburdened with the work.

Lt. Gen. Adam: Agrees with the opinion of Min. Rat Godlewski and proposes a similar solution for the other Reich ministries.

Amtsgerichtsrat Brätschneider (Food and Agriculture): Does not believe that the Ministry of Food and Agriculture will be able to send a special delegate in view of the general overload with work.

Col. Keitel: The amount of work of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture will not decrease. Food supply, however, is of the utmost importance in case of mobilization, so that an intensive cooperation on the part of this ministry is absolutely essential.

Min. Rat Schmidt (Traffic): At the Traffic Ministry hardly any higher officials can be made available for this full time task. A good deal of the work in the realm of the Reich Defense could be done by the R.T.K.

Lt. Gen. Adam: The tasks will be distributed and it is a matter of the various ministries to take care of same. Best solution: Higher official with full time assistants.

Col Keitel: Points out once more the urgency of the tasks, since it had been possible to do only very little in this connection during the last years. He asks the delegates to consider the Reich Defense at all times and represent it accordingly at the drafting of new laws. Experiences of the wars are available and are at the disposal of the various ministries: (e.g. Reich Archives, Memorandum of an administrative official about gasoline supply). All these sources must be taken advantage of for the future. The task of the full time delegates is also to bring about a close cooperation of the ministries with each other.

Min Rat Schmidt (Traffic): Requests a complete roster of the committee members.

Col. Keitel: Agrees to that, as soon as the ministries have named their full-time delegates.

## Item 3

## Nature of Work Plans

In the work plans the questions and ideas are laid down, which have come up in the Reichswehr Ministry and must be considered in case of mobilization. Up to the present time the support on the part of other ministries was frequently based only on personal helpfulness since any authority from above was lacking. The following work plans are finished:

a. Work Plan for the Reichs Ministry of Economics
" " " " " " " Food and Agriculture
" " " " " " " Labor

H1157-0258

These three are composed in one work plan for the preparation of a war economy.

b. Work Plan for the Reich Postal Ministry

c. Work Plan for the Reich Traffic Ministry.

Request the plans to be worked through carefully by the competent ministries. The plans will be discussed beginning of June, when proposals for improvements may be made. The other ministries which have no work plans yet will receive them later on. The office of air raid protection will work out a work plan in conjunction with the Reich Commissariat for aviation.

Min. Rat Codlewski (Ministry of Economics):

1. In case a completed plan for mobilization is to be created a preparation of requisition orders for the supply of raw materials, creating of war industries and getting in touch with personalities to be charged with these tasks in case of war, is necessary . All this means years of work.

2. What about the financial aspects of this work? Naturally, large sums will be required for it, with which the ministry concerned will be debited. To what extent can this be carried out in practice and to what extent will it remain only paper work once more?

Col. Keitel: Certainly, the working out of these plans requires a long time. The Reichswehr Ministry has worked for years on the principles of Reich Defense, too. The organization of a war economy always requires plenty of money and time. It is just the reason for and the purpose of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council to overcome these difficulties. Proposals and inquiries of the various Reich ministries must be made the subjects of sessions of the Reich Defense Council (Cabinet) by the working committee. It is to be decided there, which tasks have priorities over others and for which purposes means have to be available. Nevertheless, the financing of the various proposals remains a matter of the ministry concerned. The direct influence of the Reich Chancellor on these tasks represents, however, a great progress compared with past times. The various ministries have to submit yearly budget proposals, which are to be approved separately.

Min. Rat Dolvendahl (Postal Ministry): Sees an acceleration of the tasks in a direct cooperation with the Wehrmacht experts. Which is the competent agency for that in the Reichswehr Ministry?

Col. Keitel: The Army Organization Department is competent only for the great guiding principles. Technical matters are to be settled with the special offices of the Reichswehr Ministry. Inquiries regarding the specialists are to be addressed to the secretary of the Reich Defense Council, Capt. Schmundt.

Min. Rat Dolvendahl (Postal Ministry): Who is competent in questions of general nature?

Col. Keitel: Can be decided only from case to case.

Item 4

Security and Secrecy

Question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.

The secrecy of all Reich defense work has to be maintained very carefully. Communications with the outside by messenger service only, has been settled already with the Post Office, Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the Reichswehr Ministry. Main Principle of security: No document must be lost since, otherwise, the enemy propaganda would make use of it, Matters communicated orally cannot be proven, they can be denied by us in Geneva. Therefore, the Reichswehrministry has worked out security directives for the Reich Ministries and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

H1157-0259

Reading of the Security directives (Rn. M.T.A. Nr. 285/33 g.K. T 2 III A dated 19 April 33), by Capt Schmundt.

Col. Keitel: Under no circumstances communications by mail.

Min. Rat. Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Secret but urgent letters can be mailed in locked leather cases wrapped in special envelope. Heasks for a moderation of the dispatching directives.

Col. Keitel: The main thing is that the mail in the various ministries is opened by the addressee himself and not by the main office or another agency. It is of utmost importance that ways and means are provided to guarantee an absolutely safe transportation.

Min. Rat Rat Koffka (Ministry of Justice): It is most dangerous to mark the outside of the letters "Secret". Incidentally, up to the present time there is no real protection furnished in the Ministry of Justice. Only one steel safe is available.

Col. Keitel: The need for steel safes grows only slowly. The Reichswehr Ministry has spent a lot of money to obtain a sufficient number of steel safes for itself and the branch offices. Steel safes remain, nevertheless, an urgent requirement. Letters are to be addressed to the recipient personally.

Gen Finanzrat Wagenhorsch (Finance Ministry): If letters pertaining to Reich Defense can be written in such a way that in case of loss their contents cannot be recognized as mobilization measures by enemy news services, express matters must be dispatched by mail

Col. Keitel: The purpose of the directive is not to represent clear unequivocal instructions for all cases, but to point out inherent dangers in case of leakage. Have to be decided separately in every case. Proposals about this matter in June. The purpose, not the form decides.

Item 5

Leaves of absence resp. releases from duty for the purpose of participation in training measures outside the Wehrmacht.

Notices pertaining to this subject have been sent to Ministries already. Reich Cabinet has decided to grant leaves of absence to officials in the services of the Reich, etc., without deducting that time from their recreational leaves. The Reich authorities in the Reich will be informed by the Wehrkreigkommandos. I request the Pussian Ministry of the Interior to state whether this measure is to be in effect in it sphere, as well.

Ob. Reg. Rat Diels (Pr. Min. of the Int.): Agrees for Prussia.

Min. Rat Schmidt (Traffic): For the RR officials etc. this will be settled by the H.T.K. The authorities will be informed orally, but how is one to go about the instruction of the laborers. 27,000 workmen at the administration of waterways construction alone? Does that not invite abuses? What about secrecy in that case?

Col. Keitel: Only the authorities are to be informed. The men will be advised by the Wehrmacht agencies themselves. The men volunteer since they are mostly in reserve units. Furing the training

a. Security
b. Regulation of leaves of absence.

will be explained. Unfortunately, the announcement of a leave will schedule is not possible. The Ministries need not worry about the orientation of the men. What matters is that the superiors authorized to grant leaves are informed accordingly in advance.

Item 6

Storage of Weapons

H1157-0260

a. Renting of state owned lands (e.g. State Forestry areas) must be accomplished without cost.

b. The Finance Ministry has set up a "re-enforced border control service". The value of this organization lies in the distribution of personnel among the customs sectors - equal to border protection sectors. Exchange of personnel rosters between the customs etc., authorities and the Wehrkreise is in effect already. The peace-time maneuvers of the re-enforced border control service are of great importance.

c. Storage of weapons near the location where they will be needed. Unfortunately weapon stores are not always secret any more (Czech newspaper). Secrecy must be maintained to a much greater extent, appeal to, the assembled gentlemen.

d. Request to the postal authorities: Protection of Reich mail service to be prepared for the event of mobilization (at present available only in case of domestic disorders). The border protection maneuvers in Breslau have disclosed many deficiencies in communications in case of a Polish invasion of Upper Silesia. Police is not to be made available for such purposes. What has been the mission of the Landsturm in days past will have to be carried out by organizations created by the Reich Ministries themselves.

e. Consideration of the interests of Reich Defense when drafting new laws. (Examples: Construction Industry, electrification of railways). Cooperation by the Ministries is requested. Considerations of thrift alone must not be the determining factor. The interests of Reich Defense must not be forgotten for one moment.

Min. Rat Dalvendahl (Postal Ministry): Asks for the text of the cabinet resolution with regard to the Reich Defense Council.

Capt. Tschache (Ministry Office): Reads it.

Col. Keitel: Promises each of the ministries a copy of the decree of the cabinet resolution. A discussion of the work plans in separate sessions is planned for the beginning of June.

Ob. Reg. Diels (Prussian Min. of Int.): Asks the council to deal directly with the Gestapo Department with regard to Reich Defense problems, since furnishes the best guarantee for the secrecy of the problems and tasks and because that office is anyway the competent agency in the Pr. Min. of the Int. to deal with the district registration offices, Control agencies, border protection, etc.

sgd. Keitel

Distribution:
See list of participants in the
first part of the document.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 177

13 December 1945

I, EDGAR BODENHEIMER, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC 177.

EDGAR BODENHEIMER

H1157-0261

H1157-0262



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

The Chief of the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Hq, 31 October 1941.

WFSt/Abt.L (II Org/IV qu
No. 0 2588/41 Secret

Secret

Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry.

The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date, however, its possible extent will by no means correspond to expections and requirements in view of the great demand.

The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the working power of the Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent by large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers' goods (Genussmittel) for every day's life, eventual rewards for production.

For the Arbeitseinsatz, following may be considered for example:

I. Armed Forces.

a.) Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied Eastern territories.

b.) Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories and in Germany.

c.) Closed units of all kinds to relieve soldiers in labor service.

II. Construction and Armament Industry.

a.) Work units for constructions of all kind, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants).

b.) Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (eventually after withdrawal and other employment of the German workers.)

III. Other War Industries.

a.) Mining as under II b.

b.) Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc.

c.) Agriculture and forestry in closed units.

The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of above examples by:

To I. The armed forces.
To II. The Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition and the Inspector General for the German road system in agreement with the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Wi Rü Amt).

H1157-0263



Deputies of the Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of skilled workers.

To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are:

1.) The securing of guards to protect the German people from dangers.

2.) Housing in closed camps.

3.) Securing adequate nourishment.

The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military counter-intelligence agencies as until now.

OKW (AWA) will furnish the Reich Minister for Labor with blueprints based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the Arbeitseinsatz.

Furthermore the Supreme Commander of the Army is asked to take the necessary measures for the recruiting of volunteer labor in the Eastern operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor.

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution:

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/ Gen. Qu.
Ob.d.M/Skl. (Qu A II)
Ob.d.L/Gen. Qu
Reichsarbeitsministerium
Att: Staatssekretaer Syrup
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Att: Min. Rat Dr. Dietrich
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AWA (3 x)
W II

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-194

23 November 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. EC-194.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE,
Lt (jg), USNR,
391590.

H1157-0264

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-338
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Notations on first page:

Ink and pencil: vol 222-2
pencil: 338
Blue pencil : v. F 23 Nov
Brown pencil : submit to chief, office of Foreign Intelligence Berkner (?) 25 Sept.
Red stamp : Secret
Purple pencil : K 23 Sept. The Objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare! This is the destruction of an ideology! Therefore I approve and back the measures K.
Indelible ink : -2- chief foreign and chief intelligence III C. (illegible initials) 1 Oct.
Blue pencil : (initials) 29 Sept
pencil : (initials) 22 Nov
Blue pencil : (initials) IV 20 Oct back to staff Ia 20 Nov (initials) VI
Indelible pencil: Ia (illegible letters)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-338
Continued

338

Vol. 222 - 2

Amt Ausl/Abw.
Nr. 9731/41 geh. Chef Ausl.
F XIV, E 1.

Berlin, 15 Sept 1941

Secret

To be sumitted to
the Chief of OKW

Notes of Speech

SUBJECT: Directives for the treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War.

REFERENCE: 2 f 24.11 AWA / Kriegsgef. (I) Nr. 3058/41 secret

To be submitted to
the Chief of AWA

I. 1. The legal position is as follows:

The Geneva Convention for the treatment of Prisoners of war is not ("not" is underlined into purple pencil) binding in the relationship between Germany and the USSR, therefore only the principles of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually been established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody (Sicherheitsschaft) the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from a further participation in the war. This principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people; this is also in the interest of all belligerents in order to prevent mistreatment of their own soldiers in case of capture.

2) The decrees for the treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War enclosed as supplement No. 1 are based on a fundamentally different view point, as is shown in the opening phrases. According to this view point military service for the Soviets is not considered military duty but, because of the murders committed by the Russians, is characterized in its totality as a crime. Hence the validity of international legal standards in wartime is denied in the war against Bolshevism. Furthermore much is set aside which, according to previous experience has proved it self not only as militarily useful but was also considered absolutely essential for the maintenance of discipline and efficiency of the own troops.

3) The instructions are very general. But if one considers their basic principles the expressly approved measures will result in arbitrary mistreatments and killings, the formal prohibition of arbitrary actions notwithstanding.

a) This results in the first place from the instructions about the use of arms in cases of insubordination. The guards and their superior officers who are entirely unacquainted with the languages of the prisoners of war will frequently not be able to determine whether non-compliance with orders is caused by misunderstanding or disobedience. The principle: "Use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war is as a rule justified" exempts the guards of any obligation for deliberation.

b) The treatment of the prisoners of war is removed to a large extent from the supervision of the Wehrmacht; to outward appearances, however, th responsibility will remain with the Wehrmacht.

aa) The screening of the civilians and politically undesirable prisoners of war as well as the decision over their fate is effected by the action (purple pencil note very efficient!) detachments of the Security Police (Sicherheits Polizei) (underlined in purple) and the SD along principles which are unknown* to the Wehrmacht* authorities* and the compliance with which they cannot check.

* Underlined in purple. Pencilled notations in left margin: "Very efficient! and "not at all" (?)

H1157-0266



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-338
Continued

bb) The establishment of a camp police equipped with conceptions clubs, whips and similar tools is contrary to military, even though the policing is done by camp inmates; furthermore, the Wehrmacht authorities are thus handing over means of punishment of unknown persons without being able to really check on their use.

c) The final phrase of the decree suggests that the commanders of the prisoners of war camps act even more severely than the decrees provide for, in order to be sure not to be held responsible themselves.

4. According to general experience, unfair treatment provokes the spirit of insubordination, so that the guarding of these prisoners of war in all probability will always remain difficult. The instructions already provide for the employment of one guard for each 10 prisoners during work so that with the present number of approximately 1.5 millions of employable prisoners a minimum of 150 000 men is required for guard duty.

5. Enclosure No. 2 is a translation of the Russian decree for prisoners of war which complies with the principles of the International Law and to a very large extent also the Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war. This decree will no doubt be disregarded by the Russian troops at the front but both, the Russian as well as the German decree, are mostly for home consumption. Although it can hardly be assumed that the Russian decree will be adhered to in the Russian territory of the Soviet Union, there is the danger that the German decrees will be seized upon by the enemy propaganda and will be compared with the Russian decrees.

6. The reconstruction of the occupied territories, so essential for the German War Economy, will be handicapped. It will be made impossible for those prisoners of war who, because of their anti-Bolshevistic attitude or because of some special training or for other reasons could be used for the administration of these territories, to work for us after their release even though they might be inclined to do so after their experiences in the prisoners of war camps. Instead of taking advantage of the tensions among the population of the occupied territories for the benefit of the German administration, the mobilization of all international opposition forces of Russia for unified hostility will be facilitated.

7. Under the special conditions prevailing in the Russian theatre of operation, the will to resist of the enemy troops will be extremely strengthened by the enemy intelligence service and the very rapidly effective whispering campaign.

8. Possible sources of information will be blocked; prisoners of war who, as internal political opponents of the Bolshevistic regime, especially those belonging to minorities, could be used for counter-intelligence purposes will loose all willingness they may have to be enrolled. This applies especially to the nationalities of the territory of the Kaukasus which is so decisive for the war economy.

9. * It will be impossible to protest against the bad treatment of German soldiers in Soviet Russian captivity. *(purple pencil note: "I consider it useless!)

II. Office Ausl/Abw. (Foreign Counter-Intelligence) has not been consulted before issuance of these decrees of the order for their execution. For fundamental reasons as well as for the detrimental results certainly to be expected with regard to political and military matters, the office Ausl./Abw. has has considerable misgivings about them.

signed Canaris

2 Enclosures

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-338
Continued

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Az. 2f 24.11 General Armed Forces Dept. /P.W. (I)
No. 3058/41 Secret

2 Enclosures

Berlin-Schoeneberg, 8 Sept 1941
Badenschestrasse 51

Secret

SUBJECT : Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.

REFERENCE :
1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16 June 1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government.
2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26 June 1941.
3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17 July 1941.
4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2 Aug 1941.

Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by OKH/Gen. Qu. for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order, any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.

Distribution:

| | | |
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| Supreme Command army/gen. staff army/gen Hq. | - | 10 |
| Reich air force minister and C-i-C of air force | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Navy | - | 2 |
| Armed Forces C-i-C Norway | - | 2 |
| Service Commands I-XIII,XVII,XVIII,XX,XXI, also for branches 6 each | - | 102 |
| Military Commander Government General and PW Commander | - | 25 |
| PW Commander service command I | - | 15 |
| Armed Forces Commander Baltic territories Riga, and PW Commander with armed forces commander Baltic territories at present Riga | - | 20 |
| Armed Forces commander Ukraine, Powmo, and PW Commander with armed forces Commander Ukraine, at present Berditschen | - | 20 |
| Air district hq. II,XI,XII | - | 3 |
| Naval station North Sea, ilhelms haven | - | 1 |
| Naval station Baltic, Kiel | - | 1 |
| | carry over | 203 |
| (red stamp and blue ink) to No. 9731/41 secret foreign | | |
| | carry over | 203 |

for information:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Reich Labor Ministry, attention Councillor Dr. Hoelk | - | 1 |
| Reich Leader SS and Chief of German Police, Berlin SW | - | 11 |
| Reich Labor Service | - | 10 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces /staff/ hq. | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces JAG | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces Armed Forces Propaganda | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces foreign office/counter intelligence/foreign | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence I | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence II | - | 2 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces/foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence III | - | 2 |

H1157-0268



| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Command Armed Forces general armed forces office/ inspect./PW | - | 1 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces PW | - | 4 |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces reserve | - | 20 |
| Supreem Command Armed Forces draft | - | 1 |
| | | 255 |

Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces by order:
REINECKE

The balance of this enclosure appears in Doc. No. 1519 PS.

The second enclosure is a translation from Russian into German of a Russian decree pertaining to treatment of German P's.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-338

1 December 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-338.

ERNST M. COHN.
PFC, 33925738

Exhibit US 160
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM EC-405
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Excerpts from Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council.
Time: 26.6.35. Begun: 10:00
Place: Large Conference room of R.K.M. Ended: 12:40

Pp. 5-10:

Generalmajor v. Reichenau:

In taking up the newly added fields of activity, Gen. Major v. Reichenau repeats the already frequently expressed plea that, in confident cooperation, not only the demands of the Wehrmacht be supported, but that, also, suggestions for new lines of activity be brought forward from one's own sphere of work and placed before the Working Committee.

He states, further, that the securing of the Wehrmacht's supply bases and the preparation for planned employment of the German people's economic resources are just as important prerequisites for the defense of the German living space (Lebensraum) as are the military preparations proper.

2. There has been a change in the head of Section L of the Wehrmachtsamt and also in its representation in the Working Committee. Oberst v. Vietinghoff gen. Scheel has been succeeded by Oberstlt. Jodl.

F. Oberstlt. Jodl (W.A. (L)):
on "Participation in Mobilization Preparations."

The practical execution of the preparatory mobilization measures ordered by the Wehrmacht and the Supreme Reich authorities requires a considerable expansion in personnel concerned. The principle that "results are more important than concealment" (Wirkung geht vor Deckung), applies here in connection with mobilization preparations. This loosening of the heretofore closely restricted circle of persons must not be permitted to result, after the publishing of the conscription decrees (Wehrfreiheit), in alarming the public, here and abroad, by a succession of conspicuous measures preparatory to mobilization.

The provisions of the decree, "The Reich Minister of War W.A. No. 1375/35 g.K. L IV a of 26.6.35", are in general the authority for the guidance of officials, organizations, and individuals in the future. In accordance with this, all the resources of the nation that are indispensable to the preparation of the R.V. can be drafted or at least prepared, while keeping within the limits of the security regulations issued.

The existence of mobilization preparations is not to be admitted, however, to persons not directly concerned (Unbeteiligten). The individual mobilization measures are still subject to the directives issued concerning secrecy. Insofar as they cannot be camouflaged, they are to be explained on the basis of peacetime necessities.

The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of 21.5.35 and other utterances, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has stated that the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the Aide memoire of the French Charge d'affaires, of 17.6.35, on "Recruiting offices (Ersatzdienststellen) in the demilitarized zone," the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities (zivile Ersatzbehoerden) nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation therefore.

Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of such preparations or the intention of them must be kept in strictest secrecy, in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich.



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These preparations include, in particular, the following:

(a) Mobilization measures pertaining to the national police (Landespolizei) and the security police (Schutzpolizei), as well as to the Gendarmerie.

(b) Mobilization measures pertaining to transportation and communications.

(c) Preparation for the "liberation of the Rhein."

(d) Preparation of local defense (Ortsschutz).

(e) Preparation of the Reinforced Frontier Guard (Verstarkten Grenzaufsichtsdienst).

(f) Preparation of blockade measures (Sperrmassnahmen).

(g) Preliminary mustering of horse-drawn and motor vehicles.

(h) Preparation for evacuation measures.

(i) Mobilization measures for drafting of persons. (Mob. Massnahmen fur die personelle Erfassung.)

(j) Preparation of economic mobilization.

Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized zone, and without exception such material must be kept in safes. Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-grey uniforms and other items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight. Mobilization drills, roll-calls, and training with military weapons are forbidden. I am calling the attention of all administrative authorities participating in mobilization preparations in the demilitarized zone to the prudence prescribed by the present political situation and am emphasizing especially that in the demilitarized zone, in contrast to the rest of the Reich, the principle that "concealment is more important than results" (Deckung geht vor Wirkung) must be applied at present.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-405

19 November 1945.

I, Grace E. McConnaughey, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the pages indicated of Document EC-405.

Grace E. McConnaughey.

3707.

H1157-0271

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOC.E.C.406.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Minutes of the 11th meeting of the Reichs Defense Council.

Time: December 6, 1935.

Place: Big Conference room of the R.D.C.

Participants:

Reichs War Ministry

| | |
|---|---|
| Wehrmachtsamt: | Major General Keitel |
| | Lt. Col. Jodl |
| | Capt. Kreucke (Navy) |
| | Lt. Col. (E.) Hofenauer |
| | Major Zeitzler |
| | Major Boernicke |
| | Capt. Mayer-Dolmer (Navy) |
| | Capt. Voelter |
| | Major (E.) v. Steinocher |
| | Major A. D. v. Mench |
| W. Stb. | Col. Thomas |
| | Lt. Col. Warlimont |
| | Major Beutler |
| | Major Miller |
| | Major (E.) Drews (V.C. at Reichs Ministry for Economy) |
| | Capt. Czimotis |
| Abw. | Major (E.) von Frankenberg and Lindingsdorf |
| H. | Min. Dir. Tischbein |
| | Min. Dir. Hollender |
| J. | Capt. (E.) Rotgen |
| | Capt. Hielscher |
| W.R. | Min. Rat DeRendens |
| Inst. 1. | Min. Rat Rosenberger |

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

| | |
|---|---|
| General Staff of the A.F.: | Lt. Col. Wagener |
| | Lt. Col. (E.) Peterson |
| | Lt. Col. (E.) Zercke |
| | Capt. Blumke |
| | Capt. Barder |
| | Rittmeister v. Grohmann |
| General Office of the Armed Forces: | Col. Kempf |
| | Col. Engelbrecht |
| | Major. Schindle (V.O. at the R.P. Min.) |
| | Capt. Hassel |
| Weapon Division of the Armed. Forces: | Capt. Lorh |
| Administration of the Armed Forces: | Min. Rat Reich |

Supreme Commander of the Navy

Capt. Coupette
Capt. Fleischer
Capt. Gliase
Capt. (E.) Gihle
Capt. Tobye
Capt. Nordmann
Capt. Kahler
Min. Rat. Frerischs

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| | |
|---|---|
| Commander of the Air Force: | Lt. Col. Doersterling<br>Major Maass<br>Major (E.) Ladermann<br>Min. Rat Knipfer |

Representatives for the R.V. of the Supreme Government Administration and the Prussian State Ministry.

| | |
|---|---|
| Plenifpotentiary for the Fuehrer and Chancellor for economic questions: | Dept. Eng. Kreppler |
| Leading Staff of G.B. | Min. Rat Wohltab<br>Min. Rat Geh. Rat Worbes<br>Min. Rat Sussdorf<br>Ob. Reg. Rat Nolte<br>Reg. Rat Dr. Burandt<br>Dr. Noack |
| Foreign Office | Leg. Sekr. v. Buelow |
| Reichs and Prussian Ministry of the Interior | Min. Rat Wagener<br>Staatsanwalt Dr. Raeder<br>Major d. Sch. P. Abrahauer |
| Reichs Ministry for Finance | Min. Rat Geh. Rat Dr. Bender<br>Min. Rat Geh. Rat Wapenhenish |
| Reichs Prussian Ministry for Economics | Min. Rat Godlewski |
| Reichs Prussian Ministry for Food and Agriculture | Reichscommissioner z. C.V. Kriegsheim |
| Reichs and Prussian Ministry for Labor | Min. Rat Schroeder |
| Reichs Ministry for Justice | Min. Rat Haasterb |
| Reichs and Prussian Ministry for Traffic | Min. Rat Rudolf Schmidt |
| Reichs Ministry for Postal Service | Postrat Timme |
| Reichs Ministry for Propaganda | Major a.D. v. Wrochen |
| Reichs a nd Prussian Ministry for Science and Education | Min. Rat Dr. Krimmel |
| Directorium of the Reichsbank | Dr. at the Reichsbank Dr. Mueller |
| Main Administration of the German Reichsbahn | Dir. Dr. Schiling<br>Oberrst. Listtge |
| Inspector General for the German Roads | Ob. Reg. Baurat Schrenlehen |
| Reichs Forstmeister and Prussian State Forstmeister | Ob. Landforstmeister Schuette |
| Prussian State Ministry | Min. Rat Bergebrohn |



(Doc. E.C. 408 Cont'd)

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Schedule of the Day

a. Set-up and tasks of the leading staff of the plenipotentiary general of the War-Economy.

b. Nutritional standards in case of mobilization based on the harvest of 1935.

c. Required overseas transport in war-time.

d. Preparations for procurements of funds for the individual steps in mobilization. Money procurement for ships in foreign countries.

e. Legal responsibilities of the shipping trade. Armed Forces requests to be filled for new ships to be built.

f. Book for mobilization for civilian administration state of preparation.

g. Unification of war-time police system (Reinforced Police Protection).

h. V.G.A.D. in the Saar Territory.

j. Changed evacuation plans.

k. Unification of individual identification cards.

l. Organization of civilian air raid precautions. Do difficulties exist in limitations to other civilian mobilization tasks.

m. Miscellaneous.

n. Questions by the Reichs ressorts.

Major General Keitel:

1. Opens the conference takes over the place of the President of the Reichs Defense Council, expresses his thanks to Lt. General v. Reichenau for his work as president of the Reichs Defense Council up to now, and forwards thanks and greetings of good-bye from Lt. General v. Reichenau.

He points to progresses meanwhile achieved in the extended Reichs defense by the Reichs ressorts and their legal procedure instead of improvisation. He emphasizes that hand in hand with the accelerated erection of the Armed Forces, the organization of the whole nation in accelerated speed for Reichs defense will be necessary to compete with other nations in the lead. He further explains: The mobilization year starts on April 1, and ends onMarch 31. The mobilization book for civilians will be issued onApril 1, 1936 for the first time. That April 1, has to find us ready for action in the limits of possibility.

2. It is principally new to the organization of the Reichs defense, to appoint the Plenipotentiary General with its preparation and leadership.

A from him activated leading staff is present for the first time at the Reichs defense council.

Herr Ministerialdirektor Wohltat, as Director of the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.

Min. Rat Geh. Rat Worbs as Referent for Finance at the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy.



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He remarked that the highly developed Economy of a big state needs universal leadership and competent management in war time. The Armed Forces accepted the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General favorably, because it compares with experiences in the last war, and because it is assured, that by splitting the responsibility, a decomposition of the organic construction of the combined preparation will not result, but efficiency will increase.

He furthermore greets the Reichs defense referent of the Reich Forestry.

Mr. Oberlandforstmeister Schuette:

Major General Keitel emphasizes toward the new members, that "emnity and unification" were the title for the combined efforts concerning the Reichs defense.

Thereafter General Keitel discusses two important fields: raw-material and money.

Complying with the Fuehrers desire, the extension of our Armed Forces is knowingly just before all other state necessities by the economical leadership. It is the task of all members of the Reichs Defense Counsel to use for it concentratedly and economically the peoples property therefore provided, in the frame of the overall situation, and only request such funds and raw materials that will serve absolute and sole for Reichs defense. Limitations and thrift in the individual procedure, increase by themselves the size and efficiency of the preparations.

3. From today's schedule dismissed are:

Reports about the work of the Ostpreusser Councils and about the cooperation of the Reichsbehoerden among themselves, and the General Command of the Middle and Kreis-instance, because they are not yet ripe to be discussed at the Reichs Defense Council. They will be included into the report at the next conference.

Ministerial Rat Wohltat, heard of the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary General For War Economy. Appointment and tasks of the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.

1. The legal base for the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary general, are the Reichs defense law of May 21, 1935, and the decision by the government of the same date, concerning the Reichs defense - Rat.

2. The cooperation between the Plenipotentiary General and the Chief of the military Economy Staffs regulate the directives for a unified preparation for the Reichs defense as of November 1, 1935.

As well as war-economical preparations are gathered and presented to the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary general by the Chief of the milit. Economy staffs, the leading staff of the Plenipotentiary general gathers all milit. Economical preparation belonging to the Plenipotentiary general and presents them to the Chief of the Military Economics.

Questions of the War-militation-Economy will be presented from the side of the Reichs War Ministers in close agreement with the supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Duresverwaltungsamt) and from the side of the Plenipotentiary General in cooperation with the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Food and Agriculture.



(Doc. E.C.406 Cont'd)

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Pages 34-38. E.C. 406

Colonel Jodl (W.A. (L)):
Mobilization book for the Civilian Administration Stand of preparations.
About the technical side of the carrying out procedure of misformed preparations for the Reichs defense no clear decisions have been made. In the following explanation, a survey about the stand of preparations and the intentions of the President of the Reichs Defense Council will be given.

The preparations by the Civilian Administration are shown under, Work-plans in the Mobilization book and in the Mobilization Calender.
1.) The work-plans describe the tasks for the Civilian population concerning preperations for Reichs - Defense. Furthermore they contain the limitations of competence the necessary cooperation of other Reich behoiden for individual regulations.
The work - plans present the base for all Mobilization preparations, advised by the Reichs War Minister and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces as well as the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy. The work plans will be laid down in mutual agreement between the competent Dept of the Armed Forces and the highest Reichs behoiden, and issued by the Secretios of the Reichs Defense Council.

As for as work - plans for individual Administrations are not yet finished or are in need of Amendments, their conclusion shall be aspired as of 1.4.1936.

The Referents for the Reichs Defense are requested, to examine their plans to that viewpoint and to submit their requests to the Secreteries of the Reichs Defense Council.
2.) The Mobilization book for the Civilian Administration has a dual purpose.
a.) It shows the extent of civilian Mobilization - regulation and their political carrying power.
b.) It forms the standerized base for the carrying out procedure of Mobilization outside the Armed Forces.

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I, EDGAR BODENHEIMER, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the extracts indicated of document No. E.C.406.

EDGAR BODENHEIMER.

(Doc. E.C.406 Cont'd)

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TRANSLATION EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT EC-407
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

# M I N U T E S

## of the 12th Meeting of the Reichs Defense Council

Time: 14 May 1936 Begin: 10:00 o'clock

Place: Grand Conference Room of National Ministry of War End: 14:00 o'clock

(Secret business of the Command)

1.) The National Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, General Field Marshal von Blomberg, opened the 12th meeting of the Reichs Defense Council by expressing thanks for the work accomplished and pointing out in principle the necessity of a preparation for a total mobilization with emphasis on the most important measures to be taken at this time. (Among others: mobilization schedule, legal basis, preparations in the remilitarized zone). He further indicates the assignment of the national resources (Reichsressort) to finance its measures for preparation of the Reichs defense out of its budget.

2.) The chairman of the Reichs Defense Council, Lieutenant General Keitel, states:

In todays and future meetings of the Reichs Defense Council a cross section of the general situation concerning all matters of the national defense is presented. The picture of the situation does not appear in the reports of the meetings. The open discussion of State secrets before our large council gives the special obligation to the chairman of the Reichs Defense Council of pointing out its secrecy.

Todays session takes place under the auspices of the restoration of the State authority in the demilitarized zone.

The difficulties of the economic situation, which are presented today, must be mastered.

3.) The serious raw material and foreign exchange situation has led to the special mandate given to the Prussian Ministerpresident Goering by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor of which the Reichs resources were notified. In order to strengthen the connection between the Prussian Ministerpresident and the Reichs Defense Council, one more representative for the raw material and foreign exchange matters, besides the official national defense council representatives of the Prussian Ministerpresident, is appointed as a permanent member to the Reichs Defense Council according to a cabinet resolution of April 4, 1933: Lieutenant Colonel L o e b of the National Air Ministry.

4.) The following changes took place in the Reichs Defense Council.

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The chairman welcomes as new members these representatives of the National Office for Regional Planning: Director Bloecker (not present) and Dr. Schopers.

Replaces were:
in the National Ministry of Finance Geheimrat Wapenhensch by Ministerial Director Dr. Mitze
in the Postal Ministry Postal Director Timme by Ministerial Director Schroeder
in the Ministry of Transportation Ministerial Counsel Schmidt by Ober Regierungs - and Baurat Pigge.

The chairman welcomes the new co-workers and expresses his gratitude to the gentlemen who have resigned for their valuable work in the Reichs Defense Council.

To Ober Regierungsrat Dr. Barth who left the executive staff of the plenipotentiary and the mobilization staff of the Ministry for Economics, and who was one of the first and most active fellow-workers in preparing the economic mobilization, the chairman gives the special thanks of the Reichs Defense Council.

A. About the present situation reports for the uniform preparation for the national defense are presented under special consideration of the experiences from the occupation of the demilitarized zone:

1.) by Secretary of the Legation von Buelow (Foreign Office) about the foreign policy situation.

The chairman gives the order to procure documents about Italy's measures against the sanctions to solve also our difficult problems concerning the armament economy and the demobilization. A study of war economy is suggested in view of various foreign policy situations.

2.) By Major von Wrochem (National Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) about the propaganda policy situation at home and abroad.

The chairman points out the importance of propaganda as a weapon.

3.) By Colonel Jodl (W. (L) ) about the military policy situation.

The war of today is composed of many steps. The experiences during the tension period in March led to the recognition that in the Mobilization Book for the civil administration an arrangement to (3) periods of strain is unsuitable for preparatory measures; it will be abandoned. The measures to be taken in the "X" case and in the Mobilization case are combined in one chapter because they are almost the same. In part I of the Mobilization Book directives for this are drawn up. Its new edition and the directives for the mobilization schedule of the civil administration by the National Ministry of War is to be expected during the next quarter.

Explained are "Blockade Organization" and "Frontier Guard", changed inclusive Reichs defense measures, the details of which will be sent to the participating departments of the National Ministry of War. The participating civilian departments will



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not be burdened to any great extent with new tasks and costs. The chairman points out that the new construction of the armed forces makes possible improvements in the preparation which will be effective beginning in the mobilization year 1937.

4.) By Colonel Thomas (W A (W STb) ) about the military economic situation.

The improvement of our military economic situation which is dependent on foreign countries in the task of the economic policy, to be influenced by the military economy, and a foreign policy which assures itself of economically strong allies.

5.) By Ministerial Director Wohltat (executive statt plenipotentiary) about the condition in the field of food, trade - and industrial economy, raw materials and foreign exchange.

To maintain the armament and food self-sufficiency, further increases in production and the most vigorous savings measures are necessary immediately, a demand, which has led to the special mandate of the Prussian Ministerpresident Goering. The chairman states comprehensively:

Through the occupation of the demilitarized zone, the military economic situation has improved. In relation with foreign countries the power of the Reich became stronger.

According to the last two lectures, we face a difficult situation in the National economy. To overcome them Ministerpresident Goering has given more detailed explanations at the beginning of this week. Three demands must remain:

a) the demand for armament depending upon the full capacity of our economic power. The Fuehrer wants no delay for this urgent task.

b) to maintain the productive capacity of our industry and agriculture avoiding the discharge of workers.

c) to maintain the food self-sufficiency of the people: a good harvest can be hoped for.

The progress in the production of substitutes, for instance in fodder, rubber, fuel, are still a live insurance for the people and the armed forces. With keeping this in mind their often uneconomically high costs have to be judged.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC-407

19 November 1945

I, HENRY JACOB, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the first ten pages of Document EC-407.

HENRY JACOB

H1157-0279

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Geheime Reichssache)

TOP SECRET
To be transmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder

Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmidt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

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Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

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(Page 2)

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematized form below.

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Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany has dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. (p 3)

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[illegible] million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, [illegible] problem be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of this problem demands courage. The principle, by which one evades [illegible] by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissable. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: (p. 4)

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of the treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space on the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour. (p. 5)

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with

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To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France, (p 6).

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it.
If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. (p 7) The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure. (p 8)

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

H1157-0282



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power. (p 9)

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England is the motor driving against Germary). Her strength lies in the following.

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. (p 10). It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the fleet's protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:-

1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned;
2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise;
3. Human failings;
4. Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. (p 11) It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

H1157-0283





1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.
This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been created.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

(page 12)

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. (p 13)

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

H1157-0284



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

This is the plan of attack.

The plan demands:- (page 14)

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-
   e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

   (b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.
   The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighboring states. (Literally: Neighboring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will include representatives of the three services, and, as and when necessary will call upon the services of the three Commanders in Chief or Chiefs of Staff.

This Staff will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

(page 15)

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decisions taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - 120,000 men in each age class!

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot Line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entirety, is important.

The object:

1. Study of the problem in its entirety.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and skeptical judgment.

H1157-0285

Pa[redacted]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Working principles:

1. No one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program.
c) The armaments programs are to be postponed to 1943 or 1944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

- - - - - - - - - - -

18 November 1945

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79

I, Leo Davenport, S/Sgt, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant in the English and German languages and this is a true translation of Document No. L-79.

Leo Davenport
S/Sgt, 32496587

H1157-0286



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-90
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

# T R A N S L A T I O N

The Officer Commanding
Security Police & SD
in Lorraine- Saar Palatinate

Metz, 14.5.42

Confidential

1. Report: By order of the Commander I personally submitted to-day to Mr. W e l s c h, Advocate General , the Decree of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of 2 Feb. 42 (Copy) - Office Foreign Countries (Ausl.Amt) Counter Intelligence Dept. CI (Abwehr) III Nr. 570/1.42 secret (ZR/III C 2) - for his approval and I received it back in a sealed envelope.

2. Submitted to the Commander for his information and further orders. (Mr.) Pistorius wishes the Decree to be returned to him.

(signed) Ram (?)

14. May 1942

Returned to Postorius

14 May 1942

(signed) Ram

H1157-0287



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L - 90
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

T R A N S L A T I O N

Copy. (k) stamp

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin,Febr.2nd 1942

Office Foreign Countries (Amt Ausl.) Counter Intell./Dept. Abwehr III Nr. 570/1.42 confidential (ZR/III C 2) confidential

Re: Prosecution of offenses against the German State or the Occupying Power in the occupied territories.

Your Ref. None

Enclosures: 3

Enclosed please find: C o n f i d e n t i a l

1. Decree of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of 7.12.41
2. Executive order of the sam date.
3. Communication of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of 12.12.41

The decree introduces a fundamental innovation. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces orders that offenses committed by civilians within the occupied territories and of the kind mentioned above, are to be dealt with by the competent Military Courts in the occupied territories only, if

(a) the death penalty is pronounced,
and (b) sentence is passed within 8 days from the prisoner's arrest.

Unless both these conditions are fuldilled, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander does not anticipate criminal proceedings within the occupied territories will have the necessary deterrent effect.

In all other cases the prisoners are in future to be transported to Germany secretly, and further dealing with the offences will take place here; these measures will have a deterrent because

(a) the prisoners will vanish without leaving a trace,
(b) no information may be given as to their whereabout or their fate.

This order will entail only very slight alterations in the activities of the Counter Intelligence (Abwehr) Offices. Now as before these offices decide the actual time when people suspected of espionage or sabotage are to be arrested. When deciding this time it must nevertheless now be taken into consideration that before the arrest is made there will if possible have to be existent, enough proof to convict the prisoner, for there will hardly be an opportunity for further inquiries, confrontation etc. since sentence has either to be passed within 8 days or otherwise the removal of the arrested person to Germany will make impossible further investigations on the spot. Before the arrest is made, therefore, contact must be made with the appropiate Military Court and the question examined with them as to whether or not the proof collected is sufficient.

H1157-0288





In case the competent Military Court, resp. the Military Commander are of the opinion that an immediate decision on the spot is impossible, and the prisoners are therefore to be transported to Germany, the Counter Intelligence Offices have to report this fact directly to the RSHA in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrecht Street 7, c/o Dr. Fischer, Director of Criminal Police, stating the exact number of prisoners and of the groups which belong together as the case may be. In isolated case where the Superior Commander has an urgent interest in the case being dealt with by a military court, this is to be reported to the RSHA Copy of the entire report has to be sent to Office Foreign Countries Counter Intelligence Dept. Abwehr III.

The RSHA on the basis of available accomodation will determine which office of the State Police has to accept the prisoners. The letter office will communicate with the competent Counter Intelligence Office and determine with it the particulars of the removal, particularly whether this will be carried out by the Secret Field Police, the Field Gendarmerie, or the Gestapo itself, as well as on place and the manner of the actual handing over.

For the time being, the Fuehrer's Decree is to be applied only within the occupied areas of the West (Norway, Holland, Belgium and the North of France, France.)

The Counter Intelligence offices will report orally to the Chiefs of Staff on the above instructions of the Foreign Countries/Counter Intelligence ("Abwehr").

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By Order

Distribution:
etc.

signed: Signature (sic)

H1157-0289



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L- 90
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Copy of Copy

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Dec. 12th, 1941
14 n 16 WR (I 3/4)
Nr. 165/41 confidential

Confidential

Subject: Prosecution of offences committed within the occupied countries against the German State or the Occupying Powers.

1 Enclosure

It is the carefully considered will of the Fuehrer that now measures should be conceived in order to counteract in the occupied countries attacks against the German State or the occupying power. The Fuehrer is of the following opinion. If these offences are punished with imprisonment, even with hard labor for life, this will be looked upon as a sign of weakness. Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved either by capital punishment or by measures by which the relatives of the criminal and the population do not know the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal is transferred to Germany.

The enclosed directives for the prosecution of the offences comply with the Fuehrer's point of view. They have been examined and approved by him.

(signed) Keitel

Certification.

H1157-0290





Copy of Copy

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

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(stamp) Confidential

Directives

for the prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying power, of December 7th, 1941.

Within the occupied territories communistic elements and other circles hostile to Germany have increased their efforts against the German State and the occupying power since the Russian campaign started. The amount and the danger of these machinations oblige us to take severe measures as a determent. First of all the following directives are to be applied:

I. Within the occupied territories, the adequate punishment for offences committed against the German State or the occupying power which endanger their security or state of readiness is on principle the death penalty.

II. The offences listed sub I as a rule are to be dealt with in the occupied countries only if it is probalbe that sentence of death will be passed upon the offender, at least upon the principal offender, and if the trial and the execution can be completed in a very short time. Otherwise the offenders, at least the principal offenders, are to be taken to Germany.

III. Prisoners taken to Germany are subjected to military procedure only if particular military interests require this. In case German or foreign authorities enquire about such prisoners, they are to be told that they were arrested, but that the proceedings do not allow any further information.

IV. The Commanders in the occupied territories and the Gourt authorities within the framework of their jurisdiction, are personally responsible for the observance of this decree.

V. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces determines in which occupied territories this decree is to be applied. He is authorized to explain and to issue executive orders and supplements. The Reich Minister of Justice will issue executive orders within his own jurisdiction.

By Order

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

A true copy.
Signature
Major

H1157-0291



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L- 90
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Copy of Copy

(stamp) c o n f i d e n t i a l

First Ordinance

for the execution of the directives of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces concerning prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying power.

-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.--

Based on paragraph V of the directives of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces concerning prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying Power, of December 7th, 1941 I decree as follows:

I.

As a rule, the provisions of paragraph I of the Directives apply in case of the following:

1. Attacks against life or bodily health,
2. Espionage,
3. Sabotage,
4. Communistic conspiracy,
5. Offences likely to create disturbance.
6. Assistance to the enemy, through:

   a) Smuggling of persons,
   b) attempt to join an enemy force,
   c) assisting enemy soldiers (parachutists, etc.)

7. Illegal possession of arms.

II.

(1) The offences mentioned in I of the Directives are to be brought to trial in the occupied territories only in the following cases:

1. It must be likely that death sentence will be pronounced upon the offenders, at least upon the principal offenders.

2. It must be possible to complete trial and execution within a very short time ( on principle within a week after arrest).

3. No particular political objections should be present with regard to immediate execution.

4. Apart from sentences for murder or for participating in guerilla warfare, a death sentence against a woman should be improbable.

(2) If a sentence passed in accordance with subs. I has been squashed, the subsequent procedure may be continued in the occupied country provided the stipulations of paragraph 1, Nr. 1, 3 and 4 are complied with.

III.

(1) With regard to offences defined in paragraph I of the Directives, the Court Official decides in agreement with the Counter Intelligence

H1157-0292





("Abwehr") offices whether the conditions for trying the case within the occupied country are present. In the affirmative he convokes the court martial. In the negative he submits the file to his superior commander (s. 89, subs. 1 Code of Military Procedure). The latter may reserve his decision.

(2) The Superior Commander has the final decision as to whether the conditions are present for trying the case in the occupied country. In the affirmative he delegates further procedure to an authority within his area. In the negative, he orders the Secret Field Police to transport the Prisoner to Germany.

IV.

(1) Prisoners transported to Germany are subjected there to military Procedure only when the High Command of the Armed Forces or the Superior Commander, while deciding according to s. III, state that particular military interests call for adjudication by a military court. When such a statement has not been issued, the order to transport the offender to Germany is equivalent to a transfer in the meaning of par. 3, subs. 2, par. 2 Code of Military Procedure.

(2) If the Superior Commander exercises the authority invested in him under Art. I, there he should submit the documents to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, thorough the usual Service channels. The prisoners are to be designated "Military Prisoners" as regards the Secret Field Police.

(3) The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces determines the powers of the Court trying these prisoners, who under Art.I, come under military procedure. The Supreme Command can renounce the competency of the Military Tribunals and can further more suspend the proceedings until such time as they may desire.

V.

If the trial takes place in Germany it should take place with the Public strictly excluded, owing to the endangering of State Security. Alien witnesses may be heard only with the consent of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

VI.

The instructions on the procedure in military courts contained in the Decrees of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Sept. 13th, 1941 concerning the situation in Norway (Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces Dept. L (IV/Qu) No. 002034/41)Top Secret and of Sept. 16th, 1941 re. Communist Resistance Movements in the occupied territories. ( Ops. Staff of Armed Forces, Dept.L (IV Qu) No. 002060/41 Top Secret) are replaced by the directives and this Execution order.

VII.

(1) The directives take effect three weeks after having been signed. They are to be applied in all occupied countries until further notice, with the exception of Denmark.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L - 90
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

(2) The rules issued for newly occupied eastern countries are not affected by these rules.

(3) Par. I of the directives applies to pending cases. The court official and the Superior Commander are entitled to apply par. III of this execution order in such proceedings. In case the Superior Commander orders transport of an offender to Germany, par. IV is applicable. With regard to prisoners transported to Germany before the directives came into force, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces may apply Para. IV, subs. 3.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel.

Certification.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO L - 90

13 November 1945

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am Thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L - 90.

EVE GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371

H1157-0294

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-158
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Commander of the
Security Police and the
SD of the Radom District

IV A1 - No. 313/44 gRs.

Radom, 28 March 1944
TOP SECRET
11 Copies from the 26th Copy
4th Copy

The Commander of the
Security Police and
the SD of the Radom
District Branch Office.
Rec. 30 March 1944
Section IV A Journal
No. 11/44

To All
Branch Offices
(except Radom)
- sealed matter address -
and Section V.

Subject: Measures to be taken against escaped officer and non-commissioned officer P. O. Ws. who are exempt from work, with the exception of British and American P.O.Ws. on recapture.

On the 2.3.44. the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Berlin, forwarded the following O.K.W. order:

1. On recapture every escaped officer and non-working N.C.O. P.O.W., with the exception of British and American P.O.W.'s, no matter whether he escaped from a prisoners' convoy, during a mass escape or by himself, is to be handed over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, with the key word "Grade III (Stufe III)".

2. As the fact that P.O.W.'s are being handed over to the Sipo and SD must under no circumstances become known to outsiders, other P.O.W.s must not be informed of the recapture in any case. The Wehrmacht recaptured persons have "escaped and not been recaptured". Their mail should be dealt with accordingly. The same information should be given in reply to inquiries by the protecting power, the International Red Cross and other similar institutions.

3. Should escaped British and American officers or non-working N.C.O.'s be recaptured, they are temporarily to be placed under guard in the custody of the police, outside of the P.O.W. camp and out of sight of P.O.W's.
The decision as to whether or not they should be handed over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD is to be asked for immediately in each individual case by the "W.Kdos." from the OKW/C.J.C. Prisoners-of-War (Chef Kriegsgef.)"

In this connection the Chief of the Sipo and the SD has issued the following instructions:

1. The Stapo Leitstellen will take over from the camp commandants the escaped officers who have been recaptured and take them in accordance with the procedure hitherto in force, should circumstances not necessitate special transport, to the Mauthausen concentration camp. During the transport - not on the way to the station, if this could be seen by the public - the P.O.W's are to be chained. The camp commandant of Mauthausen is to be informed that the prisoners are being handed over under the operation "Bullet" (Kugel). the Stapo Leitstellen will make half-yearly reports, giving the numbers only, of the handing over of P.O.W's. The first will be made on the 5.7.44. The reports are to be made referring to: "Treatment under the operation "Kugel" of escaped officer P.O.W's who have been recaptured.

H1157-0295



Any special incidents have to be reported immediately. Detailed lists are to be maintained at the Stapo Leit-Stellen.

2. In the interests of camouflage the OKW has been asked to instruct P.O.W. camps not to send recaptured P.O.W's direct to Mauthausen but to hand them over to the local Stapostelle.

3. Should suitable Wehrmacht accomodations not be available escaped British and American officers and non-working N.C.O's who are recaptured should be placed in the custody of the police at a place where there is a Stapodienststelle. In view of the already overcrowded conditions in police prisons, these recaptured prisoners can only be taken over by the Stapo only if suitable Wehrmacht accommodations are actually unavailable. On receipt of this order contact should be made immediately with the Stalag commandants regarding accommodation. In the interests of keeping this order secret there can be no question of accommodating them outside police prisons, eigl in labor training camps.

4. If escaped officer and non-working N.C.O. prisoners-of-war, with the exception of British and American P.O.W's, are recaptured by police stations and it appears inopportune, they need not be handed over to the Stalag command after the findings have been established beyond doubt (nach eindwandfreier Klaerung des Sachverhaltes) for reasons of expediency. The Stalag should be informed of the recapture and asked to hand them over with the key words "Stufe III". Escaped British and American officers and non-working N.C.O's are always to be handed over to the Wehrmacht.

5. The local (Ort) and county (Kreis) police authorities are not to be informed of this order.

The list of the recaptured officers and non-working N.C.O. prisoners-of-war will be kept here by IV A1. To enable a report to be made punctually to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Berlin, statements of the numbers involved must reach Radom by the 20.6.44.

Signed: ILLNER (Typewritten)

Certified: MATHEI Clerk

DISTRIBUTION:

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| Konskie | - 1 | | - 11 |

23 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L - 158

I, Williard E. Skidmore, Lt. (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. L - 158.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg), USNR,
391590

H1157-0296

L. 172.

13182.

CONFIDENTIAL.

# THE STRATEGIC POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 5TH YEAR OF WAR.

A lecture delivered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces on the 7th November, 1943 at MUNICH to the Reich and Gau- Leaders.

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H1157-0297

1
Original

# The Strategic Position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War

Lecture
by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces to
the Reichs - and Gau- leaders, delivered
in MUNICH on 7 Nov 1943.

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## Introduction

Reichs leader BORMANN has requested me to give you a review to-day of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I untertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say what will be, but it is necessary to say openly what is. No-one - the FUEHRER has ordered - may know more or be told more than he needs for
2 own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as they call it - a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these gaus are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbilden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at
3. home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

## I

4 The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts :

H1157-0298

I A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II Consideration of the present situation.

III The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.

6. I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realise what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"), in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope wi this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indee what the Führer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

7. 2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being l on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victi to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

8. This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover or an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

9. 5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable/in himself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the courses taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said

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beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

age 10. 6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the EAST and that in view of the agreements with Russia the front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the WEST where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the RUHR area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the FUHRER had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim of which could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out - as originally planned - i.e. in the late autumn of 1939 - was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

age 11. 8. In the meantime however we were confronted by yet another proble which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. T point here lay in opening up a theatre of War which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed two-fold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place the was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the NORTH would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes, Secondly, it was realisation of our own maritime necessities which made imperative for us to secure for ourselves free access to the ATLANTIC by number of air and naval support points, here too, therefore, defensive a offensive requirements combined to form an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main it was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the WEST with the setting in of the most favourable season of the year, in May 1940.

age 12. 9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments - destined to do us important service in the furt course of the war - but above all the entire ATLANTIC Coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points Direct threat to the British Motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war in England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore - in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war - it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the ATLANTIC (for instance, Iceland and the AZORES on age 13. which in the meantime the enemy had laid his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactl the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment co not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41. provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our actio only took the form of aid to our Italian Ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which init turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern Flank of the European continent.

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In a measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, as North Africa became more and more a German theatre 14 of War. Employing our forces in this way - incidentally, no great force was involved - appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space".

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that Country.

15 12 Parallel with all these developments realisation was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.

13 Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE, this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

16 14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If to-day, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly under-estimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes'. But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for as long as possible there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war - the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of all hard tasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there 17 still remains much that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counter-blast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the fact of this danger and, sooner or later, had been taken by it by surprise.

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15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of TUNIS effected as a counter-measure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the NORTH and WEST coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

e 19. In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autumn of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later Allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the DONETZ, up to the gates of MOSCOW and up to the VOLKHOV created a wide forefield for the defence of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, provided the premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of this war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed and our superiority in the air was to make good, at all events in the coastal districts, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has
e 20. eluded us. The landing in England, prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shat the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the EAST however the natural catastrophe of the winter of 1941 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution.

(Passage struck out)

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side and thereby creating the possibility of seizing GIBRALTAR, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, SORANO SUNJER.

e 21 It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships +.

After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theatre of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this

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+ For - s ys CLAUSEWITZ - every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defence.

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Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the CAUCASUS and the DELTA of the NILE failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inddequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilise the front at STALINGRAD and before the CAUCASUS, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the VOLGA and along the DON - largely occupied moreover by the troops 22 of our Allies. The 6th Army, consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of EL ALAMEIN forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice.

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her Allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armoured Army and the 6th Army - but four allied armies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the EAST would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would not longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone was the great mobility of the Army and excepting on the Russian theatre of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of man-power, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all domains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to pass over to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the SOUTH had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: in the EAST to regain the territories lost there and in the SOUTH against Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime 24 the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and the Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large-scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

25

II

It was at this stage of the war thatthe Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press, Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the DUCE could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the FUEHRER from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our co-operation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuhrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards



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overthrowing the new Government and liberating the DUCE. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far SOUTH as possible, i.e. on SICILY.

26. That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further WEST in the Mediterranean - of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On SARDINIA, on CORSICA, in APULIA, in CALABRIA, or - if the thesis of betrayal were true - why not in ROME itself, or near LEGHORN or GENOA? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in order not to let the base of the enemy succeed in landing in North Italy, then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a
27 moral pretext for their betrayal, or by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of the betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were simply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the FUHRER. The measures to be taken in the event of open betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword "Axis" would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the FUHRER at once caused to be moved from the WEST to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there - and that at a time when the EAST front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our trc and through the bordering GAU'S - keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of machinations - in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparat
28. is known to you all. However somehow or other the Italians explained it all way, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

In this insupportable position the FUHRER agreed to slash thro the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at SALERNO and the afternoon of September 8th news of the Italian capitulation flew thr the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of actio of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What follow was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possibl gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction

General Outcome :

Appendix

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According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse/as speedily as possible.

Of the ntutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and we benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12 - 14 Infantry divisions, 3 - 4 armoured brigades, and in addition a few Motorist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the SKAGERRAK cut off Sweden's contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous - but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognise this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the ANGLO-SAXONS either for politieal or militaryreasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

TURKEY so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy : Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, the more England - in order to win the war - enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality - Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of the Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique'. She is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against BULGARIA.

32. Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the forces internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways.+) We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

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+ Translator's note : JODL says literally : "stands on 2 eyes".

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In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their most acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognised than in BUDAPEST. In that city a dissolute and strongly JUDAIFIED society strate is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contra distinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognised the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan : There a heroic people is fighting for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the AMUR or advance against VLADIVOSTOK. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the syren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at VLADIVOSTOK and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

VI

34 Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command to-day and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theatre of war to anotther in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. To-day this tactical advanta e of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons take steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time,
35 however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to distribute its forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong as those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the centre of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or another to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

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e 36.

It is at this point the various fronts, ce
nerves and decisions of the FUHRER. STEGEMANN c
as follows : "In war there is always the same con
between spending and saving the forces accumulate
still is a problem not easy to solve. War with
its intangible dynamics and its fluctuations of
be determined beforehand. He who expends everyt
may later on, as the result of circumstances, be
and he who expends his accumulated forces sparin
of circumstances, never come to win the upper han
able to solve this problem is able to master war.
has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done
with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in
war has never failed."

ge 37

Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has jumping-off base in the Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theatre of war can be weakened below a certain level. Our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done (Appendix).

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war : the interplay and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures (Appendix).

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the FUHRER at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure : it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

ge 38

This dilemma of man-power shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the man-power reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labour, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favourable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take steps with remorseless vigour and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France and Belgium also to compel thousands of idlesto carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

ge 39

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and scepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered+) only by Russians".

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+) In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated'. This has been scratched out in favour of 'conquered'.

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Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense VLASJOV army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. To-day only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack e 40 and one TURKMEN division are at the moment undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichsführer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem and Macedonian manpower supplies.

However, what weighs most heavily to-day on the home front and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war - and this cannot be repeated often enough - has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.

The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and material, is such that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they - like any other great trouble - has had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the 41 petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the FUHRER and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnings and first fruits are there. We shall counter the heavy and powerful armament of the 4 engined bombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavouring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute certainty in all day and night raids to lose 10 - 12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it. I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their fate.

Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right since within the framework of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the 42 superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, set backs which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defence measures which the opponent has been 44 driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and new highly efficient detector equipment together with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to

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any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.

e 44 On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the almost resolution, with a view to breaking the enemy defence and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.

There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war.

For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.

e 45 VII

III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory.

When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterise directly by the aphorism from FONTAINE :

> "Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing."

e 46 In particular however our confidence is built up on a period of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which gives its impress to the general attitude of the German people in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also unables our brave troops to achieve feats in defence and in retreat according to plan such perhaps the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopia any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.

e 47 As against this moral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means from a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery of our Italian ally. Where they have met German force in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the WEST which their Russian allies have been demanding for over two years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.

H1157-0309

Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents whether in the NORTH or WEST, in Italy or in the Balkans - will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.

46 My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his though animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.

That no command is free of errors has often been said by the FUHRER himself, moreover the history of war - to use an aphorism of SCHLIEFFEN's - consists in general only of a series of errors and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.

49 What matters ultimately is contant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.

Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from CLAUSEWITZ which is not very generally known has been found true; "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."

It behoves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faint heartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.

50 How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is that we shall never cease to fight, for through the history of the world there run, like an iron law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led and at the head of Europe - Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.

At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,

- That our trust and faith in the FUHRER is boundless.

H1157-0310

- that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people.

51

- that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.

- that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute.

- that we do cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall.

- that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.

- that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.

Exhibit #s 161
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

Translation

L 211.

Copy

Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 647/38 Top Secret.

Berlin, 19 April 1938.

3 copies
2nd copy

Top Secret for Commanders only.

DIRECTION OF WAR AS A PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION.

Considered opinion of OKW on the memo submitted by C-in-C of the Army entitled "The Organization of the Direction of the Armed Forces" (C-in-C Army No. 93/38 of 7.3.38)

CONTENTS


a) Organization of the direction of war

b) Organization of the direction of the Armed Forces

c) Direction of the Armed Forces in the leading military states.

Appendix: What is the war of the future ?


APPENDIX

WHAT IS THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ?

War in its total form is a forceful dispute with all means between two or more states.

Despite all attempts to outlaw it, war is still a law of nature which may be channelled but not eliminated. It serves the survival of the race and state or the assurance of its historical future.

This high moral purpose gives war its total character and its ethical justification.

It lifts war above the purely political act or merely a military duel for economic advantage.

Men and materials employed, gain and loss have risen to unprecedented levels. Not only damage, but annihilation threatens a people at the end of a lost war.

Thus the war of today becomes a state emergency and a battle for survival for everyone.

Since everyone stands to win or lose everything, everyone must risk all.

Thus universal military service expands to become total war mobilization for all.

This means the end of all purely personal activity for the duration of the war. All outward forms of public and private life are forced into the one main theme: "The achievement of victory."

The functions of the war leadership step into the place of individual or team achievements.

The war leadership is bound by a few basic laws; but the means at its disposal change and multiply.

Thus even the forms and methods of war leadership are subject to change.

The Air Force has joined the Army and Navy as the third service. Its far-reaching effect has greatly widened the earlier concept of the theatre of war.

The war will cause immediate suffering to an entire area and its population in accordance with that country's geopolitical situation.

War is conducted by all means; not only with weapons but also with the means of propaganda and economics.

It is directed against the enemy's armed forces, against the sources of his material strength and the spiritual strength of the people. The leitmotiv of war leadership must be: "Necessity is the mother of invention."



H1157-0311

H1157-0312



Nevertheless the most decisive factor for victory is even today conquest by force of arms. The needs of the Armed forces for gaining this are paramount.

If the armed forces of an enemy are destroyed, then usually his other means of warfare also become weak or ineffective.

In Germany's position victory or defeat of the army will be most decisive for the winnign or the loss of the war.

Victory or defeat of the army may however be decisively influenced by the success or failure of naval and air operations.

The longer the struggle for military victory endures and the longer the opposing military powers balance each other, the more decisive become the effects of psychological and economic warfare.

These (types of warfare) may lead to the decomposition of an enemy people or to the exhaustion of his sources of strength. In this way they may cause the collapse of an enemy nation which is not internally united or which is economically dependent on a foreign country. This collapse may thus come without a decisive victory of arms or armed victory may be made possible by these means.

The forms of beginning a war and the actual outbreak of hostilities will change with time.

The state, armed forces and the people will be brought to the highest possible level of war preparedness before the official mobilization has been released.

Surprise which must be the premise for quick initial success will often require hostilities to begin before mobilization has been completed or the armies are fully in position.

A declaration of war is no longer necessarily the first step at the start of a war.

The normal rules of war towards neutral nations may be considered to apply only on the basis of whether the operation of these rules will create greater advantages or disadvantages for the warring nations.

Only the singleness and unity of state, armed forces and people can assure success in war.

The primary and most difficult assignment of the national leadership will be to preserve this unity despite the collossal demands which war makes on all citizens. No home front sacrifice is too great if it gives the armed forces victory in the struggle of arms.

The armed forces however have their roots in the people. From them it gathers its material and spiritual strength.

Thus the forces, the home front and the people are woven into an inseparable whole by their reciprocal effect.

H1157-0313

Exhibit ~~USA~~ GB 163
Filed Jan 9, 1946

U.K.20.
B.W.C.E.(E) Det/21 A.Gp/VI/6

Translation of a copy of a directive signed by KEITEL dealing with the treatment to be accorded to the relatives of French P.W. captured whilst fighting for the Russians.

SECRET.
COPY.

High Command of the Armed Forces. Fuehrer's H.Q. 26 May 1943.

Nr.002106/43 g.K./WFSt/Qu.(Verw) 20 copies
Copy No. 8.

Ref: treatment of supporters of de GAULLE who fight for the Russians.

French airmen serving in the Soviet forces have been shot down on the Eastern Front for the first time. The Fuehrer has ordered that employment of French troops in the Soviet forces is to be counteracted by the strongest means.

It is therefore ordered:-

1) Supporters of de GAULLE who are taken prisoner on the Eastern Front will be handed over to the French Government for proceedings in accordance with OKW Order/WR/I/3 Nr. 4697/40 of 6 Dec 40.

2) All instances of this type will be collected and be used for exerting political pressure on the French Government, which is responsible, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, for preventing members of the French forces from leaving France.

Steps to be taken against the French Government are being prepared by OKW/A.Abt.I/Abw.(Abt.I) in conjunction with the Foreign Office.

3) Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases against relatives of Frenchmen who fight for the Russians, if these relatives are resident in the occupied area of France. If the investigation reveals that relatives have given assistance to facilitate escape from France then severe measures are to be taken.

OKW/WR is making the necessary preparations with the Military Commander on the spot, and with the S.S. and Police chief.

Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces
(signed) KEITEL
Certified correct
Lt.Col.G.S.

Certified correct copy.
(Signature)
Capt.

Distribution etc.

I certify that the above is an accurate translation of the German document.

signed. D.A. Godden. Major.
D.A.A.G.

B.W.C.E.(E) Det,
Att J.A.G. Branch,
H.Q. 21 Army Gp,

6 Aug 45.

H1157-0314

Exhibit GB 164
Filed Jan. 9, 1946
U.K. 57.

Reference : Certificate No. D 77.

dated 17 Sep. 1945 signed by me.

Place. H.Q. B.A.O.R.

17 Sep. 1945.
date.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, A. G. Wurmser, Capt., R.E. British Army hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English, French and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation, made under my supervision, into the English language from the German language, of the documents (~~or excerpts therefrom as indicated~~) attached to, and referred to in the Certificate dated 17 Sep. 1945. bearing No D 77 signed by me.

(signed) A.G. Wurmser.
Capt.,R.E.

+ To be used where excerpts only are translated and to be struck out when entire document is translated.

H1157-0315



UK 57.

NOT VIA REGISTRY

Amt Ausland/Abwehr
Ag Ausland Nr. 17/44 gKdos I B2

4.1.1944

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

Note Chief High Mil Command.

We want documents on basis of which we can institute similar proceedings.
They are reprisals which have no connection with battle actions.
Legal indications are superflous

2 copies
of which this copy
is certified correct.

(signed) REICHEL.

8.1.
To be submitted
to the Chief, High Mil. Command.

via
Chief Foreign Direct/Security.

Memorandum.

Re counteraction to KHARKOV show trial

In compliance with orders received the following steps have so far been taken.

1. "The army dept for investigations of infringement" at WR has, since 1940 been carefully collecting all documentary evidence through which breaches of International Law by the enemy up to the present have been placed on record. This evidence has been thoroughly checked by means of interrogation under oath of the participating soldiers. A systematic survey of this material has already been presented to WFSt by the Foreign Dept in 1942.

On going through the material for the present purpose (counteraction KHARKOV) it has been found, however, that in none of the cases detailed information about the participants is available. It therefore only remains:

a) To ascertain, in conjunction with the General Staff of the Army, which troop formations were present on the enemy's side at the time of the ascertained breaches of International Law.
b) To ask the Chief POW organisations to ascertain whether any POW from troop formations used at the time are in German hands.

This information has been handed over to the Chief POW Organisation and Investigation is in progress.

The events in Crete, at Dieppe and in N. Africa have been brought into the scope of the investigations. The collecting of further evidence is costing a great deal of time owing to the large distances between the Service depts. concerned.

2. The documents referred to "Commandos" have been collected by the Reich Security HQ and thoroughly investigated. In five cases members of the British Armed Forces have been arrested as participants. In accordance with the order of the Fuehrer they were thereupon shot. The possibility would exist that breaches of International Law could not be attributed to them and they could be posthumuously sentenced to death by the way of the courts. Up to the present no breaches of International Law can be proved against the Commando participants. The documentary material to hand is therefore, correspondingly poor: further material has been asked for. When this has been received and examined it will be passed on to the Armed Forces Legal Dept. and a further report submitted.

Signed : R

H1157-0316



UK 57.

NOT VIA REGISTRY

Amt Ausland/Abwehr
Ag Ausland Nr. 17/44 gKdos I B2

4.1.1944

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

Note Chief High Mil Command.

We want documents on basis of which we can institute similar proceedings.
They are reprisals which have no connection with battle actions.
Legal indications are superflous

2 copies
of which this copy
is certified correct.

(signed) REICHEL.

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to the Chief, High Mil, Command.

via
Chief Foreign Direct/Security.

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The events in Crete, at Dieppe and in N. Africa have been brought into the scope of the investigations. The collecting of further evidence is costing a great deal of time owing to the large distances between the Service depts. concerned.

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Signed : R

226.

H1157-0317



NOT VIA REGISTRY

Foreign Dept. of Defence. OU 6.1.1944
Foreign Directorate / Security 5 copies
Foreign Dept. No 17/44 VERY SECRET DOCUMENT 1 copy
Foreign I B2 (a Aug).

SECRET COMMAND MATTER. High Army Command
Army Operational Staff
Communications Station
12 Jan 1944

2. REPORT MEMORANDUM

To Chief
High Command
via
Chief For. Direct./Sec.

Re. Counteraction to KHARKOV SHOW TRIAL

In pursuance of the orders received the following "Commando" cases have been established up to the present :

1.) Guerilla activities in North Africa.

a) 1st Lieut Michael ALEXANDER, born 20 Nov 20

b) Cpl GURNEY, born 8 Feb 19, in London (Volume 6)

were landed on 15 Aug 42 in North Africa together with sabotage commando. After blowing up several ammunition dumps and splinter proof walls they surprised Cpl SEEMANN and 3 soldiers in their tent on the morning of 16 Aug 42, bound them, rendered an MG useless and took 2 German army pistols and two German army forage caps with them. For this attack A and G were only dressed in khaki coloured shirts and trousers and wore no head gear. Cpl G was wearing an English web belt with a canvas pistol pouch whilst 1st Lieut A was wearing a German pistol pouch made of black leather. During his flight after the raid A put on the German tropical cap which he had taken with him. The attacked Cpl SEEMANN found him a few hours later hidden in a sand pit under a straw mat and took him prisoner.

Proceedings for guerilla activities have been brought before the Reich Court Martial by order of the Fuehrer (sheet 29) and the charge sheet (sheet 6) has been brought before the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs (sheet 37). Proceedings have been temporarily suspended by order of the Chief OKW (sheet 43/46).

The accused are at present in the EICHSTADT/BAVARIA camp as ordinary POWs (sheet 22).

Distribution.)
Chief Sect Gen Armed
Forces Matters, Personally
Chief, POW Inspection
Chief, Armed Forces
Legal Section

2.) Attempted attacks on the battleship TIRPITZ.

At the end of October 42 a British Commando that had come to NORWAY in a cutter had orders to carry out an attack on the battleship TIRPITZ in DRONTHEIM FJORD by means of a two-man torpedoe. The action failed since both torpedoes which were attached to the cutter were lost in the stormy sea. From amongst the crew consisting of 6 Englishmen and 4 Norwegians a party of 3 Englishmen and 2 Norwegians were challenged on the Swedish border. However, only the British seaman Robert Paul EVANS born 14 Jan 22 at London, could be arrested, the others escaped into Sweden.

H1157-0318



EVANS had a pistol pouch in his possession such as are used to carry weapons under the arm-pit and also a knuckle-duster. Violence, representing a breach of International Law could not be proved. He has made extensive statements about the operation. In accordance with the Fuehrer's order (sheet 15 and 53) he was shot on 19 Jan 42.

3). Blowing up of the GLOMFJORD Power Station.

On 16 Sep 42 10 Englishmen and 2 Norwegians landed on the Norwegian coast dressed in the uniform of the British Mountain Rifle Regt. heavily armed and equipped with explosives of every description. After negotiating difficult mountain country they blew up important installations in the power station GLOMFJORD on 21 Sep 42. The German sentry was shot dead on that occasion. Norwegian workmen were threatened that they would be chloroformed should they resist. For this purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphia syringes. Several of the participants have been arrested whilst the others escaped into Sweden (sheet 173).

Those arrested are:-

Capt Graeme BLACK, born 9 May 11 in Dresden.
Capt Joseph HOUGHTON, born 13 Jun 11 at Bromborough.
Top Sgt Miller SMITH, born 2 Nov 15 at Middlesborough.
Cpl William CHUDLEY, born 10 May 22 at Exeter.
Rfn Reginald MAKEHAM, born 28 Jan 14 at Ipswich.
Rfn Cyril ABRAM, born 20 Aug 22 in London.
Rfn Eric CURTIS, born 24 Oct 21 in London.

They were shot on 30 Oct 42 (sheet 124).

A number of reports about this sabotage operation have been circulated by the English and neutral press and radio in which the capture of 7 Englishmen (sheet 114, 115, 127, 162, 163) and their shackling was mentioned.

4) The sabotage attack against German ships off BORDEAUX.

On 12 Dec 42 a number of valuable German ships off BORDEAUX were seriously damaged by explosives below water-level. The adhesive mines had been fixed by 5 English sabotage gangs working from canoes. From amongst the 10 participants the following were arrested after a few days:

KINNON, Mac Naval Lieut born 15 Jul 21 N.Argyleshire,British.
LAVER, Albert Friedrich,P/O, born 29 Sep 20.Birkenhead,British.
MILLS, William Henry, Marine, born 15 Dec 21. Kettering,British.
WALLACE, Samuel, Sgt, born 24 Sep 13, Dublin/Eire, Irish.
CONWAY, James, Marine, born 28 Aug 22, Stockport, British.
EWART, Robert, Marine, born 4 Dec 21, Glasgow, British.

A seventh soldier named MOFFET was found drowned, the remainder apparently escaped into Spain.

Participants proceeded in pairs from a submarine in canoes upstream into the mouth of the River GIRONDE. They were wearing olive grey special uniforms. After effecting the explosionsthey sank the boats and ettempted to escape into SPAIN in civilian clothes and with the assistance of the French civil population. No special criminal actions during the flight have been discovered. All the arrested, in accordance with orders were shot on 23 Mar 43. The investigations into three further "Commando" cases have not yet been completed.

Signed : REICHEL.

H1157-0319



ABSCHRIFT.

VO Foreign/Ic

FHQ 9.1.1944
Fuehrer's HQs.

The Chief OKW has handed the Deputy Chief WSSt the enclosed letter with the following remarks:-

It is of no importance to prove breaches of International Law is documentary fashion, what is important, however, is the collection of material which can be used for presentation of a show trial from a propaganda point of view. A show trial, as such, is therefore, not meant to take place but merely a propaganda presentation of cases of breaches of International Law by enemy soldiers who will be mentioned by name and who have either already been punished with death for their crimes or are awaiting the death penalty.

Chief OKW asks the Chief of the Foreign Dept. to bring with him corresponding documents for his next visit to the Fuehrer's HQ.

Signed: KRUMMACHER.

H1157-0320

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

Dir.Security - Abr. Abw. III
No. 2778/44/54 gKdos (C2)

O.U. 21 April 1944
4 Copies
1 Copy.

Reference: Countermeasures to Soviet Russia's Show Trials.

References:- 1. WFSt/Qu 2 No 003205/44 g Kdos v. 27.3.44. Armed Forces Op. Staff/Quarters. Very Secret document.
2. First Report Memo. under same No. of 4.4.44.
3. Second Report Memo. under same No. of 11.4.44.

3. Report Memorandum
for
Chief, High Mil. Command

1. The final figures of the cases concerned (persons) is 97, of which 52 are officers. Amongst these there is one English Brigadier-General, one American Colonel and eight British Majors. Distribution of the 97 cases can be seen from the following two summaries:

OFFICERS

| British | American | Taken | | Still living ? | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | After middle of 1943 | Before middle of 1943 | Yes | No | Not yet ascertained |
| 47 | 5 | 39 | 13 | 44 | 7 | 1 |

SOLDIERS below the rank of Corporal

| British | American | Taken | | Still living ? | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | After middle of 1943 | Before middle of 1943 | Yes | No | Not yet ascertained |
| 32 | 13 | 25 | 20 | 19 | 24 | 2 |

The British operation for the organisation of Albanian Units ( 4 officers and 3 ORs), which was originally omitted from the second report, is included herein.

From the material to hand, regarding Anglo-American soldiers (ORs), only those cases have been considered which have taken part in a joint operation with officers, whilst ORs alone have only be considered in 2 particularly suitable cases.

Over and above the 97 cases there are reports of cases regarding a further 8 English officers who, according to the records in hand, cannot be regarded as absolutely suitable, but which, should the occasion arise, could be used after suitable treatment, furthermore, 3 cases of English officers of Danish nationality.

It has not been possible to consider the case of an English murder plot against leading persons of the Dutch National Socialist Movement, dealt with in the first report memorandum. According to information from the Reich Security Department it has been established that an American citizen who has been arrested, has been proved to be a participant, but it has not been clarified up to the present whether or not he is a soldier. A separate report will be submitted.

2. A list of the 97 cases, with names, is contained in the attached folder. The 8 cases which are not necessarily regarded as suitable, and the 3 cases of English officers of Danish nationality, are listed in Appendix I.

230.

H1157-0321



3. The Cases of ill treatment, shackling or killing of German POWs or wounded German soldiers (El Alamein, Dieppe and Crete) and where direct guilt cannot be proven, are compiled in Appendix II. They are not contained in the number of 97 cases.

4. The Foreign Office, for the reason that they must be included in the preparation of the proposed counter measures, has asked for the total material for their examination. We should like to have your decision as to whether this request is to be complied with.

p.p. Martin.

End I Folder.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

The following notes in pencil appear upon this document :-

(a) In mauve pencil - initialled by G. KEITEL.

"For examination by Wm. Fuhrungs St. abroad".

"To be kept by W.F.St. (Liaison offr. abroad)"

(b) In blue pencil at bottom of page initialled by JODL.

L.O. Abroad to take action. : I must point out the danger of leaving these prisoners in Paris or Brussels. They must be brought to Germany. J.

Filed Jan. 5 1946
Keitel.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

H-1157

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK

No. 57 (ENGLISH)

WILHELM KEITEL

ALFRED JODL

7

Keitel - Jodl

H1157-0322